David L. Morrison v. Magic Carpet Aviation

Citations: 383 F.3d 1253; 9 Wage & Hour Cas.2d (BNA) 1569; 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 18908; 85 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 41,789; 2004 WL 1970052Docket: 03-15340

Court: Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit; September 8, 2004; Federal Appellate Court

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David L. Morrison, a pilot for Magic Carpet Aviation, claims his supervisor, Harry Mitchel, violated the Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA) by allowing him only two weeks off for depression instead of the requested four weeks, leading to his termination. Morrison sued Mitchel and three entities: Magic Carpet, Amway Corporation (Magic Carpet’s parent), and RDV Sports, Inc., which had a contractual relationship with Magic Carpet. The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants, ruling that they lacked the requisite number of employees—at least 50 within a 75-mile radius—for FMLA applicability. It found that while Magic Carpet and Amway were joint employers, they did not meet the employee threshold, and RDV Sports was not considered Morrison's employer under the FMLA. 

On appeal, Morrison contested the ruling regarding RDV Sports' employer status. The appellate court employs a plenary review for summary judgments, applying a de novo standard to legal conclusions while viewing facts favorably to the nonmovant. The determination of RDV’s employer status involves a mixed question of fact and law, assessed under criteria such as the location of employment, control exerted by the alleged employer, and the alleged employer's authority to hire or fire employees. The court indicated that RDV did not qualify as Morrison’s employer based on these factors, particularly the lack of hiring or firing authority.

RDV Sports, as a significant client of Magic Carpet, had influence over employment decisions but lacked the authority to hire or fire employees directly. The distinction between client pressure and employer status is emphasized. The analysis of whether Morrison's worksite belonged to his employer questions if mere leasehold interest suffices for ownership, suggesting that a lessee can be considered an employer for purposes of the Welch test. Morrison's worksite was the Boeing airplane he flew, leased by Magic Carpet, which in turn had a timeshare agreement with Orlando Magic, Ltd. (owned by RDV). This agreement classified as a lease but restricted RDV’s control over the airplane and crew, granting Magic Carpet operational control over all aspects of the flights.

The district court concluded that RDV's role did not equate to meaningful control over Morrison’s worksite, thus failing the first prong of the Welch test. The second prong, concerning the extent of control, raised further doubts, particularly as evidence presented by Morrison, such as gifts and perks from RDV, was deemed irrelevant to establishing control under the Welch criteria. Although these facts might suggest an employment relationship in a general sense, they did not satisfy the specific standards of the Welch test. The court noted it was bound by the prior precedent rule and could not deviate from established interpretations of employment under Welch, regardless of any potential critiques of its applicability.

Morrison's argument for establishing control by RDV hinges on his requirement to wear an RDV identification badge and specific apparel; however, the district court found insufficient evidence that RDV, rather than Magic Carpet, mandated these requirements. This lack of direct control suggests that Morrison was more likely an employee of Magic Carpet, which operated as an independent contractor. Citing several cases, the court highlighted that indirect control through contractual relationships does not create an employment relationship, referencing the agreements that explicitly confer control over crew members to Magic Carpet. Additionally, despite Morrison's obligations, such as attending RDV orientation and being listed in RDV's directory, these factors do not substantiate an employment relationship under the relevant legal framework. Morrison did not raise an employment-by-estoppel argument, which the court deemed waived. Moreover, Morrison's claim that RDV was part of an "integrated employer" with Amway and Magic Carpet was unsupported, as he failed to provide evidence for common management or interrelation of operations, indicating that any reliance on Amway was not indicative of a direct connection. Consequently, the court affirmed its decision that RDV is not Morrison’s employer.

Morrison's claim of centralized control over labor relations is insufficiently supported, as his attendance at an employee orientation at RDV does not demonstrate integration between RDV and Magic Carpet. The only aspect Morrison substantiates is the common ownership by the DeVos family of both Amway and RDV; however, this alone does not legally establish that they operate as a single entity for FMLA purposes. The district court correctly determined that RDV was not Morrison’s integrated employer. Additionally, Morrison's assertion that RDV, Amway, and Magic Carpet were joint employers is unsupported. The Department of Labor defines joint employment as situations where employers share or interchange an employee's services or exert control over the employee. Despite a timeshare agreement, Morrison was solely a pilot for Magic Carpet, and RDV did not exert direct control over him or Magic Carpet. Thus, the joint employer test is inapplicable. Morrison's additional arguments are merely reiterations of previous points and lack merit, leading to the affirmation of the district court's judgment in its entirety.