Hulgan v. City of Guntersville (Ex parte City of Guntersville)

Citation: 238 So. 3d 1243Docket: 1151214

Court: Supreme Court of Alabama; May 26, 2017; Alabama; State Supreme Court

Lead Opinion SummaryLead Opinion Original

EnglishEspañolSimplified EnglishEspañol Fácil

The City of Guntersville seeks a writ of mandamus from the Court to compel the Marshall Circuit Court to vacate its order denying the City’s motion for summary judgment in a case brought by Margaret Hulgan. The City operates Civitan Park, designated for public recreation without charging fees, per the deed stipulations. On July 4, 2012, during the City’s fireworks show, Hulgan attended and was driven to the park by Leroy Windsor, who parked in a lot where vertical poles, intended to prevent vehicle access to the grassy area, were present. Notably, there was no steel cabling between the poles on that day. 

While walking to a pavilion, Hulgan passed by a pole and a diagonal crossbar, which she later tripped over while returning to the parking lot after the fireworks. She described the lighting as poor, although sufficient to see her path, and acknowledged that she likely would have seen the crossbar had she looked. Following the fall, she sustained injuries to her right shoulder. The case involves differing expert opinions regarding the visibility of the crossbar and its associated dangers, along with Hulgan’s long history of attending the City’s fireworks shows.

Hulgan testified that she regularly watched the annual fireworks show from the pavilion at Civitan Park, provided the pavilion was unoccupied upon her arrival. She submitted an affidavit from Thomas E. Cooper, a professional engineer, who inspected the diagonal crossbar where she allegedly tripped and deemed the lighting and ingress/egress route dangerous at the time of her fall. David Wood, the City’s parks and recreation maintenance supervisor, stated that the crossbar had been in place for over 19 years and that the City was unaware of any nighttime trip hazards before Hulgan's incident, noting that no complaints about the crossbar had been received during his employment.

On June 30, 2014, Hulgan sued the City for negligence, asserting that the City had a duty to prevent unreasonably dangerous conditions on its property and had breached that duty recklessly. She contended that the crossbar constituted a hidden danger, arguing that the City was not entitled to immunity under the recreational-use statutes. The City responded on July 16, 2014, claiming immunity under the recreational-use statutes and Alabama Code § 11-47-190. Following a motion for summary judgment filed by the City on June 14, 2016, which was denied by the circuit court on August 24, 2016, the City sought a writ of mandamus to compel the court to vacate its denial and grant summary judgment in its favor. The standard of review for such a mandamus proceeding includes criteria that establish a clear legal right, an imperative duty, lack of another adequate remedy, and proper court jurisdiction.

Recreational-use statutes grant immunity to qualifying landowners, as established in cases like Tuders v. Kell and Owens v. Grant. The City asserts it has a legal right to immunity from Hulgan's claims under these statutes. The relevant law, outlined in Ex parte City of Geneva, defines the duties of landowners regarding recreational land use, stating they owe no duty to users except in cases of willful or malicious failure to warn about dangerous conditions. Article 2 of the statutes, applicable to noncommercial public recreational land, provides even greater protections by limiting landowners' liability. Specifically, it states that landowners who permit non-commercial public recreational use do not have to ensure the safety of the land, warn of dangers, or assume liability for injuries related to its use.

Hulgan does not dispute the applicability of these statutes but argues that she presented evidence satisfying the conditions of Section 35-15-24, which creates an exception to the immunity provided in Sections 35-15-22 and -23. This section specifies that immunity does not apply if the landowner has actual knowledge of a dangerous condition that poses an unreasonable risk and chooses not to take action to warn or guard against it.

The test in subsection (a) excludes constructive knowledge as a basis for owner liability and does not impose a duty to inspect outdoor recreational land. Hulgan bears the burden to prove, with substantial evidence, that the exception in 35-15-24 applies. The conjunctive "and" in 35-15-24(a)(1-4) necessitates that all elements must be satisfied. The City contends that Hulgan has not demonstrated substantial evidence of actual knowledge required under 35-15-24(a)(2), arguing it lacked notice that the diagonal crossbar posed an unreasonable risk of death or serious bodily harm. Although the City acknowledges awareness of the crossbar's existence, it asserts that Hulgan has not shown that the City knew it was dangerous. The City supports its claim with Wood's affidavit, stating no complaints had been received regarding the crossbar's danger in nearly 20 years, and it was unaware of any nighttime trip hazard. Conversely, Hulgan argues that Cooper's affidavit indicates the crossbar was unreasonably dangerous, but this is merely an opinion and does not establish actual knowledge. Consequently, the evidence does not counter Wood's testimony, leading to the conclusion that Hulgan failed to provide substantial evidence for 35-15-24(a)(2) and cannot maintain her action against the City.

Hulgan claims she provided substantial evidence under Ala. Code 1975 § 35-15-24(a)(4) that the City failed to guard against an unreasonable risk of serious harm presented by a diagonal crossbar where she tripped. She asserts that the City consciously removed a steel cable that previously prevented access between fence poles and had actual knowledge that the cable was gone, as well as the absence of warnings regarding the crossbar. However, even assuming Hulgan's evidence met the requirements of § 35-15-24(a)(4), she has not connected this evidence to the necessity of proving the City's actual knowledge as required by § 35-15-24(a)(2). The court notes that Hulgan did not provide evidence indicating the City was aware that the crossbar posed an unreasonable risk of harm. Consequently, the City has demonstrated a clear legal right to immunity under the recreational-use statutes from Hulgan's claims, as she did not meet her evidentiary burden for the elements set forth in § 35-15-24. The court grants the City's petition, vacating the lower court's denial of summary judgment and directing entry of summary judgment for the City. The discussion also references established principles of constructive knowledge regarding premises liability, emphasizing the City's challenge to Hulgan's claims about the cable's existence and its removal.