Royal E. Claybrook, Jr., Gwannette Claybrook, Petrece Claybrook, Co-Administrators of the Estate of Royal Claybrook, Sr., and Quintana Claybrook v. Jesse Birchwell, Steve Lewis, Ken Spencer, Robert Kirchner, and Metropolitan Government of Nashville & Davidson County
Docket: 98-6029
Court: Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit; January 10, 2000; Federal Appellate Court
The case involves plaintiffs Royal E. Claybrook Jr., Gwannette Claybrook, Petrece Claybrook, and Quintana Claybrook, who are appealing the dismissal of their complaint against defendants Jesse Birchwell, Steve Lewis, Ken Spencer, Robert Kirchner, and the Metropolitan Government of Nashville. The plaintiffs allege that the officers used excessive force in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, resulting in the death of Royal Claybrook Sr. and serious injuries to Quintana Claybrook. They also claim that Chief Kirchner failed to train or supervise the officers adequately and did not implement guidelines to prevent the unlawful use of lethal force.
The district court ruled that the children lacked standing to claim personal losses from their father's death and did not represent his estate for constitutional injuries. It further determined that Quintana had not experienced a discernible constitutional tort.
On February 28, 1995, undercover officers Birchwell, Lewis, and Spencer were conducting surveillance in a high-crime area when they observed Royal Claybrook Sr. displaying a firearm near the F. J Market. Believing a robbery was in progress, Officer Birchwell reported the situation to headquarters and requested a marked police cruiser. As he attempted to maneuver their unmarked vehicle to maintain a covert observation of the suspect and a suspicious gray Maxima, he realized there was no adjacent roadway, prompting him to reposition the vehicle.
A gunman, Claybrook, acted as a security guard for his daughter-in-law, Quintana Claybrook, while she was inside a gray Maxima at a market involved in illegal gambling. On February 28, 1995, when unmarked police arrived, Quintana was seated in the car with her back to the officers, who were unaware of her presence. An officer ordered Claybrook to drop his weapon; he refused, prompting a chaotic exchange. Quintana heard a noise she likened to a firecracker, felt pain in her back, and realized she had been shot. She attempted to call 911 and then her husband to report an armed robbery while remaining crouched in the vehicle.
During the ensuing shootout, Claybrook fired at the officers, hitting their cruiser. The officers claimed Claybrook shot first, while he continued to engage them after they identified themselves as police. Officer Birchwell was injured and called for backup. Claybrook attempted to ambush the officers from behind the market but was ultimately shot down by the police as he aimed his weapon at them. The entire confrontation lasted just one to two minutes.
Claybrook sustained a fatal head injury and was pronounced dead at the scene, while Quintana was found seriously injured and transported to Vanderbilt University Hospital for emergency care and extended treatment. On February 12, 1996, the plaintiffs filed a complaint in district court under section 1983 and Tennessee law. Count one claimed that Royal Jr., Gwannette, and Petrece Claybrook, as heirs of their deceased father, experienced injuries due to the alleged civil rights violations by three police officers. Count two sought recovery from Robert Kirchner, the CEO of the Nashville-Davidson County Metropolitan Police Department, for failing to adequately train, supervise the officers, and implement sufficient policies regarding the use of deadly force. Count three advanced claims by Quintana and her husband against the officers for infringing her civil rights, while count four reiterated Quintana's claims against Kirchner based on similar allegations as count two. Count five involved state law tort claims against the officers.
Each of Claybrook’s children sought $125,000 in actual damages and an equal amount in punitive damages from each defendant. Quintana requested $250,000 in compensatory damages and the same in punitive damages from each defendant. The plaintiffs also sought attorney fees under 42 U.S.C. 1988(b), a declaration of civil rights violations, and an injunction for police reform regarding deadly force policies. After the defendants answered the original complaint, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint on May 23, 1996, which reiterated and modified previous counts, clarifying that Claybrook's children were pursuing claims as representatives of their father's estate for his constitutional deprivations.
Count one of the amended complaint alleged that the officers violated Claybrook Sr.'s civil rights under multiple constitutional amendments, including unlawful arrest and excessive force, while count two claimed Kirchner's negligence in policy development and officer training contributed to these violations.
The amended complaint asserted the parent-child relationship of Claybrook to Royal Jr., Gwannette, and Petrece, who are co-administrators of the Estate of Royal E. Claybrook, Sr. The plaintiffs claimed they incurred medical and funeral expenses and experienced emotional distress due to the defendants' wrongful acts leading to their father's death. Their Prayer for Relief sought personal compensatory and punitive damages for each plaintiff and collective equitable relief, but did not explicitly request relief for the Estate itself. The district court granted the defendants' motions for dismissal and/or summary judgment on July 1, 1998, prompting the plaintiffs to file a timely appeal on July 20, 1998.
In the Sixth Circuit, a section 1983 claim is personal to the direct victim, meaning only the victim or their estate's representative can bring such a claim. The court determined that the plaintiffs, despite being co-administrators, were seeking compensation for personal losses rather than on behalf of their father's estate, leading to the dismissal of counts one and two for lack of standing. However, upon de novo review, it was found that the plaintiffs' amended complaint, when liberally construed, did adequately request damages for their father's alleged constitutional injuries in their capacity as representatives of his estate.
Certain allegations in the amended complaint suggest that Claybrook's children experienced personal losses due to the defendants' infringement on their decedent's constitutional rights. However, these allegations are considered surplusage, as the plaintiffs clearly assert their role as co-administrators of Claybrook's estate and claim that the defendants' actions deprived Claybrook of his civil rights. Therefore, the district court's dismissal of counts one and two for failure to state a claim, based on the assertion that the plaintiffs did not seek recovery for their deceased parent's injuries, was legally erroneous. Consequently, the dismissals are reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings.
In contrast, the district court found that counts three and four lack sufficient evidentiary support. Count three alleges that defendants Birchwell, Lewis, and Spencer are jointly and severally liable to Quintana Claybrook for violating her civil rights under various amendments of the U.S. Constitution, including rights related to unlawful arrest and excessive force. Count four claims that Robert Kirchner is liable to Quintana Claybrook for failing to implement proper policies and training to protect her rights.
Quintana contests the trial court's dismissal of her substantive due process claim under the Fourteenth Amendment. Typically, claims of excessive force by law enforcement during an arrest are evaluated under the Fourth Amendment's "objective reasonableness" standard. However, this standard does not apply to Section 1983 claims for injuries to innocent third parties caused by police force aimed at a perpetrator. Instead, such claims are assessed under substantive due process standards, which protect citizens from arbitrary governmental power. Conduct that "shocks the conscience" constitutes a denial of due process. In scenarios where officials have time to consider alternatives, actions taken with "deliberate indifference" towards individuals' rights can be deemed conscience-shocking. Conversely, in urgent situations where officials must act quickly, conduct is only considered conscience-shocking if it is performed "maliciously and sadistically" for the purpose of causing harm. The Court's analogy of a high-speed chase resulting in the death of an innocent passenger reflects this standard. In the current case, the more stringent "malicious or sadistic" standard applies as Officers Birchwell, Lewis, and Spencer acted without the opportunity for deliberation in response to a dangerous situation.
Even if the plaintiffs claim that the actions of the three defendant patrolmen breached departmental policy or were negligent, no reasonable fact finder could determine that the officers acted with "conscience-shocking" malice or sadism towards the unintended shooting victim, Quintana. Relevant case law establishes that behavior deemed unreasonable by tort law does not necessarily shock the conscience. The record shows that the undercover agents were unaware of anyone in the gray Maxima during the gunfire exchange that led to Quintana's injury, which negates any malicious intent. Therefore, based on the evidence favoring Quintana, the court concluded that Officers Birchwell, Lewis, and Spencer did not violate her substantive due process rights, justifying the lower court's summary judgment in their favor on count three of the amended complaint. Additionally, since no constitutional injury was inflicted on Quintana by the officers, Chief Kirchner could not be held liable for alleged failures related to training or policy, affirming the dismissal of count four. As a result, the summary judgments for counts three and four are affirmed, while the summary dismissals of counts one and two are reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings on those counts.
The district court's ruling involved an alternate dismissal of the complaint, citing failure to state a claim and/or granting summary judgment against the plaintiffs. Dismissal under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) is a legal question reviewed de novo, requiring the court to interpret the complaint favorably to the plaintiff, accepting all factual allegations as true, and determining if the plaintiff can prove any set of facts supporting their claims. Allegations that allow multiple inferences must be construed in favor of the plaintiff, but a complaint lacking sufficient allegations for any legal theory must be dismissed. Courts are not obligated to accept legal conclusions or unfounded factual inferences. Summary judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 can be granted against a plaintiff who fails to provide adequate evidence for each element of their case, with this sufficiency being a question of law subject to thorough scrutiny.
Section 1983 holds individuals liable for depriving others of constitutional rights under state law, requiring the plaintiff to demonstrate deprivation of a right secured by the Constitution, that the defendants acted under color of law, and that the deprivation occurred without due process. Additionally, on April 10, 1997, claims against Chief Robert Kirchner in his individual capacity were dismissed, although he remained a defendant in his official capacity, which is treated as a lawsuit against the public entity he represents. Municipalities and counties qualify as "persons" under Section 1983. Count five was dismissed with prejudice due to the court's discretion to decline supplemental jurisdiction over a state law claim, a decision not under review. The appellate review of counts one and two is treated as a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal, focusing solely on the amended complaint's allegations.
Counts one and two of the amended complaint are upheld, allowing the plaintiffs, as co-administrators of the decedent’s estate, to seek monetary compensation for constitutional torts endured by Claybrook, which grants them standing under Tennessee law to pursue his claims posthumously. The court refrains from evaluating the substantive merits of these claims. In contrast, counts three and four require further examination of record evidence due to the lower court's summary adjudication. Royal Claybrook Jr. lacks standing under section 1983 to pursue compensation for indirect injuries stemming from constitutional torts experienced by his spouse, regardless of the validity of her claims. The Fourteenth Amendment prohibits states from depriving individuals of life, liberty, or property without due process, while the Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable searches and seizures. The court acknowledges the complexities faced by law enforcement officers who must balance decisiveness and restraint under pressure. The plaintiffs’ argument that police officers incited violence by entering a parking lot is rejected; it is noted that police actions, while sometimes leading to forceful outcomes, are intended to maintain order. Furthermore, the court cites the Radecki case, stating that emergency situations necessitate quick judgments from law enforcement, and unless intent to harm is demonstrated, constitutional liability does not arise.
Judge Clay concurs with the majority's reversal of the district court's dismissal of Counts One and Two but dissents regarding the dismissal of Counts Three and Four. He argues that the majority improperly applies the "conscious shocking" standard, typically reserved for high-pressure situations involving police actions, such as riots or high-speed chases, which requires a high threshold of fault. Instead, he advocates for the "deliberate indifference" standard, indicating a lower threshold of culpability that is "more than negligence but less than intentional conduct." Under this standard, a factual dispute remains about whether the officers' actions concerning Ms. Claybrook meet the requisite level of indifference.
Judge Clay references the Supreme Court's precedent in Lewis, which outlines that substantive due process claims can arise from conduct that "shocks the conscience." He emphasizes that the definition of what constitutes conscience-shocking behavior is not fixed and must be evaluated based on the specific circumstances. The Court notes that liability can arise from deliberate indifference when officials have the opportunity for careful judgment and fail to act, contrasting this with situations that require immediate decisions where even reckless behavior may not reach the threshold of shocking indifference.
Officers acknowledged departmental rules requiring them to request backup from marked cars and uniformed officers before taking action, and that they should not investigate unless emergencies arose. Notably, Officer Birchwell did not perceive imminent danger or exigent circumstances when encountering Mr. Claybrook with a gun. Despite this, the officers engaged Mr. Claybrook violently without waiting for backup, contradicting the notion of being in a high-pressure situation, unlike the officers in Lewis. Ms. Claybrook's claims should be evaluated under the "deliberate indifference" standard, focusing on whether the officers had sufficient time to consider their actions. Key factual questions remain for a jury regarding the officers' awareness of Ms. Claybrook's presence in a car and whether they provoked the confrontation with Mr. Claybrook prematurely. The officers’ failure to identify themselves until after gunfire erupted raises further issues. No emergency justified their decision to shoot without following protocol. A jury should determine if the officers acted with deliberate indifference to Ms. Claybrook's rights, especially considering the potential risk to the public during the shooting. The conclusion is that Ms. Claybrook should not be denied a trial regarding the alleged violation of her substantive due process rights, warranting a reversal of the district court's dismissal of her claims and reinstatement of state law claims.
