Sima Props., L.L.C. v. Cooper

Citation: 236 So. 3d 857Docket: 2160132

Court: Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama; April 7, 2017; Alabama; State Appellate Court

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Sima Properties, L.L.C. (Sima) is appealing two judgments from the Montgomery Circuit Court that dismissed its inverse-condemnation action against John R. Cooper, director of the Alabama Department of Transportation (ALDOT), and the City of Prattville. Sima owns a gasoline station with access from Alabama Highway 14, which was disrupted when ALDOT and the city altered the highway's construction, closing Sima's driveway. Sima claims this construction terminated its easement rights and direct access, diminishing its property value and constituting a taking without due process. Sima alleges that Cooper and the city acted fraudulently and beyond their authority. It seeks compensation for its losses, litigation costs, and restoration of access to Highway 14.

Cooper filed a motion to dismiss based on sovereign immunity and failure to state a claim, asserting that if he has sovereign immunity, the court lacks jurisdiction. The city also moved to dismiss, arguing Sima does not own the property in question. Both motions referenced an affidavit from Philip Shamburger, ALDOT's right-of-way bureau chief, detailing a prior condemnation of the property dating back to 1970, which established ALDOT's ownership for public road use. The affidavit included court judgments and a map confirming ALDOT's ownership of the land from Sima's station to Highway 14.

Sima opposed motions to dismiss filed by Cooper and the city, but the trial court ruled against Sima, dismissing his claims. The court granted Cooper sovereign immunity for both damages and injunctive relief claims, determining Sima lacked ownership interest in the property, thus invalidating his inverse-condemnation claim. Regarding the city, the court identified ALDOT as the property owner, concluding Sima could not show a taking of his property, which precluded relief. Sima's subsequent motion to amend the judgments was denied, leading to an appeal to the Alabama Supreme Court, which transferred the case to a lower court. On appeal, Sima argued that dismissing his case against Cooper due to sovereign immunity was erroneous, citing Section 14 of the Alabama Constitution, which prevents damages awards against state officials in their official capacities. The court acknowledged exceptions to sovereign immunity, including valid inverse-condemnation actions against state officials in their representative capacity. It concluded that the trial court erred in dismissing Sima's claims on sovereign immunity grounds. Additionally, Sima contended that the trial court improperly dismissed his inverse-condemnation claim based on a lack of property rights concerning access to his gasoline station, emphasizing that the review of dismissal motions does not presume correctness and must accept the complaint's allegations as true.

Two sections of the Alabama Constitution of 1901, specifically Article I, Section 23, and Article XII, Section 235, prohibit the taking of private property for public use without just compensation. The Alabama Supreme Court in Gober v. Stubbs clarified that the power of eminent domain is inherent to sovereign states and not granted by Section 23, which merely places limits on its exercise. Eminent domain requires that property be taken for public use, with a key restriction that it cannot be for private use, and mandates that just compensation must be paid.

Section 235 further elaborates on landowner rights, stipulating that entities authorized to take property for public use must provide compensation before any taking, injury, or destruction occurs. Although Section 235 does not explicitly mention inverse condemnation, Alabama case law acknowledges that property owners can pursue inverse condemnation claims if compensation is not provided prior to the taking. Inverse condemnation is a legal action for recovering the value of property taken without formal eminent domain proceedings.

For a successful inverse condemnation claim under Section 235, a plaintiff must demonstrate: 1) the defendant has the authority to take property for public use, 2) that the plaintiff's property was taken, injured, or destroyed, and 3) that this was caused by the defendant's construction or improvements. Section 235 has thus been interpreted to support claims from landowners whose property is harmed due to municipal construction activities.

Cooper and the city argue that the dismissal of Sima's inverse-condemnation action was appropriate, claiming that Shamburger's affidavit and exhibits show Sima lacks ownership or rights to the property affected by ALDOT's closure of access to Highway 14. They contend that Sima fails to prove that their property was taken, a necessary element for such an action. Sima's arguments for ownership of access to the highway include: 1) asserting a property right as an adjoining landowner, supported by the precedent set in Davis v. State, which establishes that abutting landowners possess a distinct private right of access that cannot be interfered with without compensation; and 2) claiming ownership through adverse possession due to over 20 years of use of the driveway. However, the court clarifies that under established Alabama law, adverse possession cannot be claimed against land owned by the State or a county, referencing multiple cases that support this principle. Consequently, the court acknowledges Sima's valid claim regarding access rights but dismisses the adverse possession argument. The judgments dismissing Sima's action are reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings, indicating that Sima could potentially prevail if the allegations are proven.

The court has reversed and remanded the case, with judges Pittman, Thomas, and Moore concurring, and Donaldson concurring in the result without a written opinion. The court noted that any claims by Cooper and the city regarding alternative access for Sima to its property, aside from the disputed driveway, necessitate factual determinations that rely on evidence outside the pleadings. It is established that if a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim includes external evidence and is not excluded, it must be treated as a motion for summary judgment in accordance with Rule 56 of the Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure. All parties must be afforded a reasonable opportunity to present relevant material. In Singleton v. Alabama Department of Corrections, the Alabama Supreme Court emphasized that if a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is converted to a summary judgment motion due to external evidence, the parties must receive notice and an opportunity to counter the motion. The record indicates that this procedural requirement was not followed in this case.