United States v. Rigoberto Carrasco

Citations: 381 F.3d 1237; 65 Fed. R. Serv. 251; 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 18158; 2004 WL 1902729Docket: 03-10304

Court: Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit; August 26, 2004; Federal Appellate Court

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Rigoberto Carrasco was convicted after a jury trial for attempting to possess with intent to distribute over five kilograms of cocaine, receiving a 240-month sentence. Bienvenito Ruiz was convicted of conspiracy and attempt to possess the same amount of cocaine and was sentenced to life imprisonment. Both defendants appealed their convictions and sentences. The court reversed Carrasco's conviction but affirmed Ruiz's conviction and sentence, directing the district court to amend Ruiz's judgment for accuracy regarding his offenses.

The case originated from a drug transaction orchestrated by confidential informant Maria Nuñez in collaboration with the DEA. Nuñez arranged a theft of 40 kilograms of cocaine with her brother-in-law, Rodriguez, leading to his arrest at a warehouse along with another co-defendant, Ceballos. Rodriguez agreed to cooperate with law enforcement, contacting Carrasco about selling the cocaine, during which Carrasco expressed willingness to assist. 

Simultaneously, Nuñez communicated with another co-defendant, Sierra, and through him, Ruiz, who confirmed their meeting to discuss the cocaine. Both Sierra and Ruiz were arrested after they arrived at the meeting spot. At trial, Carrasco denied involvement in drug dealing and claimed he had gone to meet Rodriguez only to help him with a drug problem, but the prosecution countered this with evidence of Carrasco's past drug trade involvement.

Ceballos testified that Appellant Carrasco operated a tire business as a front for drug trafficking in 1989 or 1990. He detailed attending a meeting about a drug ripoff, purchasing cocaine from Carrasco on multiple occasions, witnessing Carrasco add cutting agents to drugs, and observing Carrasco give substantial sums of money to Rodriguez for cocaine. Carrasco's objection to Ceballos's testimony, citing Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) for lack of notice, was overruled by the district court, which classified the testimony as rebuttal and deemed prior generalized notice sufficient. Carrasco sought to testify in surrebuttal but was denied by the court. Appellant Ruiz claimed he accompanied Sierra, a Santeria priest, not for drug purposes but to assist Sierra; he attempted to distance himself upon sensing suspicious activity. Ceballos later testified that Ruiz admitted involvement in obtaining cocaine and planned to attribute his statements to the Santeria religion. The jury convicted Carrasco of attempting to possess five kilograms or more of cocaine and Ruiz on conspiracy and attempt charges. Both appellants appeal their convictions, with Carrasco arguing for a mistrial based on Ceballos's testimony and challenging the denial of his surrebuttal. The admissibility of evidence is reviewed for abuse of discretion under Rule 404(b), which mandates prior notice to the accused for introducing other crimes or acts unless excused by the court.

The Government was obligated to provide notice regarding prior bad acts related to Ceballos's rebuttal testimony. Although Rule 404(b) includes a generalized notice provision, the prosecution must inform the defense of the general nature of extrinsic acts evidence. The Government initially notified that it might present evidence of Appellant Carrasco's May 1994 arrest and conviction for drug and firearms offenses, followed by two additional prior acts: (1) a transaction involving marijuana between Rodriguez and Carrasco, and (2) a theft of foreign currency involving Carrasco, Rodriguez, and another individual. The district court deemed Carrasco's past dealings with Rodriguez admissible as they were inextricably intertwined with the charges, but there was no notice provided regarding drug dealings between Ceballos and Carrasco or Carrasco's alleged tire business as a front for drug operations. Consequently, the admission of this evidence was deemed erroneous under Rule 404(b).

The court assessed whether this error was harmless, noting that the purpose of the Rule 404(b) notice requirement is to minimize surprise and facilitate early admissibility resolutions. Carrasco's defense hinged on his concern for Rodriguez's drug issues, and the unnotified testimony about Carrasco's narcotics involvement directly impacted his defense, particularly regarding intent. The failure to provide notice significantly prejudiced Carrasco, especially since he was not allowed to reopen his case to counter Ceballos’s testimony. The Government conceded it lacked compelling evidence of Carrasco’s intent. As such, the appellate court ruled that the notice failure was not harmless, leading to the reversal of Carrasco’s conviction and a remand for further proceedings, without addressing other arguments he raised on appeal.

Separately, Appellant Ruiz claimed the district court erred by denying his proposed jury instruction on the attempt charge, asserting that an attempt requires proof of the defendant's specific intent and a substantial step towards committing the crime.

A substantial step in a criminal attempt requires that the defendant's actions clearly indicate criminal intent, going beyond mere preparation but falling short of the final act necessary for the crime. The conduct must be contextually interpreted by a reasonable observer as intended to violate the law. The district court provided an instruction to the jury stating that for a conviction of attempting to possess cocaine with intent to distribute, the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant intended to possess cocaine and took substantial steps corroborating this intent. The court's refusal to include a specific definition of "substantial step" from the defendant's proposed instruction was reviewed for abuse of discretion, guided by established legal standards. The court found no reversible error based on the nature of Ruiz’s defense, which was focused on lack of intent rather than the actions taken. Ruiz's presence at the meeting for a drug transaction, though argued as unintentional, demonstrated more than mere preparation. The court ultimately reversed Appellant Carrasco’s conviction due to the government's failure to provide notice of prior bad acts, while affirming Ruiz’s convictions and remanding for a correction of the judgment regarding his offenses. The decision is thus partially reversed, partially affirmed, and remanded.