Bobby Henry v. Peggy Kernan, Warden Daniel E. Lungren, Attorney General
Docket: 98-15768
Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit; October 25, 1999; Federal Appellate Court
In the case 197 F.3d 1021 (9th Cir. 1999), Bobby Henry appealed against Peggy Kernan and Daniel E. Lungren regarding the admissibility of his post-Miranda statements. The court noted that the State argued these statements were voluntary until a specific inquiry by Henry was interrupted by a detective’s statement suggesting that his admissions were not yet usable against him. The court recognized that while post-Miranda statements could be used for impeachment, this case presented two distinguishing factors.
First, it was established that the sheriff's officers knowingly violated Henry's Miranda rights by continuing to question him after he requested counsel, a fact acknowledged by the State. This deliberate misconduct distinguished the case from previous precedents, particularly from Harris v. New York, where no such intentional violation occurred.
Second, in California, out-of-court statements used for impeachment are also considered admissible for their truth, meaning they can substantively prove guilt. In Henry's case, no limiting instruction was given to clarify that his statements could only be used for impeachment purposes, which led to their primary use as evidence against him regarding his motive and self-defense claim.
The court concluded that the State should not be allowed to utilize Henry's post-Miranda statements, given the deliberate violation of his rights and their use as substantive evidence of guilt.
The state trial court erred by allowing the prosecution to use Henry's post-Miranda statements for their truth and for impeachment as a prior inconsistent statement. The panel unanimously denied the petition for panel rehearing, with Judges Tashima and Silverman voting against rehearing en banc, and no further requests were made for such a rehearing.
The primary issue at hand was whether Henry's confession, obtained in violation of Miranda rights, was involuntary and thus inadmissible for impeachment purposes during trial. The district court previously denied habeas relief to Henry, asserting that his Fifth Amendment rights were not violated. Jurisdiction for the appeal was established under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 2253, leading to a reversal and remand.
Henry was arrested for the murder of Bill Withrow after turning himself in and underwent extensive interrogation despite requesting legal counsel, resulting in a detailed confession. His first trial ended in a mistrial, and during the second trial, the court determined that his post-Miranda statements were inadmissible for the prosecution but could be used for impeachment if he testified.
In a related issue, Henry sought to exclude testimony from Dr. Sander, a physician he consulted, claiming it was protected under the California psychotherapist-patient privilege. The trial court ruled against this claim, stating Henry's belief that Dr. Sander was a psychotherapist was unreasonable.
During the trial, Henry testified he acted in self-defense, but his post-arrest statements were used to undermine his credibility on cross-examination, and a recording of the interrogation was played for the jury. Ultimately, Henry was convicted of second-degree murder. After exhausting state court claims, he filed a habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, arguing that his statements were improperly admitted and that his right to privacy was violated regarding the doctor’s testimony. The district court denied this petition and issued a certificate of probable cause, leading to Henry's timely appeal.
The district court's ruling on a § 2254 habeas petition is reviewed de novo, while factual findings are assessed for clear error, with state court determinations presumed correct under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). For Henry to succeed on his Fifth Amendment claim, he must show: 1) his statements were obtained in violation of Miranda; 2) the state court erred in allowing these statements for prosecution; and 3) the error significantly influenced the jury's verdict. Post-Miranda confessions deemed involuntary cannot be used for any purpose.
It is acknowledged that police violated Henry's Miranda rights by continuing interrogation after he requested an attorney. Despite this, both the trial and district courts found his statements voluntary and admissible for impeachment. The voluntariness of confessions and the presence of coercive police activity are reviewed de novo. Henry argues that psychological coercion during interrogation rendered his statements involuntary, while the State contends the statements were voluntary despite the illegal questioning.
Under the Fourteenth Amendment, a confession is involuntary only if police employ coercive tactics that compromise the suspect's free will. Voluntariness is evaluated based on surrounding circumstances and the overall impact of police conduct. The key question is whether the confession resulted from a free choice or coercion. A review of the interrogation transcript indicates that Henry's questioning involved psychological coercion, contradicting the state court's conclusions of a calm and relaxed setting.
The defendant, Henry, was informed of his arrest for murder and advised of his rights, during which he clearly requested an attorney multiple times. Despite this, the officers continued to interrogate him, with Detective White pressing Henry on the motive for the shooting. Henry provided a disjointed and confused narrative, revealing personal grievances against the victim, Withrow, and mentioning various unrelated life events. His demeanor was shaken and fearful, marked by tears and requests for forgiveness. The officers' tactics, including misleading statements regarding the use of his comments, effectively stripped Henry of his ability to control the interrogation process. The document draws a parallel to a similar case, Cooper v. Dupnik, where the intentional disregard of a suspect's Miranda rights rendered subsequent statements involuntary. In both instances, the suspects exhibited significant distress and reiterated their requests for legal counsel, which were ignored by law enforcement.
The Cooper Court highlighted that the police conduct in this case mirrors concerns from Miranda and Escobedo v. Illinois regarding coercive interrogation methods. The Court emphasized that both physical and psychological coercion can violate constitutional rights, noting that the tactics employed by the Arizona police disregarded the defendant's rights when he requested counsel, leading to a sense of helplessness. This behavior constituted a prima facie violation of the Fifth Amendment's protection against self-incrimination.
The Court clarified that the issue at hand involved coercion that was actively inflicted by law enforcement, rather than merely technical involuntariness. It pointed out that pressures in custody can overwhelm a person’s free will, and Detective White exploited these pressures by ignoring the defendant's request to stop questioning. Consequently, the Court ruled that the defendant's post-Miranda statements were involuntary and inadmissible, noting the state trial court's error in allowing their use for impeachment.
The State's argument that the defendant's statements remained voluntary until a specific interruption was countered by the Court, which found two distinguishing factors: first, the police deliberately violated Miranda, knowing they were doing so, and second, unlike in Harris v. New York, there was evidence of calculated misconduct aimed at undermining the defendant's rights. Thus, the case was deemed significantly different from precedent, reinforcing the unconstitutionality of the interrogation methods employed.
In California, out-of-court statements used for impeachment can also serve as substantive evidence to establish the truth of the matters asserted, per Cal. Evid. Code §§ 1220, 1235. In the case at hand, Henry's post-Miranda statements were primarily used to demonstrate his motive for the crime and to counter his self-defense claim, rather than solely for impeachment. No limiting instruction was provided to clarify that these statements could only be used to assess Henry's credibility. The court determined that the prosecution's use of Henry's post-Miranda statements was erroneous, as they were utilized to prove guilt despite being presented as impeachment evidence.
The document further addresses whether the admission of these statements constituted harmless error. The standard for assessing this in a habeas review context is whether the error had a substantial and injurious effect on the jury's verdict. It was concluded that Henry's statements significantly influenced the jury, as they were critical in establishing his motive for the shooting, countering his argument of self-defense. The prosecution relied heavily on these statements during the trial, particularly through Detective Machen’s testimony and the closing arguments, which emphasized the importance of Henry's motivations in the case.
The challenged statements made by Henry were central to the prosecution's burden to prove he acted with the requisite intent for first or second-degree murder, rather than in self-defense. Henry's confession significantly influenced the jury's verdict, with no other evidence able to match its impact. The admission of these statements was deemed a substantial and injurious error. Consequently, as Henry's post-Mirandized statements were found to be involuntary, habeas relief is granted based on his Fifth Amendment claim.
Regarding Henry's constitutional privacy claim, he contended that his right to privacy was violated when the trial court compelled his doctor, Dr. Sander, to testify about confidential communications. However, the court determined that Dr. Sander was not a psychotherapist, undermining Henry's claim to a psychotherapist-patient privilege. The absence of a recognized constitutional privilege for such communications means that Henry's challenge was essentially an evidentiary matter under state law, not reviewable in federal habeas proceedings.
Henry did not demonstrate that Dr. Sander's testimony violated due process or his right to a fair trial. Testimony from other witnesses indicated Henry had expressed harmful intentions toward Withrow, making Dr. Sander's statements not singularly damaging. Therefore, the court affirmed the denial of habeas relief on the privacy claim.
In conclusion, due to the involuntary nature of Henry's statements and the significant impact of their admission, the court grants habeas relief on the Fifth Amendment claim, reversing the district court's prior denial, and remands the case with instructions for a conditional writ of habeas corpus, requiring Henry's release unless retried within a reasonable timeframe without his confession.
The ruling reverses and remands the case with specific instructions. The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) does not apply since the petition was filed before its enactment on April 24, 1996. The district court noted that all interview participants, including the defendant Henry, maintained a "quiet, matter of fact tone," but this does not negate Henry's confusion and fear, which is evident as he was sobbing by the end of the interview. Distress can manifest in various ways, not solely through tone of voice. Henry's argument regarding the district court's decision to strike his declaration of state of mind during his confession is unnecessary to address since habeas relief is granted based on his Fifth Amendment claim. Additionally, Henry claimed that his communications with Dr. Sander were privileged under California law; however, California does not recognize physician-patient privilege in criminal cases.
