Renaldo Hernandez, and David A. Cerda v. Joliet Police Department, Francis Ruettiger, Tom Stein
Docket: 98-3558
Court: Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit; November 22, 1999; Federal Appellate Court
Renaldo Hernandez filed a federal lawsuit against the Joliet Police Department and its officers, Francis Ruettiger and Thomas Stein, as well as the Will County State's Attorney's Office and First Assistant State's Attorney Douglas DeBoer, alleging violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, along with state law claims for libel, slander, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The district court dismissed Hernandez's § 1983 claims against the individual defendants but allowed a claim under § 1985(3) to proceed. Additionally, the court sanctioned Hernandez's attorney for filing a frivolous claim against the State's Attorney's Office. In September 1998, the court granted summary judgment for all defendants on Hernandez's civil rights claims and dismissed the state law claims without prejudice. Hernandez, a former police officer and vice-president of the Afro-Latino Policemen's Association, reported instances of racial discrimination by Stein, who opposed affirmative action, and noted that Ruettiger had used racial slurs. Hernandez left the police force in 1994 due to Obsessive/Compulsive Disorder and later had a dispute with Stein regarding his disability pension application, which led to Stein's recusal from the case.
On August 1, 1996, Hernandez confronted Detective Benjamin Billups at the courthouse, questioning whether the Joliet Police Department had recognized Billups, whom he referred to as a "bigot." He recounted a conflict with Officer Stein during his pension hearing, claiming Stein had initially wanted to fight but backed down. Officer Ruettiger, present during the exchange, reported that Hernandez expressed a willingness to physically confront Stein, using derogatory language to describe him. Ruettiger later informed Stein about these threats, prompting Stein to consult First Assistant State's Attorney DeBoer regarding potential criminal charges against Hernandez. DeBoer determined that Hernandez's remarks did not constitute criminal conduct and suggested Stein contact Hernandez's employer instead. Stein subsequently informed David Levek, Hernandez's supervisor, leading Levek to dismiss Stein's complaint as unwarranted.
Hernandez filed a federal complaint on August 4, 1997, claiming violations of his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, along with allegations of libel, slander, and intentional infliction of emotional distress under Illinois law. Throughout late 1996, the Will County defendants' attorneys requested Hernandez to dismiss the State's Attorney's Office from the lawsuit, citing various reasons without mentioning Eleventh Amendment immunity. Nevertheless, Hernandez did not dismiss the office and instead filed an amended complaint on October 27, 1997.
On November 26, 1997, defendants filed a motion to dismiss the amended complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, arguing that the State's Attorney's Office is immune from suit under the Eleventh Amendment. Concurrently, they served Hernandez with a proposed motion for sanctions, asserting that the claims against the State's Attorney's Office and DeBoer were meritless and unsupported by law. Attorney Cerda failed to dismiss the Will County defendants within the 21-day period mandated by Rule 11, prompting the defendants to file a motion for sanctions. Although Cerda acknowledged the inability to sue the State's Attorney's Office, he did not dismiss it, allowing it to remain a party until the trial judge ruled on the motions to dismiss and confirmed the Office's immunity.
The trial judge subsequently imposed sanctions against Cerda for pursuing frivolous claims and for not dismissing the Office after being notified of its immunity. The judge noted that a reasonable inquiry would have revealed the claims were meritless, and Cerda should have acted upon the defendants' motions. Cerda's objection to the sanctions was rejected, and he was ordered to pay $4,226.64 for the County's defense costs and the sanctions.
On July 7, 1998, Ruettiger, Stein, and DeBoer filed motions for summary judgment regarding Hernandez's remaining claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3). The court granted these motions on September 9, 1998, citing a lack of evidence for a conspiracy or discriminatory actions against Hernandez based on race, and declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims. Hernandez and Cerda appealed.
The appeal raises four issues: 1) whether the district court erred in dismissing Hernandez's § 1983 claims; 2) whether it erred in granting summary judgment on the conspiracy claims; 3) whether the court abused discretion in sanctioning Cerda under Rule 11; and 4) whether it abused discretion in awarding full fees to the State's Attorney's Office for Cerda's Rule 11 violation. Additionally, the Will County defendants filed a Motion for Sanctions under Rule 38 against Hernandez and Cerda, while the appellants filed a cross-motion for sanctions against attorney James Sotos.
Hernandez seeks to reinstate his claims against the defendants under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, arguing that the court erred in dismissing these claims and mischaracterizing them as Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution claims. He cites the Sherwin Manor Nursing Center v. McAuliffe precedent, asserting that to establish an equal protection claim, a plaintiff must show intentional discrimination by a state actor based on membership in a historically disadvantaged group. The court reviews dismissals de novo, favoring the plaintiff's allegations unless no facts could support a claim for relief.
The court finds that Hernandez's allegations do not indicate he faced a special administrative burden due to his national origin, as he was not charged or arrested following Officer Ruettiger's report. Instead, the report led to an inappropriate phone call from Stein to Hernandez's supervisor, which did not constitute a special burden as required by Sherwin Manor. Hernandez argues that the phone call itself represents a § 1983 violation, claiming it forced him to address alleged misconduct at work, causing stress. However, the court cites Paul v. Davis, noting that slander by a public official does not equate to a constitutional tort. Thus, the alleged defamation does not support a § 1983 action.
Regarding Hernandez's claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3), the trial court found that he failed to provide sufficient evidence of a civil conspiracy. The court noted that while racial slurs were used by defendants in the past, there was no evidence that they directed such language at Hernandez or acted based on his race. Consequently, the court upheld the dismissal of both Hernandez's § 1983 and § 1985(3) claims.
The court reviews district court rulings on summary judgment motions de novo, determining if there is no genuine issue of material fact and if the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Summary judgment can be granted even if there are alleged factual disputes, provided they do not suffice to defeat the motion. Hernandez argues that the trial court erred by granting summary judgment to Ruettiger, Stein, and DeBoer on his civil conspiracy claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3). He contends the court overlooked evidence of Stein's and Ruettiger's racist remarks and actions against Hernandez related to his advocacy for an affirmative action plan. Hernandez claims Stein's derogatory comments about the Afro-Latino Policemen's Association and his opposition to affirmative action demonstrate a conspiracy against him. He alleges that Ruettiger's animosity toward African Americans and DeBoer's complicity in producing a false police report further support his claims. Hernandez asserts that the evidence presented is sufficient for a reasonable jury to conclude a conspiracy existed to violate his rights under § 1985(3). To establish such a claim, a plaintiff must prove the existence of a conspiracy, the intent to deprive a class of equal protection, actions in furtherance of that conspiracy, and resulting injury or deprivation of rights. The existence of a conspiracy requires evidence of an agreement among conspirators to inflict harm, which can be inferred from circumstantial evidence if it allows a reasonable jury to find that a mutual understanding existed to achieve the conspiracy’s goals.
No evidence supports the claim that defendants Ruettiger, Stein, and DeBoer conspired to harm Hernandez. The initial meeting between Hernandez and Billups, overheard by Ruettiger, was coincidental, and there is no proof that Stein orchestrated it to produce a police report. The relationship between Ruettiger and Stein appears to be purely professional, lacking any motive for Ruettiger to falsify a report at Stein's request. Additionally, Hernandez's conspiracy theory falters as no adverse actions were taken against him following the informational report, which merely noted a threat without leading to charges or arrest. DeBoer indicated that Ruettiger's report contained no indictable conduct, undermining the notion of a conspiracy to ruin Hernandez's life. The alleged subsequent phone call to Hernandez's employer regarding the report does not substantiate a conspiracy. Consequently, the evidence is insufficient for a reasonable inference of collusion among the defendants, justifying the district court's summary judgment in their favor on Hernandez's section 1985(3) claims.
Regarding Rule 11 sanctions, attorney Cerda argues against the district court's award, claiming he did not overlook the Eleventh Amendment bar against suing the Will County State's Attorney's Office and contends that the judge improperly awarded the entire fee petition. The appellate court reviews such sanctions under an abuse of discretion standard, affirming the trial court's decision unless it is based on an erroneous legal interpretation or evidence assessment.
Rule 11 sanctions were imposed on Cerda after the trial court determined that Hernandez's complaint against the Will County State's Attorney's Office was frivolous, as actions against a state's attorney are barred by the Eleventh Amendment. The court noted that Hernandez failed to dismiss the State's Attorney's Office despite being informed of their immunity and receiving a motion for sanctions 21 days prior to the court filing, as required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(1)(A). The district court found that Hernandez, through reasonable inquiry and the notice of the defendants' motion, should have recognized the meritlessness of his claims. Consequently, the court awarded the full amount of the State's Attorney's Office's fee petition, totaling $4,226.64, to deter future violations by Cerda.
The court highlighted that Hernandez overlooked a clear legal principle that prohibits suits against state officials, referencing Garcia v. City of Chicago and Ingemunson v. Hedges, which confirm that state's attorneys are considered state officials. Cerda contended that the imposition of sanctions was an abuse of discretion since he acknowledged the immunity in his brief; however, the court concluded that his failure to dismiss the claims led to unnecessary costs for the State's Attorney's Office.
Furthermore, the court clarified the 21-day notice requirement for sanctions under Rule 11(c) and noted that Cerda received the proposed motion for sanctions but did not take corrective action within that timeframe. The court found no justification for Cerda's inaction, affirming that the district court acted within its discretion in sanctioning him for inadequate pre-filing inquiry and for neglecting to dismiss the State's Attorney's Office after being alerted to the lack of merit in the claims.
Motions for sanctions under Rule 38 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure were filed by both the Will County defendants and Cerda after the submission of briefs on appeal, seeking damages and costs on the grounds that the appeal was frivolous. Rule 38 allows a court of appeals to award damages and costs if an appeal is deemed frivolous, defined as having an obvious outcome or lacking merit (citing Spiegel v. Continental Illinois Bank). Despite the appellants' failure to provide a valid basis for overturning the district court's decisions, their arguments, although not meritorious, were considered to have some conceivable chance of success, leading the court to conclude that the appeal was not frivolous. Consequently, both parties' motions for Rule 38 sanctions were denied, and each party was ordered to bear its own costs.
The court affirmed the district court's dismissal of Hernandez's Section 1983 claims and the summary judgment on his Section 1985(3) conspiracy claims. Additionally, it upheld the district court's discretion in sanctioning Cerda under Rule 11 for filing a frivolous claim against the Will County State's Attorney's Office and affirmed the full fee award related to Cerda's Rule 11 violation. The court reiterated the denial of sanctions under Rule 38.
