An appeal involves the case of James K. Hardison against Michael M. Cohen and the Department of Veterans Affairs, focusing on whether a statutory scheme precludes a former federal employee from seeking monetary or equitable relief after a claimed unconstitutional discharge. The court concluded that the statutory scheme does bar monetary damages, yet it remained uncertain whether equitable relief could be entirely excluded. Ultimately, the court determined that Hardison was not entitled to equitable relief because he lacked a property interest in his position.
Hardison had begun a three-year medical residency at the Miami Department of Veterans Affairs Medical Center on July 1, 2000, under statutory provisions allowing the Secretary of the VA to employ medical residents. He was terminated on June 14, 2002, by Dr. Cohen, who cited misconduct and poor performance. Hardison argued that he was entitled to a pretermination hearing and posttermination appeal based on the Medical Center's regulations and policies from the Council on Podiatric Medical Education. His lawsuit claimed a violation of his Fifth Amendment due process rights, seeking a declaratory judgment, reinstatement with back pay, and damages.
The district court dismissed Hardison's case, agreeing with a magistrate judge's recommendation that Title 38 provides the exclusive remedy for VA employees, thus precluding judicial remedies. Hardison's motions regarding late objections and an amended complaint were denied. The court assessed his claims under a de novo standard, treating the allegations as true and in his favor. The discussion will proceed to evaluate each type of relief Hardison requested, starting with monetary damages and followed by equitable relief.
Hardison seeks damages from Cohen for his alleged role in Hardison's wrongful discharge, asserting that such damages are permissible under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, which allows individuals to sue federal agents for constitutional rights violations committed under color of federal law. Bivens claims can be made without a statutory basis for action and have been recognized for violations of the Fourth, Fifth, and Eighth Amendments. To succeed, plaintiffs must demonstrate (1) a lack of alternative means for redress and (2) the absence of "special factors" that would discourage a Bivens remedy. Such special factors include judicial deference to Congressional intent, particularly when existing government programs suggest that Congress has provided adequate remedies for constitutional violations. The Supreme Court has shown reluctance to expand Bivens remedies into new contexts, indicating that the absence of statutory relief does not automatically warrant judicially awarded damages against violating officers. In Bush v. Lucas, the Court denied a Bivens claim from a federal employee, citing the adequacy of existing statutory remedies, and emphasized that Congress is better positioned to determine public interest in creating new remedies. Similarly, in Schweiker v. Chilicky, the Court declined to allow a Bivens claim for damages, reaffirming that Congress should make compromises in remedying injuries from complex programs. The Court ruled against such claims when plaintiffs had already accessed administrative remedies, even if those did not fully compensate them.
In United States v. Fausto, the Supreme Court determined that a civil servant excluded from judicial review under the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 (CSRA) could not seek relief under the Back Pay Act. The Court emphasized that the CSRA provides a comprehensive system for reviewing personnel actions, indicating that Congress intended to exclude certain employees from judicial relief. Following this reasoning, in Lee v. Hughes, the Eleventh Circuit denied a terminated federal employee's Bivens claim for damages, citing the employee's exclusion from CSRA remedies as a "special factor counseling hesitation" and reflecting Congress's intent to withhold legal relief. The Court highlighted the importance of separation of powers, suggesting courts should refrain from providing remedies when Congress has not authorized them.
Applying this precedent to Hardison's case, the court found that Hardison was excluded from Title 38's remedial processes for VA employees and, therefore, could not pursue a Bivens action for damages. Allowing Hardison to seek such damages would contradict Congressional intent, especially since permanent VA physicians, who have limited remedies, are also barred from Bivens claims. The court noted that granting greater rights to medical residents than to permanent physicians would undermine established policies regarding employment protections.
Regarding Hardison's potential claim for equitable relief, the court acknowledged differing views among circuits about whether the absence of a Bivens remedy for damages precludes equitable relief for constitutional violations. While the Eleventh Circuit has not definitively addressed this issue, previous cases suggest conflicting interpretations. The Supreme Court's prior decisions focused on Bivens actions for damages without resolving the relationship between statutory remedial schemes and equitable relief.
The remedy sought in Bush parallels the respondents' request for consequential damages due to an alleged unconstitutional denial of a statutory right. Federal courts possess broad authority to provide equitable remedies, and the Supreme Court has not definitively ruled out Congressional preclusion of such remedies. Several circuits have diverged in their interpretations regarding the interaction between equitable relief and statutory remedial schemes. For instance, the Third Circuit in Mitchum v. Hurt affirmed the federal courts' longstanding power to grant equitable relief but acknowledged that a federal employee under a comprehensive remedial scheme might be restricted from circumventing that scheme through actions under 28 U.S.C. 1331. However, the Third Circuit maintained that Congress intends for equitable relief to protect constitutional rights.
The D.C. Circuit, in Hubbard v. EPA, asserted that courts have broader authority to impose equitable remedies against agencies than against individuals, noting that while Congress can limit this power, the CSRA does not explicitly restrict jurisdiction to enjoin unconstitutional actions by federal agencies. This reasoning was supported in Spagnola, which affirmed the right of civil servants to seek equitable relief for constitutional violations.
In contrast, the Ninth and Tenth Circuits have concluded that a comprehensive remedial scheme precludes federal employees from obtaining equitable relief, emphasizing a general disfavor towards judicial interference in federal employment matters. The Fourth and Seventh Circuits have recognized this division but have not resolved the issue. Commentators have also expressed differing views, with some criticizing the Supreme Court's reluctance to recognize constitutional damages claims and arguing that equitable remedies should only be pursued after legal remedies are found inadequate, suggesting that damages should be available when congressional remedies are insufficient or when judicial decisions are reserved for other branches of government.
Equitable remedies should be accessible unless a statutory remedial scheme is deemed 'constitutionally sufficient,' as deficiencies could leave certain federal employees without constitutional protections. Denying federal courts the ability to review legislative schemes and provide equitable relief infringes on the separation of powers, hindering the courts' role as a check on government branches. Civil servants must be able to seek equitable relief to uphold their constitutional rights. Some appellate courts and commentators interpret the decision in Stephens v. Department of Health, Human Services as barring equitable remedies in the presence of a comprehensive statutory scheme, but the current circuit has not definitively ruled on this. This is supported by three factors: the lack of distinction made between legal and equitable relief in Stephens, the plaintiff’s access to an administrative remedy in that case, and the absence of discussion regarding Perry v. Thomas, which affirms federal courts' authority to issue injunctive relief despite existing administrative remedies. The issue of whether Hardison had a property interest in his former position must be addressed, as the Due Process Clause requires that the threatened interest be 'life, liberty, or property.' Hardison claims a property interest in his medical residency, but property interests derive from independent sources, such as state law, rather than directly from the Constitution. Federal laws can also define these interests. Specifically, Title 38 does not support Hardison’s claim; he was appointed under section 7406, which allows the Secretary of the VA to appoint residents without adhering to civil service laws and grants discretion in managing their employment, including no appeal rights for adverse actions. As a temporary employee, Hardison's situation aligns with that of plaintiffs in Silva v. Bieluch, who similarly lacked a property interest following demotion from probationary positions.
Plaintiffs claimed violations of due process rights due to demotion without a hearing. The Court ruled that, as their appointments were probationary, they had no property interest in their positions. Similarly, Hardison lacked any guarantee of future employment with the Medical Center and had no statutory right to appeal adverse personnel actions, negating any property interest in his job. Hardison argued that Cohen breached grievance policies requiring a pretermination hearing and a posttermination appeal. However, he did not establish that these policies created an exclusive basis for discharge or that discharges were only permissible for cause. Furthermore, Hardison did not assert a breach of contract claim under state law, which his counsel conceded during oral argument. The district court dismissed Hardison’s complaint for both legal and equitable relief, a decision that can be affirmed on any supported ground. The Court concluded that Hardison's Bivens claim for monetary damages is barred by Title 38's remedial provisions, and without a protected property interest in his employment, his claim for equitable relief fails. The district court's judgment to dismiss Hardison's complaint is therefore affirmed.
