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Tomlinson v. G.E. Capital Dealer Distribution Finance, Inc.
Citations: 601 So. 2d 905; 1992 Ala. LEXIS 585; 1992 WL 127494Docket: 1910108
Court: Supreme Court of Alabama; June 12, 1992; Alabama; State Supreme Court
The Court has withdrawn its previous opinion and issued a new ruling on Jerry A. Tomlinson's appeal against G.E. Capital Dealer Distributor Finance, Inc. (formerly Contel Credit Corporation) concerning a summary judgment favoring G.E. Capital. Tomlinson's lawsuit alleges fraud and breach of warranty related to computer equipment leased from G.E. Capital, with a counterclaim from G.E. Capital for unpaid lease balances. Tomlinson entered into multiple lease agreements with G.E. Capital, which were not binding until accepted by the lessor. He expressed dissatisfaction with the equipment and ceased payments, subsequently filing suit against both G.E. Capital and CADO Systems, alleging CADO acted as G.E. Capital’s agent. G.E. Capital counterclaimed for the remaining lease balance. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of G.E. Capital based on the absence of sufficient evidence to support Tomlinson's claims, particularly regarding the alleged agency relationship between CADO and G.E. Capital, which is typically a matter for jury determination. However, the Court noted that the burden is on Tomlinson to provide evidence of agency to counter G.E. Capital's properly supported motion for summary judgment. G.E. Capital supported its motion with the lease agreements, which explicitly stated that neither CADO nor any of its representatives were agents of G.E. Capital. Additionally, Tomlinson acknowledged in his deposition that he customarily reads contracts before signing them, implying he was aware of the terms outlined in the lease agreements. John P. Lionato, an account manager at G.E. Capital, affirmed that CADO operates as a separate corporation with no control by G.E. Capital over its business practices, including negotiations with customers. CADO independently decides whether to offer sales contracts or leases to G.E. Capital or other financing sources, and both parties are under no obligation to accept or provide any specific agreements. In response to a motion for summary judgment, Tomlinson submitted an affidavit with exhibits, which G.E. Capital sought to strike, claiming they were not produced during discovery and contained hearsay not based on personal knowledge. The trial court granted G.E. Capital's motion to strike. Tomlinson argued this was an error, asserting he provided significant evidence against the summary judgment motion. The court referenced Iverson v. Xpert Tune, Inc., which holds that sanctions for discovery failures are at the trial court's discretion. The appellate court found that the trial court abused its discretion by striking the affidavit and exhibits, reversing the judgment and remanding the case for further consideration of the summary judgment motion. Tomlinson did not contest G.E. Capital's counterclaim, which the court affirmed. The appellate court's decision included granting the application, withdrawing the original opinion, substituting a new opinion, affirming in part, reversing in part, and remanding.