Court: District Court of Appeal of Florida; May 29, 1992; Florida; State Appellate Court
Judge W. Sharp dissents on two grounds regarding the denial of attorney fees to Lisa in a dissolution case. He argues that the trial judge abused discretion by not considering the relative financial capabilities of both parties and misinterpreted section 61.075(1) of the Florida Statutes. Over their twelve-year marriage, the parties accumulated minimal marital assets, including a residence, two undeveloped lots, and a mobile home. The trial judge awarded Daniel the marital residence (valued at $35,000) and Lisa the mobile home and acreage (valued at approximately $80,000), along with the undeveloped lots as lump sum rehabilitative alimony (valued at approximately $34,000).
Lisa, a homemaker with custody of their three children, has limited income (totaling $1,800 per month from alimony and child support) which does not cover her living expenses. In contrast, Daniel has a significantly higher income (approximately $2,905 per month) and substantial non-marital assets, including inherited land valued between one and three million dollars. The trial court's rationale for denying attorney fees was based on the belief that requiring Daniel to pay would constitute an improper distribution of his non-marital assets, which he interpreted as prohibited by section 61.075(1).
However, Judge Sharp contends that the statute does not prevent the court from considering non-marital assets when determining alimony or attorney fees, especially when marital assets are inadequate. He asserts that the trial court should evaluate the total financial circumstances of both parties, including non-marital assets, to decide on the award of attorney fees to a financially disadvantaged spouse.
Older Florida case law remains applicable despite the introduction of the new equitable distribution statute. The trial court's denial of attorney's fees to Lisa was based on a misunderstanding that the statute barred such an award due to non-marital asset distribution, which is legally incorrect. A trial judge’s failure to apply the correct legal standard constitutes an error of law, not merely an abuse of discretion. The purpose of section 61.16, which governs attorney's fees in dissolution cases, is to ensure both spouses can access competent legal counsel regardless of their financial disparity. A spouse does not need to be entirely destitute to qualify for fees if the other possesses significantly greater financial resources. In the referenced Canakaris case, the court emphasized that financial disparities justified awarding fees, even though one spouse had substantial assets.
In Lisa's case, the financial circumstances are similarly unequal, primarily due to Daniel's non-marital assets. The distinction regarding the nature of the assets is deemed irrelevant. If attorney fees are denied, Lisa may face two adverse outcomes: her attorney may not receive full or timely payment, which could deter future legal representation for women, or she may need to use her limited alimony or child support, or liquidate awarded assets intended for her rehabilitation. Denying attorney fees forces Lisa to deplete necessary resources for her legal representation, which is deemed an abuse of discretion. The award of attorney’s fees is crucial to prevent an inequitable reduction of the financial support granted to her.
