Burt v. City of Montgomery

Citations: 598 So. 2d 5; 1991 Ala. Crim. App. LEXIS 2709; 1991 WL 291503Docket: CR 89-347

Court: Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama; December 26, 1991; Alabama; State Appellate Court

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Frederick Charles Burt was convicted of two counts of third-degree assault under a municipal ordinance in Montgomery, Alabama, receiving concurrent six-month jail sentences, $100 fines for each case, and a total of $200 to the victims' compensation fund. Additionally, he was ordered to pay restitution totaling $1,901.90. Burt appeals, raising three issues, one of which is a due process claim based on the alleged failure of the municipal police to preserve evidence critical to his defense. The assaults occurred on December 24, 1987, involving victims Bertha McClain and Tillman Keith Davis. McClain testified that she did not possess a weapon when Burt assaulted her and described a knife she retrieved during the incident, clarifying it was a small kitchen knife, not a butcher knife, and that she never took it outside her home. The appellant claimed that while at the police department, he was shown a knife, but there was no documentation of it as the case was classified as a misdemeanor. Defense witness Corporal R.G. Lock-ler indicated that he had no recollection of a knife at the scene. Although Burt was not arrested immediately, complaints were filed by the victims after the incident, leading to his arrest on January 4, 1988. Prior to trial, Burt filed a discovery motion, which did not specifically request the knife, but later alleged that the Montgomery Police Department had confiscated it. A subpoena for the knife was issued, but the police department reported it could not be located, which Burt argues is material evidence for his self-defense claim.

The appellant's trial occurred on June 29, 1989, following a motion to dismiss heard on June 13, 1989. During this hearing, the appellant asserted that a knife relevant to the case was collected by police and later brought to the interrogation room, but there was no evidence confirming the knife's custody by the Montgomery Police Department or its presentation in municipal court. The trial court questioned whether the knife was ever in police custody and ultimately denied the motion, concluding that any loss of the knife did not prejudice the appellant. The appellant acknowledged in his appeal that he could not prove the police acted in bad faith regarding the knife's loss. 

Legal precedent set by Arizona v. Youngblood establishes that without evidence of police bad faith, the failure to preserve potentially useful evidence does not constitute a due process violation. The court noted that unless evidence destruction is flagrant and deliberate, a conviction should only be overturned if it can be shown that the omission of the evidence actually prejudiced the defense. The knife's critical value lay not in its physical presence but in its link to one of the victims at the crime scene. At trial, seven defense witnesses supported the appellant's claim of self-defense, stating the victim was armed with a knife.

Additionally, the trial court did not permit cross-examination of the victim, Ms. McClain, regarding her reputed knife-carrying habits because there was no indication the appellant was aware of such reputation. Evidence suggesting a victim's habit of carrying weapons is admissible only if the accused can demonstrate prior knowledge of that habit. Furthermore, a witness cannot testify to their own reputation. The trial court's decision to deny the motion to dismiss and the restriction on cross-examination were thus upheld.

The municipal court mandated the appellant to pay restitution to the victims, which the appellant contests, arguing that the municipal court lacks the authority to impose such an order. However, Ala.Code 1975, 15-18-65 et seq. grants municipal courts the power to order restitution, particularly when granting probation, as specified in 12-14-13(d)(8). While there is no explicit statute allowing municipal courts to impose restitution outside of probation, the legislative authority to define crimes and punishments lies with the legislature, which must be clearly established by statute. The court emphasized that statutory jurisdiction is strictly defined and cannot be inferred. 

Restitution is authorized under Ala.Code 1975, 15-18-65 through 15-18-77, without limitation to specific courts. The legislative intent aims to ensure fairness in justice by requiring offenders to compensate victims for losses incurred due to their criminal actions. The clear legislative intent must guide judicial interpretation, and the court confirmed that municipal courts can impose restitution based on this authority. The judgment of the circuit court was affirmed. Furthermore, it was noted that, although not raised on appeal, the police lacked authority to arrest the appellant for a misdemeanor not witnessed by them, in accordance with Ala.Code 1975, 15-10-3.