United States v. Gerald Tisdale and Kevin Middleton, Rudy Forman
Docket: 1998
Court: Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit; November 3, 1999; Federal Appellate Court
Kevin Middleton appeals his conviction for conspiracy to distribute cocaine and related charges from the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, which resulted from a jury trial. His primary argument is that he was denied effective assistance of counsel because his attorney failed to move to suppress evidence obtained during a police raid at co-defendant Gerald Tisdale's residence. For a successful ineffectiveness claim based on suppression, Middleton must demonstrate that the suppression issue has merit and that there is a reasonable probability the verdict would have been different without the evidence. The court finds the suppression argument lacks merit, affirming the conviction. The search, conducted on November 9, 1990, was based on a no-knock warrant issued by a New York state judge and supported by an affidavit from a police officer that included information from a reliable confidential informant. The informant provided detailed accounts of drug transactions with Tisdale, which justified the no-knock warrant under New York law. The issuing judge questioned the informant under oath and deemed the warrant appropriate based on the risk of evidence destruction.
The appellant argues that the no-knock warrant lacked sufficient particularized showing of exigent circumstances as required by *Richards v. Wisconsin*, 520 U.S. 385 (1997). However, this argument is rejected. The method of police entry is a critical factor in evaluating the reasonableness of a search under the Fourth Amendment, as established in *Wilson v. Arkansas*, 514 U.S. 927 (1995). To justify a no-knock entry, police must have reasonable suspicion that announcing their presence would be dangerous, futile, or would allow evidence destruction. *Richards* indicates that a no-knock search can be valid even without a no-knock warrant if exigent circumstances exist, as seen when a magistrate deleted the no-knock provision but exigent circumstances justified the entry.
Issuing a warrant with a no-knock provision can protect police from later claims that exigent circumstances were lacking. The exclusionary rule does not apply if a police officer reasonably relies on a warrant issued by a neutral magistrate, even if the warrant is later deemed defective (*Illinois v. Krull*, 480 U.S. 340 (1987)). Reliance is unreasonable only if the supporting affidavit lacks probable cause to the point of being unreasonable. In this case, the affidavit suggested exigent circumstances since the drugs were described as easily disposable, exemplified by an incident where J.D. Gerald discarded drugs from the apartment window. This indicates that the officers' reliance on the warrant was not entirely unreasonable, and the presence of easily disposable contraband could justify no-knock entry.
Additionally, the applicability of the federal no-knock statute, 18 U.S.C. 3109, to state warrants executed by a joint state-federal task force is disputed, but this is deemed moot following *United States v. Ramirez*, 523 U.S. 65 (1998), which clarified that federal and constitutional standards align. The court concludes that 3109 includes an exigent circumstances exception assessed under the same Fourth Amendment standard set forth in *Richards*.
Both parties addressed the good faith issue in the context of the exigent circumstances rule established in the 1997 case Richards, without disputing that the standard applied at the time of the no-knock search warrant execution in November 1990. New York was noted as a jurisdiction with a similar rule to the blanket no-knock rule overturned by Richards, although the appellant did not argue that such a blanket rule existed prior to Richards. The case of People v. Clinton, decided nearly twenty years before Richards, invalidated a no-knock warrant due to the lack of immediate danger concerning the narcotics involved. The statutory text aligned with the requirements set by Richards, with the no-knock provision not solely based on drug involvement. For the appeal's resolution, it was assumed that the showing made was insufficiently particularized, and the court refrained from determining whether New York had a blanket rule or if it was unconstitutional prior to Richards. Officers could rely on the no-knock warrant in good faith, and the failure of trial counsel to file a suppression motion was deemed not to constitute ineffective assistance, given that the motion would have been meritless. The remaining arguments raised on appeal were also found lacking in merit, leading to the affirmation of the district court's judgment. The appellant's motion for a new trial was acknowledged as untimely and ineffective.
