United States v. Callie Mobley and Jimmie Mobley

Citations: 193 F.3d 492; 52 Fed. R. Serv. 1554; 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 23743; 1999 WL 773540Docket: 99-1621

Court: Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit; September 30, 1999; Federal Appellate Court

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Three weeks prior to trial, defendants Callie Mobley (Mayor of Alorton, Illinois) and Jimmie Mobley (Street Superintendent) moved to strike portions of their indictment for conspiracy to steal from the Village. The indictment accused Callie of receiving excessive salary payments and Jimmie of having Village employees perform renovations on their properties, with federal implications due to the Village's receipt of federal grants. The indictment alleged the conspiracy spanned from January 1990 to December 1997.

On the trial date, the district judge removed several paragraphs from the indictment, including paragraph 23, which detailed Callie Mobley's salary and the use of a backdated document to mislead the Village's paymaster. The judge justified the removal by stating that the events in question occurred before the charges and were outside the scope of the case. However, the indictment claimed the conspiracy started in 1990, allowing for the inclusion of events from that year as overt acts. Additionally, paragraph 23 referenced wrongful acts in years that were within the statute of limitations.

The judge also ruled on a motion in limine, granting some requests and denying others without detailed explanation. Following this, the Assistant U.S. Attorney indicated intentions to seek interlocutory appeal permission, to which the judge expressed frustration over potential delays. Ultimately, during a recess, the prosecutor secured approval to appeal, leading the judge to adjourn the proceedings.

Witnesses and prospective jurors were unnecessarily summoned and dismissed due to the district judge's late decisions on motions, which should have been resolved well in advance of the trial to avoid disruption to all parties involved. The court emphasized the importance of timely rulings, particularly at least one week prior to trial, to allow for proper preparation and potential appeals under section 3731. Additionally, any significant orders—such as those striking parts of an indictment or excluding evidence—must be accompanied by clear explanations to facilitate effective appellate review and uphold procedural integrity. The district judge failed to provide adequate reasoning for granting a motion in limine and for deleting paragraph 23 from the indictment, which could have prevented confusion and errors in the case. The lack of explanation hindered the parties’ ability to formulate their appeals effectively. The court asserted that it would address the clearly erroneous decisions made in this interlocutory appeal to ensure the case proceeds appropriately.

Paragraph 23 should be reinstated, allowing the prosecutor to prove its allegations as overt acts within the charged conspiracy. The defendants argue a lack of appellate jurisdiction based on the nature of Paragraph 23, which references overt acts rather than a complete count or discrete theory of liability. The district judge's lack of explanation creates ambiguity regarding whether the deletion pertains to an appealable portion of a count or to excluding overt acts before 1993. If the decision impacts proof rather than the charge, it falls under the appealable provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 3731, particularly concerning the exclusion of evidence that constitutes substantial proof of a material fact.

Regarding the motion in limine, the judge aimed to prevent the prosecutor from demonstrating that the Mobleys' spending exceeded their lawful income and that Callie Mobley misappropriated Village funds during a time of financial strain. The Mobleys’ expenditures are relevant to showing their motive for using Village resources and indicating a source of unlawful income. Such evidence is admissible unless its probative value is significantly outweighed by the potential for unfair prejudice or confusion. Although the Mobleys argue that the evidence of extravagant spending could unduly prejudice the jury, the potential misuse of funds does not preclude the prosecution from establishing motive. The defendants could have strengthened their case by conceding their overspending, but their failure to do so means the court need not resolve whether such a concession would have warranted excluding details of their expenditures.

Evidence that Callie Mobley caused the Village to fail to remit payroll taxes is subject to exclusion under Fed. R. Evid. 404(a)(1) and (b) if offered solely to demonstrate her criminal propensity. The prosecutor does not intend to use this evidence in the case in chief but anticipates that Mobley will claim the excess payments received from 1991-94 were deferred compensation tied to the Village's prior financial status. If this defense is raised, the prosecutor seeks to counter that the Village's financial condition had not improved, as evidenced by the unpaid payroll taxes. The court granted an unconditional exclusion of this evidence, which would hinder the prosecutor's ability to present a complete case, particularly against Mobley's potential defense regarding the Village's financial improvement. This ruling was deemed an abuse of discretion. Consequently, the prior decisions are reversed, and the case is remanded for trial in accordance with this opinion, with Circuit Rule 36 applying on remand.