B. C. Foreman Ida Clark Otis Tarver Dominic De La Cruz Louis Davis Mandy Pesina v. Dallas County, Texas Commissioners Court of Dallas County, Texas Lee F. Jackson, Dallas County Judge Jim Jackson John Wiley Price Mike Cantrell Kenneth A. Mayfield, Dallas County Commissioners Bruce Sherbet, Elections Administrator of Dallas County, Texas
Docket: 98-10864
Court: Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit; October 14, 1999; Federal Appellate Court
Plaintiffs B. C. Foreman, Ida Clark, Otis Tarver, Dominic De La Cruz, Louis Davis, and Mandy Pesina, who served as precinct election judges in Dallas County, Texas, lost their positions following the defendants' adoption of a new appointment method for election judges without preclearance from the U.S. Department of Justice as required under the Voting Rights Act of 1965. The plaintiffs filed a lawsuit alleging this violation. After extensive litigation, which included a Supreme Court appeal, the case was dismissed as moot when the Texas legislature enacted a different appointment method. The primary issue on appeal is whether the district court erred in awarding attorney fees to the plaintiffs as prevailing parties. The appellate court reversed the district court's decision and ruled that the plaintiffs were not entitled to attorney fees. The Texas Election Code mandated the Dallas County Commissioners Court to appoint election judges annually and allowed discretion in appointments while requiring consideration of the Elections Administrator's recommendations. From 1972 to 1996, the Commissioners Court adopted various methods for selecting election judges without obtaining the necessary preclearance from the Department of Justice.
In September 1996, the Commissioners Court altered the appointment process for presiding election judges in Dallas County, Texas. In precincts where the Republican Senate candidate had the most votes in the 1994 election, judges would be chosen based on the Republican party's approval, though a majority of the Commissioners Court could reject this choice. In precincts where the Republican candidate did not win, the commissioner would decide the appointment based on either party's submission, with the opposing party's nominee serving as an alternate, subject to a veto from the majority of the Court. This change effectively led to more Republican judges and fewer Democratic judges.
On October 3, 1996, black and Hispanic voters who were not reappointed as election judges filed a lawsuit, claiming the 1996 Order had not received necessary preclearance under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act (VRA). They sought a temporary restraining order against the implementation of this order, which was granted by the district court. Shortly thereafter, the Commissioners Court rescinded the 1996 Order and began appointing judges at their discretion, resulting in the appointment of only Republicans as presiding judges and Democrats as alternates, displacing at least 54 black and 33 Hispanic judges.
The plaintiffs amended their complaint to challenge the October Order for also lacking preclearance under the VRA. The three-judge court denied their request for an injunction, allowing the elections to proceed under the October Order, and dismissed the case afterward, asserting that Section 5 did not apply to the Commissioners Court's appointment procedures due to the preclearance of the Texas Election Code in 1985.
On appeal, the Supreme Court found that the appointment procedures were indeed covered by Section 5 of the VRA, emphasizing the need to determine whether the county's procedures differed from those in place when the VRA was enacted in Texas in 1972. Due to insufficient records from 1972 on the appointment methods, the Supreme Court vacated the three-judge court's ruling and remanded the case for further investigation.
Prior to the Supreme Court's decision, the Texas legislature amended section 32.002 of the Texas Election Code to establish a gubernatorial method for selecting election judges, a change precleared by the Justice Department on September 2, 1997. Following this, the Commissioners Court appointed new election judges on October 7, 1997. On January 8, 1998, a three-judge court dismissed the plaintiffs' preclearance claim as moot but left the issue of attorney's fees unresolved. Subsequently, a district judge ruled the plaintiffs were prevailing parties under 42 U.S.C. 1973l(e) and awarded them approximately $183,263 in attorney's fees. The defendants appealed the ruling.
The appeals court reviews attorney's fee awards for abuse of discretion and factual findings for clear error, while legal conclusions are reviewed de novo. The defendants challenged the district court’s finding that the plaintiffs qualified as prevailing parties, which the court based on two grounds: the plaintiffs' suit served as a significant catalyst for the legislative amendment and their success in obtaining a temporary restraining order.
The concept of prevailing parties, as clarified by the Supreme Court in Farrar v. Hobby, requires that a plaintiff achieve actual relief that materially alters the legal relationship between the parties. The plaintiffs must demonstrate a resolution that changes their relationship with the defendant. The defendants argued against the catalyst theory's applicability following the Farrar decision, asserting it cannot be used to justify prevailing party status based on actions by third parties, including legislative bodies.
The defendants' challenge to the district court's application of the catalyst theory introduces a complex legal issue. Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Farrar, the catalyst theory permitted plaintiffs to be considered prevailing parties even without a formal court victory, as long as their lawsuit was a significant factor in achieving the desired outcome. However, Farrar casts doubt on the catalyst theory's validity by emphasizing that a plaintiff must secure an enforceable judgment or comparable relief to claim prevailing party status, thereby necessitating a material alteration in the legal relationship between the parties. While some courts have completely rejected the catalyst theory post-Farrar, others maintain its applicability. This Court has not definitively resolved the impact of Farrar on the catalyst theory despite some post-Farrar cases referencing it. Ultimately, even if the catalyst theory were to be accepted in this Circuit, the specific facts of this case do not demonstrate that the plaintiffs qualify as prevailing parties under 42 U.S.C. § 1973l(e).
Under the catalyst theory, a plaintiff can only be deemed a prevailing party and entitled to attorney's fees if they demonstrate: (1) the relief sought was indeed obtained, and (2) the lawsuit caused the defendant to change its conduct. The lawsuit must be a significant factor in motivating the defendant's behavior. In this case, defendants argue plaintiffs do not qualify as prevailing parties because they did not obtain the requested relief and insufficient evidence exists to show the lawsuit influenced the Texas legislature's adoption of a new gubernatorial appointment procedure.
The plaintiffs filed suit under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act (VRA), claiming the defendants implemented a 1996 appointment procedure without necessary preclearance from the Department of Justice. They sought various forms of relief: a declaration that the 1996 Order was unenforceable, injunctions against non-precleared procedures, and a requirement for the defendants to preclear the appointment method.
The court found that the plaintiffs aimed solely to enforce Section 5's preclearance requirements, and when the legislature adopted a different method, the case was rendered moot, leaving plaintiffs without the substantive relief they sought. Although plaintiffs claimed to have achieved relief through reappointment under the new method, this argument was unconvincing as their complaint specifically targeted the preclearance issue. The court concluded that a defendant cannot be liable for attorney's fees for relief not explicitly demanded in the lawsuit, particularly when that relief was secured through actions of an independent party. Thus, the district court erred in determining the plaintiffs had successfully obtained the relief sought.
Insufficient evidence exists to establish a causal link between the plaintiffs' suit and the Texas legislature's decision to change the appointment procedure. The catalyst theory requires plaintiffs to demonstrate that their lawsuit was a significant influence on the relief obtained, which they fail to do. The legislative process involves various factors, making it challenging for a plaintiff to show their individual suit was the main catalyst for legislative changes. The district court incorrectly relied on affidavits from three legislators who claimed the lawsuit influenced the legislative decision, as these affidavits lack probative weight regarding the overall intent of the Texas legislature. The court should consider the official legislative record, which indicates that efforts to amend the appointment method began before the plaintiffs’ lawsuit. Therefore, even if the plaintiffs achieved some relief, there is no substantial evidence connecting their lawsuit to the legislative changes. Additionally, the district court's finding that the plaintiffs were prevailing parties based on a temporary restraining order is disputed, as such an order is generally considered a temporary measure without bearing on the merits of the case.
To obtain prevailing party status, a party must achieve 'actual relief on the merits' that materially alters the legal relationship between the parties, as established in Farrar. A temporary restraining order does not qualify as merits-based relief or a final remedy; it serves merely as an equitable measure to maintain the status quo during litigation. Therefore, it cannot establish prevailing party status. The district court erred in its contrary determination. While the court did not resolve the viability of the catalyst theory in this Circuit, it ruled that the district court incorrectly found the plaintiffs to be prevailing parties under this theory as well. As such, the decision to grant attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1973l(e) was an abuse of discretion, leading to a reversal of the award. Additionally, the context of the legislative actions prior to the plaintiffs' suit indicated that the changes they claimed to have influenced were already under consideration, undermining their claim to have catalyzed those changes. A dissenting opinion argues that the catalyst theory should apply, but disagrees with the majority's conclusion about prevailing party status.
The court reviews a district court's attorneys' fee award for abuse of discretion, with underlying factual findings examined for clear error. A district court has broad discretion to determine the appropriate fee award, as established in several cases including LULAC v. Roscoe Independent School District and Associated Builders and Contractors of Louisiana. The process of determining attorneys' fees is considered an "intensely factual" inquiry, which justifies the district court's discretion based on its superior understanding of the litigation and the aim to limit frequent appellate reviews of factual matters. Upon applying this deferential standard, the author disagrees with the majority's view that the district court erred in its factual findings or abused its discretion in awarding fees to the plaintiffs. To establish prevailing party status under the catalyst theory, plaintiffs must show that (1) they obtained the relief sought and (2) their lawsuit prompted the defendant to change its conduct. The majority contends that the plaintiffs filed the action solely to enforce preclearance procedures of the Voting Rights Act, asserting that the plaintiffs ended up with nothing when the Texas legislature adopted a different appointment method. However, this conclusion is not supported by the record.
A group of African-American and Hispanic voters from Dallas County, who served as election judges, filed a complaint against the Dallas County Commissioners Court for changing appointment procedures on September 3, 1996, which threatened their positions. The plaintiffs claimed the changes violated Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act by not obtaining necessary preclearance from the Department of Justice. Initially, they sought declaratory and injunctive relief to prevent the unapproved procedures from taking effect.
The district court granted a temporary restraining order, halting the implementation of the 1996 Order. Subsequently, the defendants rescinded the 1996 Order and adopted a new procedure that allowed discretionary selection of election judges. This action achieved one of the plaintiffs' goals, as the 1996 Order was effectively nullified, even without a formal court declaration of its unenforceability.
The plaintiffs also aimed to have the new appointment procedures precleared. However, the defendants contended these procedures were exempt from preclearance due to their discretionary nature under the Texas Election Code, which had been precleared in 1985. The district court supported the defendants, denying the plaintiffs' request for a permanent injunction.
Ultimately, the plaintiffs succeeded in obtaining a judicial declaration affirming that the procedures for appointing election judges were subject to Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act. The Supreme Court's ruling in Foreman v. Dallas County clarified that the Commissioners Court's selection actions required preclearance, meaning they could not implement new procedures without complying with Section 5 in the future.
The Supreme Court remanded the case for further proceedings after the Texas Legislature amended Section 32.002 of the Texas Election Code to select precinct election judges based on gubernatorial election results. This amendment was precleared by the Department of Justice in September 1997, superseding the October 1996 Orders at issue in the litigation. As a consequence, all plaintiffs were reappointed as election judges, and the defendants were required to implement the precleared selection method mandated by the Voting Rights Act.
To qualify as prevailing parties under the catalyst theory, the plaintiffs must demonstrate that their lawsuit significantly contributed to the legislative changes. While the lawsuit doesn’t need to be the sole reason for the legislature's action, it must have played a crucial role in the resulting improvements. The majority opinion found that the district court erred in establishing a causal link between the lawsuit and the legislative actions, particularly criticizing the reliance on affidavits from three Texas legislators.
Contrary to this view, the dissent argues that the district court's reliance on these affidavits was appropriate, emphasizing a distinction from the case of Bread Political Action Committee v. Federal Election Commission. In Bread, the Supreme Court rejected the use of a legislator's affidavit to infer legislative intent regarding statutory interpretation. However, in the current case, the affidavits were used to illustrate that the lawsuit was a motivating factor for the legislative action, focusing on legislative motive rather than intent. Factors surrounding legislative motive should be carefully examined in this context.
Courts should prioritize the statute's language and official legislative history over post-hoc opinions of legislators when interpreting statutory meaning. While such opinions may provide insight into motivations for introducing legislation, they are often insufficient and can be confusing. Nonetheless, a reasonable method exists for parties to demonstrate that a lawsuit influenced legislative action, notably through legislators' statements about their motivations.
Three Texas legislators—Senator Royce West, Representative Debra Danburg, and Representative Terri Hodge—provided affidavits indicating that the current lawsuit was a catalyst for their respective legislative actions. Senator West introduced Senate Bill 130 after learning about a 1996 Order from the defendants that would change election judge selection procedures, and he engaged with the plaintiffs' counsel regarding the lawsuit's influence on his legislative initiative. Representative Danburg, chair of the Texas House Committee on Elections, confirmed that her introduction of House Bill 331 was also influenced by awareness of the lawsuit. Representative Hodge noted that the lawsuit was a topic of discussion among her colleagues and recognized it as a catalyst for legislative action.
The defendants did not present any affidavits or evidence that contradicted the legislators' assertions regarding the lawsuit's significance in prompting the legislation. Their only supporting evidence was a 1995 house bill with similar language, which did not effectively counter the legislators' testimony about the lawsuit's impact on the legislative process.
The court majority concluded that the prior existence of a bill proposing gubernatorial selection indicated that the 1997 legislation was already being considered by the Texas legislature and was not influenced by the plaintiffs' lawsuit. However, the 1995 bill that passed in the Texas House did not make it through the Senate, meaning that the gubernatorial appointment proposal was not under legislative consideration at the time of the plaintiffs' 1996 lawsuit. The majority also noted a lack of case law supporting the idea that a pre-existing legislative concept inherently prevents finding a catalytic effect from litigation.
Senators West and Danburg, who introduced the 1997 bills, testified that the plaintiffs' lawsuit was the catalyst for their legislative actions, and the majority did not dispute their credibility. The district court correctly dismissed the defendants' argument that the earlier 1995 bill motivated the introduction of the 1997 legislation due to a lack of contradictory evidence.
The majority referenced Milton v. Shalala, which highlighted the difficulty of linking legislative actions to individual lawsuits, as the plaintiff's claim there was one of many similar cases. In contrast, the present plaintiffs' lawsuit was unique and directly acknowledged by legislators as a catalyst for the 1997 legislation. Unlike the Milton plaintiff, the current plaintiffs provided uncontradicted, sworn statements from legislators affirming the lawsuit's role in prompting legislative action.
The dissenting opinion disagreed with the majority's assessment, arguing that the district court did not err in finding the plaintiffs' lawsuit was a significant factor in the passage of the legislation that led to changes in the appointment of election judges. The plaintiffs ultimately achieved their lawsuit's objectives by prompting the abandonment of a prior order and securing a favorable Supreme Court ruling regarding the appointment procedures under the Voting Rights Act.
Plaintiffs were reappointed as election judges following the enactment of Texas legislation in 1997, which was influenced by their lawsuit against the defendants. The district court found substantial evidence supporting this claim, leading to the conclusion that the court acted within its discretion in awarding attorneys' fees to the plaintiffs under 42 U.S.C. 1731(e). The dissent notes that while the majority questions the continued validity of the catalyst theory after the Supreme Court's ruling in Farrar v. Hobby, other circuits continue to apply it. Additionally, the Supreme Court did not definitively rule on the need for preclearance related to the October Order due to insufficient record information. The majority's assertion that legislators' statements lack evidence of a response to the lawsuit is countered by an affidavit from Steve McDonald, who testified that the lawsuit was cited as a motivating factor for the legislative action. No opposing affidavits were presented in the record.
