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Nathan Kaplan, Edith Citron, Martin H. Philip, Derivatively on Behalf of Texaco, Inc., Consolidated-Plaintiffs-Appellees, Texaco, Inc. v. William C. Rand, Esq., Robert A. Beck, Peter I. Bijur, John Brademas, Willard C. Butcher, Edmund M. Carpenter, Alfred C. Decrane, Jr., Michael C. Hawley, Franklyn G. Jenifer, Allen J. Krowe, Thomas S. Murphy, Charles H. Price, Ii, Robin B. Smith, William C. Steere, Jr., Thomas A. Vanderslice, William Wrigley, Robert Ulrich, J. David Keough and Richard A. Lundwall

Citations: 192 F.3d 60; 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 21946; 80 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1669Docket: 1998

Court: Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit; September 14, 1999; Federal Appellate Court

Narrative Opinion Summary

In this case, the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York awarded $1 million in attorney fees to counsel representing plaintiffs Nathan Kaplan, Edith Citron, and Martin H. Philip in a derivative action against Texaco, Inc. The plaintiffs alleged breaches of fiduciary duty by Texaco’s officers in connection with discriminatory practices, resulting in a settlement that included non-monetary benefits like a Task Force report and a non-discrimination clause in vendor contracts. William C. Rand, Esq., a shareholder, appealed the fee award despite not being a party to the case. The appellate court held that shareholders have standing to appeal fee awards impacting corporate funds, rejecting the fee award due to a lack of substantial non-monetary benefits. The court reversed the district court's judgment, finding the settlement's benefits illusory and insufficient to justify the attorney fees, and remanded the case with directions to deny the fee award. This decision underscores the requirement that derivative actions must confer significant corporate benefits to support attorney fees, particularly in the absence of a monetary recovery.

Legal Issues Addressed

Attorney Fees in Derivative Actions

Application: The court reversed the district court’s fee award due to the lack of substantial non-monetary benefits, which are required to justify such awards in derivative actions.

Reasoning: An award of counsel fees is only justified if the derivative action yields a substantial non-monetary benefit to the corporation, defined as a significant correction of abuses prejudicial to the corporation's rights.

Evaluation of Settlement Benefits

Application: The court found that the purported benefits of the settlement, such as the Task Force report notice and non-discrimination clause, did not constitute substantial benefits to warrant attorney fees.

Reasoning: The settlement in this case lacks substantive remedies for past misconduct, offering instead illusory therapeutic 'benefits.'

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23.1

Application: The rule mandates notice to shareholders in derivative actions, allowing them to object and potentially appeal court decisions affecting their interests.

Reasoning: Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23.1 mandates shareholder notice for settlements or dismissals, implying that shareholders should retain the right to challenge court rulings based on their objections.

Jurisdiction and Standing in Derivative Actions

Application: The appellate court considered William C. Rand, Esq.'s appeal despite his non-party status, recognizing his interest as a shareholder objecting to the fee award.

Reasoning: A shareholder who objects to the payment of attorney fees from corporate funds in a derivative action possesses an affected interest, allowing them standing to appeal a judgment directing such payment.

Role of Special Master in Fee Determination

Application: The Special Master recommended a reduced fee award after determining the benefits to the corporation were insufficient to justify the requested multiplier.

Reasoning: The Special Master determined that the benefits to stockholders were significant but insufficient to warrant the requested fee increase.