Bruce Buckles Linda Buckles and Alvin Banks v. King County, a Political Subdivision of the State of Washington Joseph W. Tovar Chris Smith Towne M. Peter Philley
Docket: 98-35270
Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit; September 10, 1999; Federal Appellate Court
The case involves Bruce and Linda Buckles and Alvin Banks appealing a summary judgment from the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington in favor of King County and members of the Growth Management Hearings Board regarding a zoning decision under the Washington Growth Management Act of 1990. The key issues addressed include whether the board members are entitled to absolute immunity from damages and whether the Buckles' claims of procedural due process, substantive due process, and takings against King County can survive summary judgment. The Ninth Circuit reviewed the summary judgment de novo and affirmed the district court's ruling.
The Buckles own approximately 10 acres of property in unincorporated King County, which has been used for residential purposes since their purchase in 1974. The property is surrounded primarily by residential zones, with some adjacent areas designated for industrial and commercial use. In November 1994, the Buckles were notified that King County would rezone their property from 'SE-P' (Suburban Estates) to 'RA-5-P' (Rural Area), which permits residential use with a minimum lot size of five acres. This rezone was part of a broader effort by King County to comply with the Growth Management Act, which mandates the adoption of comprehensive land use plans and the designation of urban growth areas.
The Buckles engaged an attorney to petition the King County Council to designate their property as 'Rural Neighborhood' for limited retail and commercial use. Their lobbying succeeded on November 17, 1994, when the Council adopted Amendment 101, designating their property as 'Rural Neighborhood' just before the adoption of the King County Comprehensive Plan. In January 1995, the Council enacted Ordinance 11653, zoning the Buckles' property as 'Neighborhood Business' under the comprehensive plan mandated by the Growth Management Act.
The Comprehensive Plan faced challenges, including claims of inadequate public participation regarding the redesignation of the Buckles' property. These challenges were consolidated into Vashon-Maury v. King County, where the Washington Growth Management Hearings Board found Amendment 101 invalid due to procedural violations, specifically the lack of public comment. The Board did not assess substantive violations of the Growth Management Act. Notably, the Buckles were unaware of this proceeding, which became a significant grievance in their case.
In response to the Board's remand, King County held new proceedings that included four public hearings. Subsequently, the Council adopted Ordinance No. 12170, redesignating the Buckles' property as 'Rural Residential' with an RA-5 zoning classification. The Buckles appealed this decision to the Board, which rejected their appeal. Instead of appealing the Board's decision to superior court as allowed under the Growth Management Act, the Buckles filed a lawsuit in King County Superior Court against King County and Board members, claiming they were victims of a zoning change and alleging due process violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The case was removed to federal court, where the Buckles amended their complaint to include a takings claim. The district court dismissed claims against the Board members based on quasi-judicial immunity and ruled that the Buckles could not pursue a federal substantive due process claim, ultimately granting summary judgment for King County on their takings, procedural due process, and state substantive due process claims.
Members of the Growth Management Hearings Board are granted absolute immunity from lawsuits for damages related to their rulings on petitions, as determined by the district court. Immunity assessments are a legal question reviewed de novo. The Growth Management Act established three boards in Washington, with the Central Puget Sound board overseeing King County cases. Each board comprises three members with qualifications in land use planning, operating as a quasi-judicial body that adjudicates compliance challenges under the Act. The Board can find local government plans or regulations invalid if they interfere with the Act's goals, even though such plans are initially presumed valid.
The principle that no one is above the law underpins the discussion of immunity, emphasizing that public officials must justify any claim for absolute exemption from liability for unconstitutional actions. The Supreme Court has recognized the necessity of absolute immunity for certain officials performing judicial-like functions to protect them from lawsuits alleging improper motives in their decisions. This has been extended to agency officials engaged in similar quasi-judicial roles, such as members of the Nevada Gaming Commission and parole board officials.
Judicial immunity may extend to officials other than judges, such as Board members, when their discretionary judgments are similar to those made by judges in resolving disputes. This immunity is rooted in the need to protect the independent and impartial exercise of judgment essential to the judiciary, as exposure to potential damages could compromise this independence. The Supreme Court has established that the characteristics of the judicial process applicable to administrative adjudications include adversarial proceedings, insulation from political influence, reliance on evidence, and comprehensive decisions on factual and legal issues.
The Board, which adjudicates land use disputes, exhibits these judicial characteristics, confirming its quasi-judicial role. The Buckles’ claim that the proceedings were non-adversarial due to their non-party status is misguided, as the Board's decision involved opposing positions from community petitioners and King County regarding zoning compliance with public participation requirements.
Regarding political insulation, Board members are appointed by the governor for staggered six-year terms, with restrictions preventing political party dominance and ensuring that members do not engage in conflicting work or hold other public offices. Prohibitions on ex parte communications and provisions for disqualification based on bias further enhance the independence and impartiality of Board members.
The Board's decision-making process is structured with several safeguards to ensure the reliability of information. Discovery is restricted to instances ordered by the Board, and the government must provide an index of all materials used in the contested action. Documentary evidence for hearings must be submitted in advance to the parties involved. The proceedings include features akin to judicial processes, such as sworn testimony, subpoenas, adherence to the Washington rules of evidence as a non-binding guide, and a written decision with the right to judicial review in superior court.
Contrasting this case with Cleavinger v. Saxner, where procedural safeguards were lacking, the Board's procedures are deemed sufficient to support immunity for its members. The Buckles argue against the Board's immunity due to perceived deficiencies in procedural safeguards, particularly regarding notice, indispensable parties, and the right to appeal. However, notice provisions and the right to review are applicable only to parties involved in the proceedings.
The Buckles' claim that their non-party status undermines the Board's immunity overlooks the Board's role in adjudication. The Board did not alter the zoning of the Buckles' property but determined that King County failed to meet public participation requirements, subsequently invalidating an ordinance and remanding the case for further action. The absence of an indispensable parties doctrine does not negate immunity, as courts also recognize exceptions in cases focused on public rights. The presence of multiple procedural safeguards in the Board's processes supports the conclusion that immunity should not be denied.
The Buckles contend that Board members should not receive absolute immunity, paralleling the case of Zamsky v. Hansell, where commissioners were denied such protection for performing dual roles as lawmakers and compliance monitors. In contrast, the Board members do not fulfill this dual function. They argue that absolute immunity is unnecessary since the state covers the Board members' legal defenses and indemnifies them against judgments. However, the principles of judicial immunity prioritize protection from harassment and discourage collateral attacks, ensuring that judicial errors are corrected through appeals rather than lawsuits against decision-makers. If Board members lacked this immunity, it could lead to a surge in litigation against them, deterring qualified individuals from serving and disrupting the judicial review process.
The Buckles assert that this immunity leaves them without recourse against the Board, but they overlook their right to appeal the Board’s decision, which they did not exercise. Consequently, they waived their right to a remedy regarding the Board's decision. The court concludes that the Board members are entitled to absolute immunity and does not address the Buckles' claims of qualified immunity or procedural due process.
Additionally, the Buckles have filed claims against King County, alleging illegal 'downzoning' of their property from commercial to residential use, despite its long-standing residential designation. They present three legal challenges: procedural due process, substantive due process, and takings claims, while asserting that King County's actions constitute 'spot zoning.'
The district court's summary judgment for King County on the Buckles' procedural due process claim is affirmed due to the Buckles' failure to adequately support their assertion of partiality in the zoning decision. They did not present evidence or argue for a 'legitimate claim of entitlement' to commercial zoning based on state law, particularly neglecting to address a previously invalidated amendment.
Regarding the substantive due process claim, the district court's dismissal is upheld as the Buckles cannot assert a substantive due process claim alongside a takings claim, per established precedent. The court emphasized that when a specific constitutional provision addresses the government action in question, that provision must govern the analysis, not the broader substantive due process protections. The Buckles argue that their claim pertains to 'spot zoning,' which can be interpreted in multiple constitutional contexts, but the court maintains that changing the label does not alter the legal outcome. The core issue in a spot zoning challenge is whether the zoning action serves the general welfare of the community.
Washington courts define 'spot zoning' as an arbitrary and unreasonable zoning action that designates a smaller area within a larger district for a use classification that differs significantly from the surrounding areas and is inconsistent with the comprehensive plan. Spot zoning typically favors private interests rather than the community's welfare. In the case of Smith v. Skagit County, illegal spot zoning was identified when 470 acres of island property were rezoned from residential-recreational to industrial use.
The Buckles' substantive due process claim was dismissed, as it must be analyzed under the Takings Clause rather than a generalized notion of substantive due process. Any aspect of their spot zoning claim that could be interpreted as a Fifth Amendment claim will be addressed as a takings issue. The Buckles argued that they should be allowed to pursue a state substantive due process claim, asserting that the Washington Constitution offers broader protections than the federal constitution, referencing a post-Macri decision. However, this argument was dismissed because the Buckles failed to articulate the necessary factors to support their claim, thus limiting the analysis to the federal constitution.
The Buckles' takings claim challenges King County Ordinance 12170, which designated their property as 'Rural Residential.' They argue that this designation does not serve a legitimate county interest and constitutes a taking without just compensation, particularly as it represents a 'downzoning' from commercial to residential use. This claim aligns with their spot zoning theory, asserting that the stricter zoning imposed on them is unfair compared to the zoning of their commercial neighbors.
The Buckles' takings claim overlooks key facts: their property has been part of a residentially-zoned area for over twenty years, purchased under the same zoning, and used solely for residential purposes. A brief 1995 zoning change to Rural Neighborhood for limited commercial use was invalidated due to improper lobbying and violation of public participation laws, rendering reliance on this designation ineffective. The county’s zoning was part of a legally mandated Comprehensive Plan that designated urban growth areas, maintaining the rural residential status for the Buckles' property and surrounding areas, while a small neighborhood business area was retained.
In contrast to the Supreme Court's ruling in City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes, where the city failed to adhere to its zoning laws, the Buckles’ circumstances reflect a consistent application of zoning regulations. Their claim, which alleges that the residential zoning constitutes a taking without just compensation, falls under regulatory takings doctrine, which allows for property regulation as long as it does not eliminate all viable use and serves a legitimate government interest. The Buckles admit that the residential redesignation did not eliminate all economically viable use or interfere with investment-backed expectations. Thus, their takings claim hinges on whether the 'Rural Residential' designation advances a legitimate state interest, a determination they believe should be made by a jury.
The district court ruled on the Buckles' takings claim through summary judgment, consistent with practices before the Del Monte Dunes decision, which necessitates reevaluation of this approach. The Supreme Court clarified that a property owner bringing a takings claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 has a limited right to a jury trial, particularly on factual issues regarding deprivation of economically viable use of property. Although the Buckles claimed a loss in property value due to residential zoning, they did not assert total deprivation of use.
Del Monte Dunes highlighted that the determination of whether a land use decision substantially advances a legitimate government interest is a mixed question of law and fact, best assessed by a jury under specific circumstances. The Supreme Court permitted jury involvement in cases where the landowner argued that the city's actions were inconsistent with its own zoning ordinances. However, the Court also emphasized that its ruling does not guarantee a jury trial for all takings claims, noting that some issues may remain within the judge's purview.
The Court expressed difficulty in distinguishing cases that require jury trials from those that do not, acknowledging the lack of a clear demarcation and cautioning against broad application of its ruling. Ultimately, the court concluded that the district court acted correctly in its summary judgment ruling due to the distinct nature of the Buckles' claims compared to those in Del Monte Dunes.
The Buckles' challenge to King County's zoning focuses on the claim of spot zoning, arguing that the zoning of their property is inconsistent with the surrounding properties rather than with the county's general ordinances. They assert that it is unfair for the county to maintain the established boundary between residential and commercial zones without including their property as part of the commercial zone. Unlike Del Monte Dunes, the Buckles do not allege that King County failed to adhere to its zoning regulations; instead, they claim that the county's decision not to expand the commercial zone constitutes an unreasonable application of general regulations.
The Buckles' arguments center on two main points: first, that King County effectively took their property by redesignating it from a limited business use to Rural Residential, and second, that the zoning constitutes an illegal spot zone. However, the county contends that it cannot take property that the Buckles never had a definitive business designation for, as the zoning for limited business use was never finalized. The district court found no material issues of fact, noting that the surrounding zoning and nonconforming uses do not support the Buckles' claims of incompatible use.
Additionally, the Buckles' Section 1983 claim is characterized as a due process issue rather than a takings claim, which was dismissed appropriately. The distinctions between their case and Del Monte Dunes allow the district court to determine whether the county's actions served a substantial interest. King County provided at least four interests for designating the Buckles' property as residential, including compliance with the Growth Management Act and maintaining zoning consistency with adjacent residential properties.
Key points include that the government is justified in not allowing nonconforming uses near the Buckles' property to warrant additional commercial zoning and in not expanding the adjacent Rural Neighborhood due to the presence of a salmon-bearing stream on the property. The Supreme Court has affirmed the government's legitimate interest in protecting undeveloped areas from urbanization, as highlighted in Agins v. Tiburon, where a zoning ordinance restricting residential development was upheld because it did not eliminate all economic use of the property and served to promote orderly residential development. The Buckles argue their situation is more similar to Nectow v. City of Cambridge, which involved zoning restrictions in an industrial context; however, the majority of land around the Buckles' property is residentially zoned, making Agins more applicable. The ruling emphasizes that while not every zoning restriction will be upheld, the Buckles' claim fails due to their purchase of the property when it was zoned for residential use and their historical residential use of the property. King County argues that permitting the Buckles' claims could lead to widespread commercial zoning in rural areas. The court affirmed the decision, with each party bearing its own appeal costs.
The neighborhood business zone (NB) aims to provide convenient retail and personal services while minimizing commercial impacts on nearby properties. The Board claims that the suit is barred by the Eleventh Amendment, arguing it is against the Hearings Board, a state agency. However, the Buckles allege claims against the Board members personally, circumventing this bar. The Washington Supreme Court's suggestion that procedural safeguards necessary for quasi-judicial settings may not apply in land use cases is noted with disagreement, referencing a federal case that upheld quasi-judicial immunity for board members in similar contexts. The district court dismissed the procedural due process claim, classifying King County's zoning action as legislative, but this classification is not essential to the current ruling.
The term "spot zoning" lacks a solid legal foundation and is often deemed a catchword; Washington courts do not provide broader protections under state law compared to federal law. The Buckles categorize their claim as "spot zoning," though it is more accurately described as "reverse spot zoning," where a zoning change imposes stricter restrictions, harming the property owner economically. While the Buckles cite cases from other states to support their claim, these cases differ significantly from the current situation, as they involve properties that were previously zoned for more extensive use before being restricted. The Buckles' expert valued their residential property at $421,000, significantly higher than its purchase price. Courts generally assess whether regulations interfere with landowners' investment-backed expectations in cases of economic use denial, as established in the Penn Central case.
