William Russell Aiken v. City of Memphis, Tennessee

Citations: 190 F.3d 753; 5 Wage & Hour Cas.2d (BNA) 961; 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 21268; 1999 WL 689468Docket: 97-6371

Court: Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit; September 7, 1999; Federal Appellate Court

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Plaintiffs, former and current Memphis police officers, appealed a district court's dismissal of two claims and a final judgment favoring the City of Memphis in a case involving alleged violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). The plaintiffs contended that the city’s sick leave policy, the lack of compensation for canine officers’ commuting time, compensatory time usage policies, and the classification of police captains regarding FLSA overtime requirements were all violations of the Act. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the city on the first two claims, and after a pretrial conference, ruled in the city’s favor on the remaining claims based on trial submissions. The appeal was reviewed de novo by the Sixth Circuit Court, affirming the district court's judgments based on the absence of genuine issues of material fact and adherence to legal standards. The court emphasized that evidence must be viewed in favor of the non-moving party and that legal conclusions were reviewed de novo while factual findings were assessed for clear error.

Plaintiffs argue that the district court incorrectly upheld the city's compensatory time policy under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). According to the collective bargaining agreements, officers can choose between overtime pay and compensatory time, accumulating up to 480 hours. Officers must log their requests for compensatory time within thirty days, but commanding officers can limit requests if they believe staffing will be adversely affected. Plaintiffs contend this practice violates the FLSA, specifically the provision allowing compensatory time instead of overtime, which mandates that employees must be allowed to use accrued time unless it unduly disrupts agency operations. The plaintiffs interpret "unduly disrupt" to mean that an agency can only deny a request if it would impose an unreasonable burden on service quality and quantity. The city’s policy of denying overtime to allow compensatory time for other officers is argued not to constitute undue disruption. Plaintiffs reference case law and regulatory guidance indicating that the need for overtime to accommodate a compensatory time request does not inherently justify a claim of undue disruption. They assert that the city’s practice of closing logbooks does not align with the FLSA’s requirements and thus constitutes a violation.

The plaintiffs' argument is fundamentally flawed as it fails to consider the term "reasonable period," which the Act allows parties to define. Relevant case law and regulations affirm that agreements between employers and employees regarding compensatory time are valid as long as they do not conflict with the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). Specifically, the use of compensatory time must be based on a prior agreement between the employer and employee, as outlined in 29 C.F.R. 553.25(c)(2). The terms of such an agreement dictate what constitutes a "reasonable period." The Department of Labor has indicated that the appropriateness of these agreed-upon terms should not be subject to further review under the FLSA.

In this case, the city and the plaintiffs' union had a specific agreement that defined the conditions under which employees could take compensatory time off. This agreement established that the reasonable period for requesting compensatory time spans from thirty days before the desired date until staffing levels are adequate. The district court did not err in siding with the city regarding this claim.

Additionally, the plaintiffs argued that they were entitled to compensation for time spent commuting with their assigned canine companions. While the city requires officers to care for their dogs at home and transport them to work, the majority of compensation-related issues have been resolved. However, the city does not compensate officers for commuting time, including time spent caring for the dogs during the commute. The court disagreed with the plaintiffs' assertion that this policy violates the Act.

The Portal-to-Portal Act, which amended the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) in 1947, specifies activities that are not considered work and thus are non-compensable, such as commuting to and from the workplace and activities that are preliminary or postliminary to principal work tasks. However, employees must be compensated for any work required by the employer during the commute. In legal discussions surrounding canine care during commutes, it has been established that activities like feeding, training, and walking police dogs are compensable. Despite this, plaintiffs in the referenced cases did not provide sufficient evidence that officers engaged in such dog care activities for more than a minimal amount of time during their commutes. Courts have determined that trivial amounts of time spent on work-related tasks outside of scheduled hours may be disregarded, as established in prior rulings. The plaintiffs’ affidavits indicated only occasional dog care tasks during commutes, which were deemed too general to create a factual question for summary judgment. Additionally, claims related to vehicle maintenance and other commuting issues, such as cleaning and scheduling maintenance for city vehicles, were also contested, particularly concerning whether such time should be compensated.

Plaintiffs' claims regarding cleaning and maintenance of police vehicles lack merit under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). The FLSA specifies that activities incidental to an employee's use of an employer's vehicle for commuting do not count as principal work activities, provided there is an agreement between the employer and employees. The plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that police officers' vehicle use during commutes falls outside normal commuting areas or lacks a union agreement. Cleaning and scheduling maintenance for vehicles are considered incidental activities, which Congress intended to exclude from compensable work. Routine tasks like vehicle inspections are classified as preliminary or postliminary and are therefore non-compensable. 

Regarding compensation for commute time, the district court correctly ruled that merely monitoring a police radio does not convert travel time into compensable work. The plaintiffs argued that responding to emergencies while commuting should warrant compensation; however, if an officer responds to an incident during their commute, they are only compensated if the response exceeds thirty minutes. The deterrent effect of marked police vehicles on crime is irrelevant to FLSA considerations, and no exemption exists for commuting time in marked vehicles, regardless of modifications or branding. Additionally, the minimal effort involved in monitoring a police radio during commutes is insufficient to establish compensable work.

On the Location-When-Ill (LWI) policy, the plaintiffs contended that the district court erred in granting summary judgment against them. The LWI policy allows employees on leave for illness or injury to receive normal pay but mandates that they remain at home unless visiting a doctor or obtaining supervisor permission. While the policy does not restrict activities at home, leaving without permission can lead to disciplinary action. The city enforces this policy through regular supervisory checks, which may include phone calls or in-person visits if there is no response.

Plaintiffs assert that the LWI policy imposed by their employer was excessively burdensome, warranting that all time spent under the policy, even during non-work hours, should be considered as hours worked for the purposes of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). They seek overtime compensation for time spent outside regular shifts. The FLSA mandates that employees be compensated at a rate of at least one and a half times their normal pay for hours worked beyond the established maximum workweek. The determination of whether time counts as work hinges on the restrictions placed on employees during what is considered their free time. Courts have established that for off-time to qualify as work time under the FLSA, an employee's freedom must be severely restricted.

In this case, the Court found that the time Memphis officers spent under the LWI policy does not qualify as compensable work. Officers retain the freedom to use their time at home as they choose, with only a minor obligation to seek permission before leaving, and there is no evidence that permission was routinely denied. The minimal requirement of checking in does not prevent them from engaging in personal activities. Previous cases that established on-call time as compensable involved much greater restrictions. Thus, the district court correctly dismissed the plaintiffs’ claim.

Plaintiffs argue that the district court wrongly ruled in favor of the city concerning the exempt status of police captains under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). The City of Memphis classifies captains as salaried executive employees and does not pay them overtime, as the FLSA exempts bona fide executives from overtime requirements. To qualify for this exemption, an employee must be paid on a salary basis, meaning they receive a predetermined amount per pay period that is not reduced based on the quality or quantity of work performed. 

Plaintiffs contend that captains do not meet the bona fide executive criteria because they can face pay reductions for disciplinary infractions affecting their work's quality or quantity. Although the city's Civil Service Rules allow for disciplinary actions, including unpaid suspensions, these rules do not specifically apply to captains, with only one captain experiencing a suspension without pay. 

The Supreme Court case Auer v. Robbins is cited, where it was determined that an employee's pay is considered "subject to" deductions only if there is an actual practice of such deductions or a policy creating a significant likelihood of them. In Auer, the Court ruled that a manual listing potential violations did not sufficiently indicate that pay deductions were expected for salaried employees, thus maintaining their exempt status. This reasoning aims to prevent unforeseen overtime liability stemming from vague policies not likely to impact salaried employees.

Memphis police captains are classified as salaried employees, with no evidence of regular pay reductions despite the theoretical possibility. Only one captain has experienced a pay deduction, indicating a lack of established practice. All employees, including captains, are subject to Civil Service rules, which do not clearly specify the circumstances under which captains may be suspended. The district court's decision is upheld.

The excerpt also references Title 29 C.F.R. 553.23, which outlines conditions for using compensatory time instead of overtime pay. An agreement must be established before work performance, potentially through collective bargaining or other formal agreements. The document notes the complexity of reconciling certain regulatory sections but emphasizes the importance of private arrangements in Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) cases, allowing existing agreements to remain valid where the FLSA does not impose strict contractual limitations.

Additionally, the city argues that short commuting stops are negligible and not compensable, while plaintiffs assert all commuting time should be treated as compensable. The case contrasts with prior rulings regarding employees required to monitor devices during on-call hours, concluding no significant work obligation exists during commutes for the plaintiffs. Following litigation, the city clarified its policy to apply strictly during scheduled duty hours to prevent misuse of sick days as vacation. An on-call employee is expected to return to work if summoned, as defined in 29 C.F.R. 553.221.

An officer on LWI leave is presumed unable to work and therefore does not face the risk of being called in, distinguishing this situation from other on-call cases where time may be compensable. Penalties for non-compliance with significant safety rules do not affect an employee's salaried status, and the defendant acknowledges that some of the rules in question are not classified as major safety rules. Several courts have previously ruled in similar cases, affirming the principles established in Auer. 

Additionally, the plaintiffs assert that they are sometimes denied compensatory time off in violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). The law stipulates that officers must be allowed to use compensatory time within a reasonable period after requesting it, provided such use does not unduly disrupt the agency's operations. The criteria for a "reasonable period" are influenced by customary work practices and specifics of each situation. The Department of Labor regulations further clarify that requests for compensatory time off should only be denied if granting them would significantly disrupt the agency's ability to operate effectively, with mere inconvenience being insufficient justification for denial.

The plaintiffs argue that precinct commanders are improperly declaring logbooks full not due to genuine concerns about manpower levels for public safety, but rather to avoid paying overtime for replacement officers when other officers request compensatory time off. They cite the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), Labor Department regulations, and a collective bargaining agreement to assert that paying overtime does not qualify as an unduly disruptive operation, as defined under 29 C.F.R. 553.25(d). The plaintiffs reference Department of Labor commentary indicating that requiring overtime for one employee to allow another to take compensatory time does not constitute undue disruption. They also cite the Eighth Circuit case Heaton v. Moore, which supports their position that denying comp time based on overtime costs is improper.

The defendant acknowledges a policy against granting comp time if it necessitates hiring a replacement at overtime rates, which the plaintiffs claim is frequently misapplied by precinct commanders to declare logbooks full. The district court noted that the city could allow comp time by paying overtime but stated such denials were infrequent; the plaintiffs contend this is not accurate. The district court ultimately ruled that the collective bargaining agreement governs the issue, conflating the timing of requests with the concept of undue disruption. The plaintiffs argue this reasoning fails to address their central claim regarding the improper declaration of logbook status. The majority opinion similarly avoids the issue, deferring to the collective bargaining agreement. The author expresses disagreement with both the district court's and majority's conclusions, advocating for the reversal of the district court's judgment on this matter, while concurring with the majority on other issues.