Court: Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit; September 1, 1999; Federal Appellate Court
Jabril Shareef was convicted by the United States District Court for the Western District of New York on charges of mail fraud, violations of the Hobbs Act (18 U.S.C. § 1951), and conspiracy to commit mail fraud (18 U.S.C. § 371), related to underpayment of wages on a public works project in Buffalo, New York. He was sentenced to 30 months in prison followed by three years of supervised release. On appeal, Shareef argued that the government did not adequately prove the interstate commerce element of the Hobbs Act violation, that he received ineffective assistance of counsel, that prosecutorial misconduct denied him a fair trial, and that his sentence was improperly enhanced due to alleged perjury at trial. The court affirmed the conviction, finding no grounds for reversal.
The case stemmed from a contract requiring the payment of New York's Prevailing Wage Rate for laborers on the Buffalo project, which was awarded to Integrated Waste Special Services (IWSS). Shareef's subcontracting business failed to pay his workers the mandated wages, leading to the charges of extortion. The indictment specified that Shareef and his associate, James Nelson, unlawfully obtained money from their employees through fear of economic loss, thereby obstructing interstate commerce.
Evidence presented at the joint trial of Shareef and Nelson indicated that Shareef underpaid laborers on the Buffalo project, paying them between $6 to $10 per hour instead of the required $21.89 per hour. Shareef coerced laborers to endorse paychecks without reviewing the amounts and threatened termination if they complained about their wages. In his defense, Shareef claimed he believed all workers were paid correctly and denied any cash payments or complaints from laborers. Nelson also denied knowingly participating in the fraud but admitted to law enforcement that he was involved and that Shareef orchestrated the scheme. The jury convicted both Shareef and Nelson of mail fraud, Hobbs Act extortion, and conspiracy.
On appeal, Shareef challenged the sufficiency of evidence to support his Hobbs Act extortion conviction, arguing that the government failed to demonstrate the required effect on interstate commerce. He contended that since the laborers and his company were all New York residents, and none testified to a connection with interstate commerce, the indictment's requirements were unmet. He further argued that the government could not demonstrate an impact on IWSS (the alleged victim of the extortion) without showing direct theft from the laborers, which he claimed was not proven. Shareef also raised issues regarding ineffective assistance of counsel, improper cross-examination by the Assistant United States Attorney, and the district court's enhancement of his sentence based on perjured testimony. The court rejected all of Shareef's contentions, stating they were based on misunderstandings of Hobbs Act principles.
The Hobbs Act prohibits actions that obstruct, delay, or affect commerce through robbery or extortion, including attempts or conspiracies to do so. A conviction under the Act requires proof of a connection to commerce that is only a minimal burden, as established in United States v. Arena. Potential or subtle effects on commerce suffice for both conspiracy and substantive violations, contradicting Shareef's argument that only actual effects are relevant for substantive charges. Indictments under the Hobbs Act do not need to specify the exact nature of the commerce impact or prove intent to interfere, as long as the interference is a natural consequence of the offense. The indictment against Shareef alleged extortion from laborers and claimed this conduct affected interstate commerce generally, allowing the government to demonstrate potential impacts on laborers' activities or IWSS's operations. Lastly, the court found no merit in Shareef's claim that the evidence was insufficient to show even a potential effect on interstate business, affirming the standard of review that favors the government’s perspective and the jury's credibility assessments.
James F. Williams, vice president of IWSS and CEO of its parent company, testified at trial regarding the Buffalo project, highlighting IWSS's engagement in multiple projects beyond New York State, including work with municipal agencies in Ohio and Texas. He confirmed IWSS's ultimate responsibility for employee payments and noted that Shareef's underpayments led to allegations from the New York State Department of Labor against both Shareef and IWSS, potentially jeopardizing IWSS's ability to secure payment and performance bonds and prequalify for other contracts. This evidence suggested Shareef's actions could diminish IWSS's interstate business, satisfying the interstate commerce requirement of the Hobbs Act.
In addressing Shareef's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the standard established in Strickland v. Washington requires showing that counsel's performance was unreasonably deficient and that such deficiency likely altered the trial's outcome. Shareef argued his attorney's failure to review Nelson's pretrial statement, which was included in government documents, resulted in a missed opportunity to request a severance from Nelson’s trial. Shareef contended that their defenses were antagonistic, and the joint trial allowed the jury to hear incriminating statements against him that would not have been admissible in a separate trial.
However, the court noted a federal preference for joint trials among co-defendants and that severance is warranted only if there is a serious risk to a defendant's trial rights or if it could prevent a reliable jury decision. The court concluded that Shareef could not demonstrate a different outcome would have resulted had his attorney sought a severance.
Requiring separate proceedings in joint crime cases with incriminating statements would undermine the efficiency and fairness of the criminal justice system. Such an approach would necessitate repeated testimonies from victims and witnesses, potentially causing additional trauma, and could unfairly benefit the last-tried defendants who would gain knowledge of the prosecution's case. Joint trials help avoid inconsistent verdicts and promote a fair assessment of culpability.
In the cases of Shareef and Nelson, their defenses were not irreconcilable, as both denied awareness of underpayment issues, allowing for the possibility of an unknown perpetrator within Shareef's company. Even if one codefendant made accusations against the other, those could be redacted in a joint trial. A motion for severance is unlikely to have been granted.
Shareef's argument that Nelson's statements would be inadmissible in a separate trial is flawed. The cited Bruton and Richardson cases involved codefendants who did not testify, preventing cross-examination. However, Nelson did testify and was cross-examined by Shareef, making his statements admissible. Since Nelson voluntarily testified and confirmed his prior statements against Shareef, it cannot be assumed he would withhold such testimony in a separate trial.
Moreover, even without Nelson's testimony, overwhelming evidence against Shareef existed, including testimony from at least 14 laborers and Shareef's office manager, who facilitated the underpayments. Therefore, Shareef's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to request severance does not warrant a new trial. Additionally, Shareef's assertion regarding the prosecutor's conduct during cross-examination and summation is found unpersuasive.
Prosecutorial misconduct can lead to reversal of a conviction only if it results in "substantial prejudice" to the defendant, compromising due process by rendering the trial unfair. Specific comments by the prosecutor, particularly during summation, are evaluated for "egregious misconduct." The assessment considers the severity of the misconduct, remedial measures taken by the court, and the strength of the evidence against the defendant. In the reviewed case, the court found no basis for reversal, concluding that the prosecutor's comments did not improperly undermine the credibility of the defendant, Shareef, nor misrepresent the case. Instances of inappropriate conduct by the AUSA were addressed promptly by the trial court, which reinforced the government's burden of proof to the jury. The court noted that while some comments suggested Shareef bore a burden to produce evidence, these transgressions were isolated and did not warrant a new trial given the strong evidence against him. Additionally, Shareef's argument that the AUSA's summation unfairly implied other witnesses were lying was rejected. Although inflammatory remarks can be grounds for reversal, the court recognized that characterizing conflicting testimony as lies can be permissible if tied to the evidence. Overall, any misconduct identified did not prejudice Shareef's right to a fair trial.
In the summation, the Assistant United States Attorney (AUSA) reviewed testimony from Shareef's office manager and several underpaid laborers, contrasting their accounts with Shareef's, stating that if the jury believed Shareef, it implied the named witness had to be lying. The court found this argument did not constitute misconduct. Shareef's challenge to his sentence, based on an enhancement for perjury, was also rejected. Under Section 3C1.1 of the Sentencing Guidelines, a defendant's offense level can be increased if obstructing or attempting to obstruct justice is found, including committing perjury or providing materially false information. The court noted that Shareef's testimony was contradicted by at least 15 witnesses and concluded that there was no indication that his false testimony stemmed from confusion or mistake. Therefore, the enhancement for obstruction of justice was deemed appropriate. Ultimately, all of Shareef's arguments on appeal were considered and found insufficient for reversal, leading to the affirmation of his conviction.
