Fort Ord Toxics Project, Inc. California Public Interest Research Group Curt Gandy Joe Manaea v. California Environmental Protection Agency Sub. Department of Toxic Substances Control Jesse Huff, Director, Department of Toxic Substances Control, and United States Department of the Army United States Department of Defense, Real Parties in Interest-Appellees
Docket: 98-16160
Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit; September 2, 1999; Federal Appellate Court
Plaintiffs, comprising two nonprofit organizations and two individuals, initiated legal action against California and federal agencies, aiming to compel compliance with California environmental law before a Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) cleanup at Fort Ord. The district court dismissed the case, citing a jurisdictional preclusion under CERCLA § 113(h). However, this decision was reversed on appeal.
Fort Ord was designated as a priority cleanup site by the EPA in February 1990. Subsequently, an agreement among the Army, EPA, California Department of Toxic Substances Control (DTSC), and the California Regional Water Quality Control Board established cleanup procedures under CERCLA. The Army, with DTSC's approval, disposed of contaminated soil in a landfill on the base, prompting plaintiffs to file a complaint in state court. They alleged DTSC's violation of the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) due to a lack of an environmental impact statement before allowing the Army to bypass California's hazardous waste disposal prohibitions and requested a preliminary injunction against the Army's cleanup actions.
The case was removed to federal court by the Army. While the district court remanded the case concerning state defendants, it denied the remand for the Army, which then moved to dismiss the lawsuit based on CERCLA § 113(h). The district court granted this motion, resulting in the dismissal of the case, which the plaintiffs appealed. The appellate court reviewed the dismissal de novo for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
Plaintiffs contend that the district court improperly dismissed their lawsuit based on the jurisdictional provisions of § 113(h). They argue that this section only postpones jurisdiction for claims challenging CERCLA cleanups that rely on state law deemed 'applicable or relevant and appropriate' (ARAR), and since their claim is based on the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA), which is not ARAR, § 113(h) should not apply. Additionally, plaintiffs assert that § 113(h) only applies to cleanups conducted under § 104 and § 106 of CERCLA, while the cleanup at Fort Ord is under § 120, thus falling outside of § 113(h)'s jurisdictional bar. Lastly, they argue that even if § 113(h) postpones federal jurisdiction, it does not remove jurisdiction from state courts, claiming the district court erred by not remanding their case to state court.
However, the court finds no merit in the plaintiffs' first and third arguments. Plaintiffs interpret § 113(h) as allowing federal courts to hear challenges to CERCLA cleanups based on non-ARAR state law, but the court disagrees, stating that such an interpretation is flawed. The purpose of § 113(h) is to protect CERCLA cleanup processes from lawsuits that could hinder timely remediation efforts. Furthermore, under § 121 of CERCLA, cleanups must comply with ARAR state laws, meaning that the federal government is only obligated to adhere to state environmental laws that meet this criterion. Consequently, the plaintiffs' claim that they can delay a CERCLA cleanup by citing non-ARAR state law is deemed nonsensical, as it misinterprets the legal framework governing CERCLA cleanups.
Congress did not intend for § 113(h) to create an unreasonable legal rule, but rather aimed to protect CERCLA cleanups from disputes over applicable environmental standards while not shielding unrelated litigation. The court's decision in MESS clarifies that § 113(h) withdraws jurisdiction only from challenges directly related to CERCLA cleanups, not from all lawsuits. For instance, a lawsuit enforcing minimum wage laws does not challenge the cleanup and thus does not invoke § 113(h). The language "applicable or relevant and appropriate" was meant to prevent delays in cleanups due to irrelevant lawsuits, postponing federal jurisdiction only over those directly addressing cleanup issues.
Regarding state court jurisdiction, the plaintiffs argue that since § 113(h) specifies "No Federal court shall have jurisdiction," state court jurisdiction remains intact. However, this argument is rejected. Congress did not aim to allow litigation in state courts that could similarly delay CERCLA cleanups, as state court injunctions could impede the cleanup process. Congress intended that federal courts hold exclusive jurisdiction over challenges to CERCLA cleanups. The plaintiffs acknowledge their lawsuit is a challenge but claim it does not arise under CERCLA, a position the court finds too narrow.
Congress granted district courts exclusive jurisdiction over all controversies arising under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), using expansive language that extends beyond claims solely created by CERCLA. Courts must interpret statutory provisions holistically, considering the overall intent and policy behind the law. The broad language of § 113(b) supports the conclusion that it covers any challenges to CERCLA cleanups, while § 113(h) is designed to promote prompt execution of such cleanups by postponing federal court jurisdiction.
The plaintiffs argued that § 113(h) applies only to cleanups conducted under § 104, not § 120, which could create an inconsistency allowing challenges to federal cleanups but not to private ones. Although this interpretation appears reasonable based on statutory language, it was ultimately determined to be unappealing and was reversed by the district court. The jurisdictional bar in CERCLA specifies that it removes jurisdiction over challenges to actions taken under § 9604 and related orders, but there is contention regarding whether this extends to cleanups under § 120. The Army maintains that § 104 is a broad authority for cleanups applicable to both private and federal properties, with § 120 providing specific standards for federal facilities. Prior cases have applied the jurisdictional bar to federal cleanups without addressing the independence of § 120, allowing the court to reconsider the applicability of this bar in the current context.
No circuit court has published a decision directly addressing whether § 120 cleanups operate under a distinct authority from § 104. The Army asserts that § 120 cleanups are encompassed by the broader authority of § 104, a position supported by several district court rulings (Werlein v. United States, Heart of America Northwest v. Westinghouse Hanford Co., Worldworks I v. U.S. Army) and some legislative history, specifically referencing P.L. 99-499. However, the Army’s stance lacks support from the statutory text, as § 120 appears to establish an independent grant of authority distinct from §§ 104 and 106. Notably, 42 U.S.C. § 9620(g) indicates that authority under § 120 cannot be transferred to other entities, and other CERCLA provisions, including § 117, treat § 120 cleanups separately from § 104 cleanups. Furthermore, the distinction between removal actions (temporary measures) and remedial actions (permanent solutions) is critical, with § 120(e)(2) specifically granting the EPA Administrator authority for remedial actions on federal property, while no similar authority for removal actions is provided under § 120. Consequently, removal actions on federal property must be governed by § 104. Determining the applicable provision for a particular cleanup necessitates careful analysis of the specific grants of authority under CERCLA.
§ 113(h) of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) prohibits challenges to removal actions on federal property, as these actions are authorized under § 104. However, it does not preclude challenges to remedial actions, which are authorized under § 120. The legislative intent behind this distinction is ambiguous, though some commentators suggest that Congress likely intended it, given the urgency associated with removal actions. The document indicates that the cleanup at Fort Ord is classified as a remedial action under § 120, making § 113(h) inapplicable. Consequently, the court reverses the previous ruling, emphasizing that the statutory language necessitates recognizing the difference between removal and remedial actions at federal facilities.
