Jason B. Nicholas v. Thomas J. Miller, Deputy Superintendent for Programs/inmate Organization Coordinator, Woodbourne Correctional Facility Robert Hanslmaier, Acting Superintendent, Woodbourne Correctional Facility Raymond Broaddus, Deputy Commissioner, New York State Department of Correctional Services
Docket: 1998
Court: Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit; August 13, 1999; Federal Appellate Court
Jason B. Nicholas, a pro se plaintiff, appeals the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York's judgment that granted summary judgment to various New York prison officials, dismissing his complaint regarding the denial of his request to establish a Prisoners' Legal Defense Center, which he claimed violated his First Amendment rights. Nicholas, who has studied law while incarcerated, sought to create this center to inform the public about prison issues, lobby for reforms, and provide legal assistance to inmates. His request was denied by Deputy Superintendent Thomas J. Miller and Acting Superintendent Robert Hanslmaier, and his subsequent administrative appeal was rejected by Deputy Commissioner Raymond Broaddus. Nicholas filed his action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in October 1995, requesting both a preliminary and permanent injunction to allow the formation of the Center, along with a declaratory judgment and monetary damages, citing violations of his rights to free speech, assembly, petition, access to the courts, political expression, association, and equal protection. The appellate court vacated the district court’s judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings.
On June 10, 1996, the district court, led by Chief Judge Griesa, dismissed Nicholas's complaint as frivolous under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d). Nicholas appealed, and the appellate court vacated the dismissal regarding claims against Miller and Hanslmaier, recognizing an arguable basis for Nicholas's First Amendment associational rights but affirming the dismissal of other claims. On August 25, 1997, Nicholas filed an amended complaint reasserting his First Amendment, due process, and equal protection claims, adding Broaddus as a defendant, and seeking $25,000 in compensatory and punitive damages from each defendant. He also moved for a preliminary injunction. The defendants answered, asserting defenses including qualified immunity, and opposed the injunction. The district court required a more detailed response from the defendants regarding the associational rights issue cited in the appellate order.
The defendants opposed the injunction and filed for summary judgment supported by Miller’s affidavit, which claimed that Nicholas’s proposed Center conflicted with an existing group. Nicholas cross-moved for summary judgment and requested counsel. The district court mandated further responses from the defendants, warning that failure to address the substantive issues could lead to the granting of the injunction. Defendants subsequently submitted an affidavit from George Duncan, who claimed that the Center would threaten facility safety and instigate conflicts, likening it to a gang and predicting serious violence and extortion.
The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants based on Duncan's affidavit and dismissed Nicholas's motions as moot, leading to a judgment on July 10, 1998, which Nicholas appealed. The appellate court reviews summary judgment orders de novo, considering evidence favorably for the non-moving party. It concluded that genuine material facts remained, making the summary judgment improper, yet confirmed that the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity, shielding them from monetary damages.
Nicholas's claim pertains to the infringement of his First Amendment associational rights in a prison context. Citing *Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union, Inc.*, the Supreme Court established that prison officials can curtail associational rights if they reasonably conclude such associations threaten prison order or legitimate penological objectives. This precedent allowed the upholding of regulations against inmate-to-inmate solicitation for union membership based on officials' testimony regarding potential dangers.
In *Turner v. Safley*, the Court refined the test for evaluating prison regulations affecting inmates’ constitutional rights, asserting that a regulation is valid if it is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests. Factors for this evaluation include: the connection between the regulation and the governmental interest, the legitimacy of the governmental objective, alternative methods for exercising the right, the impact on other inmates and prison resources, and the availability of alternatives.
In *Allen v. Coughlin*, the Second Circuit applied the *Turner* standard to a regulation allowing the removal of non-publisher-sent newspaper clippings from inmate mail as contraband. The court found that prison officials' affidavits lacked sufficient evidence, resulting in a reversal of the district court's summary judgment against the inmate.
Similarly, in Nicholas's case, the district court failed to apply the *Turner* analysis or address its factors adequately. Nicholas raised valid concerns regarding the prison's justification for denying his proposed Center, questioning the legitimacy of its claimed interests and highlighting the absence of identified groups providing similar services. The court did not consider whether some functions of the proposed Center might comply with *Turner*. Given the existence of genuine factual disputes, the case is remanded for further proceedings.
Defendants-appellees did not raise the issue of qualified immunity in their summary judgment motion, but they did assert it in response to the amended complaint and on appeal. The court found that the defendants are entitled to qualified immunity because the First Amendment right to form an inmate legal services organization was not clearly established at the time the request was denied. To determine if a right was clearly established, three questions must be addressed: whether the right was defined specifically, whether existing Supreme Court and circuit court decisions support it, and whether a reasonable official would have understood their actions as unlawful.
While it was established that inmates retain First Amendment speech rights that align with their status and penological objectives, no precedent explicitly defined the right to form such organizations or deemed the denial of permission a violation of the First Amendment. Consequently, the defendants are entitled to qualified immunity, but this only protects them from monetary damages; Nicholas's claims for equitable relief can proceed.
Nicholas's assertions regarding providing legal assistance to other inmates typically fall under the right of access to the courts, a claim previously dismissed as frivolous. The court refrains from commenting on the potential for a First Amendment associational right concerning legal discussions, particularly given the prohibition against practicing law without bar admission in New York.
The judgment of the district court is vacated, and the case is remanded for further proceedings, including a ruling on Nicholas's motions for injunctive relief and appointment of counsel. Judge Edward R. Korman participated by designation.
