Sochor v. State

Citations: 580 So. 2d 595; 16 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 297; 1991 Fla. LEXIS 721Docket: No. 71407

Court: Supreme Court of Florida; May 2, 1991; Florida; State Supreme Court

SummaryOriginalCytator Case TreatmentBackward CitatorAnalysis

EnglishEspañolSimplified EnglishEspañol Fácil

Dennis Sochor appeals his convictions for kidnapping and first-degree murder, along with his death sentence. The court affirms both the convictions and the sentence. The trial testimony revealed that on December 31, 1981, an eighteen-year-old victim and her friend were at a lounge in Broward County. After the friend became ill, Sochor and his brother, Gary, assisted the victim in taking her friend to her car and promised she would return to the lounge. The next morning, the friend discovered the victim was missing and called the police. A photograph of Sochor taken that night led to his identification after it aired on television. Witnesses, including Sochor's roommates, stated he left abruptly upon seeing his picture and implicated him in the victim's disappearance.

Authorities arrested Sochor in Georgia in May 1986 on an unrelated charge and subsequently extradited him to Florida, where he was indicted for murder and kidnapping; the victim’s body has never been found. At trial, Gary testified that he accompanied Sochor to the lounge, where Sochor interacted with the victim, and later that night, witnessed Sochor assault her in a truck after leaving the lounge. Gary recalled seeing the victim scream for help and Sochor's aggressive behavior. After the incident, Gary discovered women's clothing in the truck and later returned to Michigan.

The prosecution introduced three taped confessions from Sochor, in which he admitted to meeting the victim, wanting sex, and, upon her refusal, choking her in a fit of rage. He claimed to have disposed of her body alone. The jury convicted Sochor of both charges and recommended the death penalty by a 10-2 vote. The trial judge imposed the death sentence, citing four aggravating factors and no mitigating factors. Sochor appeals, arguing errors occurred during both the guilt and sentencing phases of his trial.

Sochor asserts multiple errors regarding his conviction for premeditated and felony murder. He argues insufficient evidence supports his conviction, specifically questioning the presence of premeditation. The court notes that determining premeditation is a jury question, with evidence including the weapon's nature, provocation, prior interactions, and the homicide's execution. The court finds adequate evidence for the jury to infer premeditation, citing Gary's testimony that Sochor paused to shout at him during the assault, indicating he had time to reflect on his actions. Sochor's claim of a heat-of-passion homicide does not negate the premeditation finding. Additionally, the court confirms sufficient evidence for a felony murder conviction based on kidnapping, as the victim was initially in the truck voluntarily but was later held against her will, facilitating the crime.

Sochor further contends his confessions were improperly admitted due to the state's failure to prove the corpus delicti of the homicide since the victim's body was never found. The court clarifies that circumstantial evidence suffices to establish corpus delicti, and does not require proof beyond a reasonable doubt. The victim's disappearance and circumstances surrounding it, coupled with Gary's testimony, support the conclusion that she is deceased and that her death resulted from Sochor's actions. Notably, Sochor’s defense did not contest her death but focused on alternative theories like voluntary intoxication or mistaken identity.

Sochor alleges multiple errors during his trial that he claims resulted in an unfair trial. He admits that his counsel did not object to these errors at trial, which, under the contemporaneous objection rule, means they are not preserved for appellate review. Despite this, Sochor argues that (1) the trial was fundamentally unfair, constituting fundamental error, and (2) the contemporaneous objection rule should have less application in capital cases. The court has previously rejected the latter argument. Fundamental error is defined as errors that either involve jurisdictional issues or where justice demands its application, requiring a denial of due process. The court found that the alleged errors, either alone or together, did not amount to fundamental error and thus rejected Sochor's claim.

Further, while Sochor raised issues regarding jury instructions, his counsel failed to object to the instructions or propose alternative ones, preventing these claims from being reviewed on appeal without a showing of fundamental error. One specific claim was regarding the trial court's failure to instruct the jury on voluntary intoxication as a defense to felony murder related to kidnapping. The court noted that voluntary intoxication is a valid defense for specific-intent crimes like kidnapping, but since the jury was instructed on this defense concerning premeditated murder, the omission did not constitute fundamental error. This is because the failure to instruct on a non-essential element of the crime does not meet the threshold for fundamental error. Additionally, there was sufficient evidence of attempted sexual battery, a general-intent crime, which did not permit voluntary intoxication as a defense.

Sochor also contended that the trial court erred in failing to provide jury instructions regarding the statute of limitations as a defense to felony murder and kidnapping. The court stated that such a defense must be raised during the trial, and had it been raised, the state could have proven that Sochor's absence from the state tolled the statute of limitations. Consequently, Sochor's claims were ultimately deemed unsubstantiated.

The trial court did not err fundamentally by omitting jury instructions, as capital crimes have no statute of limitations. Thus, Sochor's argument for overturning his murder conviction based on the expiration of limitation periods for underlying felonies is rejected. The failure to provide a long-form excusable homicide instruction also does not constitute fundamental error, as established in State v. Smith. The court affirms Sochor's convictions for kidnapping and first-degree murder based on substantial evidence.

During the penalty phase, Sochor argues that the trial court improperly allowed the state to present nonstatutory aggravating circumstances, specifically victim impact evidence in violation of Booth v. Maryland. However, as no objections were raised during trial, this issue is procedurally barred. The court concludes that any potential objection would not have succeeded. Sochor's claim regarding the state's evidence of his lack of remorse is dismissed, as the prosecutor's comments did not warrant a new sentencing trial.

Sochor also challenges the introduction of prior violent acts through his ex-wife's testimony and hearsay regarding a Michigan rape confession. Since his counsel did not object, these claims are procedurally barred. The ex-wife's testimony was relevant to counter Sochor's claim of alcohol-induced violence, and the Michigan rape evidence was pertinent in addressing his history of criminal activity. The court finds no error in these instances.

Claims regarding jury instructions during the penalty phase are also rejected due to lack of objection at trial, leading to procedural bar. Furthermore, Sochor's claim that the prosecutor and trial court undermined the jury’s role is dismissed, as the standard jury instructions adequately convey the jury's importance and the claim was not raised at trial, resulting in another procedural bar. Lastly, Sochor contests the sufficiency of evidence for three of the four aggravating factors found by the trial court, but this claim remains unaddressed in the provided excerpt.

Sochor does not dispute the existence of a prior violent felony conviction, which is supported by the record. He challenges the finding that the murder occurred during the commission of a felony, but sufficient evidence exists for both kidnapping and attempted sexual battery, thus supporting this aggravating factor. Additionally, the murder is deemed especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel, as evidenced by the victim's screams for help, signs of struggle, and Sochor's confession of choking the victim. The court finds that strangulation of a conscious victim entails foreknowledge of death and extreme fear, aligning with the heinousness factor. However, the court disagrees with the characterization of the murder as cold, calculated, and premeditated, as the evidence does not meet the required heightened level of premeditation; the killing appears to stem from the victim's resistance to Sochor's sexual advances.

Sochor claims mitigating factors related to extreme mental or emotional disturbance and impaired capacity to appreciate the criminality of his actions, relying on his alcohol use and testimony from doctors regarding his violent behavior while intoxicated. His history as an admitted rapist and previous violent behavior when rejected for sex further complicates the assessment of these factors. The determination of mitigating circumstances lies with the judge and jury, and differing conclusions do not warrant reversal. Although several doctors noted Sochor's mental instability, inconsistencies in his truthfulness and the presence of selective amnesia were highlighted. The sentencing order affirmed his competence to stand trial and indicated that this standard was not the basis for sentencing.

Sochor argues that the trial court improperly excluded nonstatutory mitigating evidence, referencing testimony from family members regarding his abusive upbringing and personal struggles. The trial judge acknowledged this testimony but ultimately found it insignificant and unsubstantiated as mitigating circumstances.

The trial court has discretion in determining if family history constitutes mitigating circumstances, with no abuse of discretion found in this case, as the evidence did not qualify as mitigating. Sochor's claim that his death sentence is disproportionate was also rejected; the court weighed three remaining aggravating factors against the absence of mitigating circumstances and deemed the death penalty warranted. Even after discounting one aggravating factor, the remaining factors justified the sentence without necessitating resentencing. The court affirmed the convictions for kidnapping and first-degree murder. Aggravating factors included Sochor's prior felony conviction involving violence, the commission of the murder during another felony, and the heinous nature of the crime. Sufficient evidence supported the underlying felony of attempted sexual battery, with testimonies indicating Sochor's intent and actions. Claims regarding venue and sanity were dismissed as meritless. Additionally, allegations of fundamental errors during the trial, including prosecutorial misconduct and questionable witness testimonies, were also found to lack merit.

Sochor’s claims regarding the trial court's jury instructions are rejected, including allegations of failure to instruct on nondeath lesser-included offenses, manslaughter, third-degree murder, and kidnapping. The court found the felony-murder instruction adequate, as the jury had been informed about the underlying felonies and the aggravating circumstance applies to both felony murder and premeditated murder. Additionally, other claims from Sochor concerning the instructions on aggravating factors (heinous, atrocious, or cruel; cold, calculated, and premeditated), statutory and nonstatutory mitigating evidence, and the jury's understanding of the burden and standard of proof for mitigating circumstances were also rejected without further discussion. The assertion that Florida's sentencing scheme presumes death upon the finding of a single aggravating factor was similarly dismissed.