United States v. Carletos E. Hardamon, Also Known as Cj
Docket: 98-1511
Court: Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit; August 17, 1999; Federal Appellate Court
Carletos E. Hardamon was indicted for conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute cocaine base, alongside three co-defendants, all of whom pleaded guilty and testified against him. Hardamon was convicted and sentenced to life in prison, 10 years of supervised release, a $2000 fine, and a $100 special assessment. On appeal, he claimed ineffective assistance of counsel and prosecutorial misconduct, arguing that the government improperly presented testimony from witnesses who received sentence recommendations. He also contested the district court's determination of the quantity of crack attributed to him and the increase in his offense level due to his leadership role in the conspiracy. The investigation, conducted by the Alton Police Department and DEA, revealed that Hardamon was instrumental in distributing crack in Alton, Illinois, from mid-1996, using middlepersons to facilitate transactions. He provided significant amounts of crack to his co-defendants and managed their operations, directing sales and covering expenses. Evidence against Hardamon included the seizure of crack cocaine from a co-defendant's residence. The appellate court affirmed the lower court's decisions.
On December 30, 1996, a confidential informant conducted two controlled buys of crack cocaine from Trotter at his apartment, yielding 4.9 grams and 4.6 grams, which formed Counts 2 and 3 of an indictment. A subsequent search of Trotter's residence resulted in the seizure of crack cocaine and significant cash, including the prerecorded funds used in the buys, leading to the arrest of Trotter and others. On January 23, 1997, a Grand Jury indicted Trotter on five counts, including conspiracy to distribute crack cocaine from July to December 1996, and distribution and possession charges related to the controlled buys, all under 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 846. Following a series of indictments, including a second superseding indictment that added co-conspirators Media and Overton, Trotter and his co-defendants pled guilty and testified against Hardamon, who was later found guilty of conspiracy to distribute crack cocaine. A Presentence Investigation Report (PSR) recommended Hardamon be held accountable for 53.25 ounces of crack, receive enhancements for being an organizer of the conspiracy and for possessing a weapon, and be sentenced to life imprisonment. Hardamon's objections to these recommendations were overruled by the trial judge, resulting in his life sentence on February 25, 1998.
Hardamon's appeal raises four main issues: 1) denial of effective assistance of trial counsel; 2) prosecutorial misconduct related to witness testimony obtained through sentence reductions; 3) the district court's alleged error in holding him accountable for 1.509 kilograms of crack cocaine as relevant conduct; and 4) clear error in increasing his offense level by four based on his role as an organizer or leader in the conspiracy.
In the analysis of the ineffective assistance claim, the court questioned whether Hardamon truly intended to pursue this on direct appeal, noting that such claims are typically better suited for post-conviction proceedings under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. The court pointed out that challenges on direct appeal often lack sufficient support from the trial record and can limit future claims to the established law of the case. Consequently, Hardamon withdrew his ineffective assistance claim during oral argument, preserving it for later review.
Regarding prosecutorial misconduct, Hardamon contends that the government violated 18 U.S.C. § 201(c)(2) by providing benefits to cooperating witnesses for their testimony, invoking the precedent from United States v. Singleton. However, as he did not object to the witnesses' testimony during trial, the court will review this issue for plain error.
The court rejected Hardamon's argument that the trial court erred in allowing cooperating witnesses to testify, affirming that multiple circuits have established that the government does not violate 18 U.S.C. § 201(c)(2) by immunizing witnesses or entering cooperation agreements. This position has been consistently supported by various circuit rulings, including recent clarifications from the Tenth Circuit. Hardamon did not provide compelling reasons to deviate from this unanimous view. Additionally, Hardamon contested the district court's determination that he was responsible for 1.509 kilograms of crack cocaine, arguing that such findings are subject to a "clear error" review standard. The court emphasized that a finding of fact can only be deemed clearly erroneous if there is a strong conviction that a mistake was made, noting that if permissible interpretations exist, the fact-finder's choice cannot be classified as clearly erroneous.
Hardamon objected generally to the Presentence Report (PSR) regarding accountability for 1.509 kilograms of crack cocaine, claiming the 'relevant conduct' figures were inaccurate and questioning their source. To preserve an issue for appellate review, specific objections must be made during trial, as established in precedent cases. Without a timely and specific objection, only plain error review applies, which is rarely successful. Hardamon's case does not meet the criteria for such exceptional circumstances.
Relevant conduct in determining a defendant's base offense level includes all reasonably foreseeable acts related to the criminal activity, as per U.S.S.G. sec. 1B1.3(a)(1)(B). Hardamon argued that the district court did not specifically establish that 20 grams of crack alleged to be supplied in 1996 were part of the conspiracy and claimed the judge's reliance on certain evidence was unreliable. The government contended that Hardamon failed to provide evidence to challenge the inclusion of this quantity, maintaining that the district court's attribution of 1.509 kilograms should be upheld.
During sentencing hearings, the rules of evidence do not apply, allowing judges to consider a broad range of evidence, including hearsay. The Criminal Code permits courts to receive extensive background information about a convicted person for sentencing purposes. Sentencing judges have wide latitude in the scope of their inquiries, and they can consider relevant information without adhering strictly to evidentiary rules, provided it has sufficient reliability to support its accuracy.
The sentencing stage of a trial is crucial for ensuring that judges are informed about the defendant's background to make fair and just decisions. Judges must have access to comprehensive information about the defendant's life from birth to sentencing to uphold the principle of justice in a legal system governed by laws. In a related case, Hardamon challenges the attribution of 20 grams of crack cocaine to him based on Overton's testimony, claiming it is unreliable since she did not mention the transaction in other interviews. However, the court finds that the singular testimony of a witness, such as Overton, is sufficient to support factual findings regarding responsibility for the drugs, despite Hardamon's interpretation of the sentencing guidelines.
A trial judge is permitted to utilize information beyond the evidence presented at trial when imposing a sentence, including details from the defendant's pre-sentence report and plea hearings of co-defendants. Sentencing judges can also consider information from co-defendant trials, and reliance on hearsay or inadmissible information is not inherently improper. They may assess hearsay evidence of the defendant's other criminal activities, even if the defendant has pleaded not guilty to related charges. The Supreme Court affirms that sentencing judges possess broad discretion in determining sentences, allowing them to consider a wide array of information concerning the crime and the defendant's background, consistent with due process.
In the case of Hardamon, the court upheld the district's decision to hold him responsible for 1.509 kilograms of crack cocaine, as he failed to provide specific evidence challenging the reliability of the information used against him. Additionally, Hardamon contested a four-level increase in his offense level based on his role as an organizer or leader of a criminal activity involving five or more participants. The sentencing judge identified Hardamon as the primary supplier of drugs and the operational leader, stating that the conspiracy relied on his drug supply. While Hardamon acknowledged he controlled one participant, he argued that he lacked sufficient control over all members to be considered a leader. The court reviews the determination of his role for clear error.
Application Note 4 under U.S.S.G. sec. 3B1.1 outlines factors for courts to evaluate whether an individual is an organizer or leader in a conspiracy, including decision-making authority, participation in the offense, recruitment of accomplices, entitlement to a larger share of the crime's profits, involvement in planning, the scope of illegal activities, and control over others. Hardamon exemplified a leadership role within the conspiracy as a primary source of crack cocaine, frequently transporting drugs for distribution in Alton, Illinois. He was perceived as a leader by co-conspirators, received the largest share of profits, and directed others on how to manage the drugs. Additionally, he financed travel expenses for co-conspirator Trotter and resolved disputes among members.
Hardamon’s claim of clear error by the district court for not controlling all conspiracy members is rejected; sec. 3B1.1 does not require complete control over all participants to establish leadership. The court emphasizes that relative responsibility is what matters, not total control. With evidence of Hardamon's significant role as a drug supplier, his direction of co-conspirators, and his financial management of their expenses, the conclusion that he is a leader or organizer is upheld. Additionally, Hardamon's withdrawal of his ineffective assistance of counsel claim preserves it for future review without needing further discussion. The court finds no prosecutorial misconduct in utilizing testimonies from Overton, Media, or Trotter and affirms Hardamon's conviction and sentence, noting no errors in the district court's findings regarding his role in the conspiracy.
Count one of the indictment charged all four defendants with conspiracy to distribute crack cocaine. Counts two through four specifically charged Trotter for knowingly distributing crack cocaine on three separate occasions. Count five implicated Trotter and Media for the same offense on a different date. Count six charged Overton and Media with conducting a money transfer derived from the proceeds of crack cocaine distribution, with counts seven through nine charging Overton for similar conduct on different dates, and counts ten and eleven charging Media for the same on yet other dates.
Additionally, Hardamon was noted for distributing drugs in several Illinois cities, with a specific transaction constituting Count five of the indictment. The record lacks details on the exact timing of controlled buys and the relationship between Stuart and Theodora Overton, as well as the specific location of Hardamon's arrest.
Regarding judicial review, the excerpt highlights a doctrine that prevents district judges from reexamining appellate court rulings unless there is a significant reason, such as changes in law or new evidence. While res judicata does not apply in § 2255 proceedings, the court may choose not to reconsider previously decided issues unless circumstances have changed.
Furthermore, Media, Trotter, and Overton were motivated to testify against others in exchange for potentially lower sentences. The document also references § 201(c)(2), which criminalizes offering value for testimony. Lastly, the Pre-Sentence Report (PSR) described its estimate of 1.509 kilograms of crack cocaine as conservative and excluded an additional 25 ounces to avoid double counting.
