Fhc Equities, L.L.C. v. Mbl Life Assurance Corporation, a New Jersey Corporation
Docket: 97-1736, 97-2115
Court: Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit; September 14, 1999; Federal Appellate Court
FHC Equities, L.L.C. appealed a summary judgment favoring MBL Life Assurance Corporation concerning a land purchase agreement. The district court had granted summary judgment to MBL on April 11, 1997, and subsequently denied FHC's motions to alter the judgment under Rule 59(e) and for relief under Rule 60(b). FHC filed its notice of appeal on July 1, 1997, which was deemed untimely as it was not submitted within 30 days of the April 11 judgment, despite FHC's argument that the Rule 59(e) motion tolled the appeal period. The appellate court dismissed FHC's first appeal for lack of jurisdiction and affirmed the denial of the Rule 60(b) motion, emphasizing that timely filing of an appeal is jurisdictional and mandatory. The court noted that FHC did not dispute the tardiness of the initial notice of appeal.
A timely motion under Rule 59 tolls the appeal period until the court rules on the motion, as stated in Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4). If a Rule 59 motion is filed late, it does not toll the appeal period, as established in Browder v. Director, 434 U.S. 264-65, and further supported by Rhoden v. Campbell, 153 F.3d 773 (6th Cir. 1998). Rule 59(e) mandates that motions to alter or amend a judgment must be filed within 10 days of the judgment's entry. In this case, the Plaintiff's motion was filed 17 days after the judgment, which is late. Excluding weekends and holidays, the last permissible filing date was April 25, and the Plaintiff filed on April 28, making it one day late.
The Plaintiff argues that Rule 6(e) allows an additional three days for filings served by mail. However, courts have consistently rejected this argument regarding Rule 59(e) motions, citing cases such as Halicki v. Louisiana Casino Cruises, Inc. and others. Rule 6(e) does not apply to time periods commencing with a judgment's entry, meaning the 10-day period for Rule 59(e) motions is not extended by Rule 6(e). The D.C. Circuit explains that the time for filing a Rule 59(e) motion is measured from the judgment's entry, not from the service of notice, reinforcing that the 10-day period for Rule 59(e) motions begins with the clerk's entry of the judgment in the court's records.
Strict compliance with the 10-day deadline for filing a motion to alter or amend a judgment under Rule 59(e) is required, with no discretion for district courts to extend this period as per Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(b). This short time frame is designed to maintain the finality of judgments. The Plaintiff failed to present any court that supports the argument that Rule 6(e) extends the 10-day limit for Rule 59(e) motions, and the cited cases by the Plaintiff are irrelevant. The court aligns with numerous other decisions that deem Rule 6(e) inapplicable to Rule 59(e) motions. Additionally, even if the district court addresses the merits of an untimely Rule 59(e) motion, it does not affect the timeliness of the appeal, as established in Denley v. Shearson/American Express, Inc. The district court cannot extend the time for Rule 59(e) motions.
Regarding the Rule 60(b) motion, the district court retained jurisdiction to consider it despite the filing of a notice of appeal, as the appeal was untimely, which prevents the appellate court from ruling on the merits. The Plaintiff sought relief under Rule 60(b)(1) for mistake or excusable neglect, a matter typically within the discretion of the trial court and not subject to reversal unless there is an abuse of discretion. The Plaintiff's only argument for relief under Rule 60(b) was based on a mistaken understanding of the Federal Rules and efforts to comply, asserting that the appellate court's finding of untimeliness constituted inadvertence or surprise.
In Lewis, the court examined whether a district court can grant relief under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) to allow for a late appeal, effectively making it timely. The court noted that while a Rule 60(b) motion is not typically used to extend appeal periods beyond those set by Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(5), there are exceptional circumstances where relief may be warranted. The court must assess if the late appeal stemmed from one of the specified reasons in Rule 60(b) and determine if the respondent was prejudiced, if the motion was promptly filed after notice, and if the attorney exercised due diligence.
In the case of Lewis, the appeal was late due to the attorney mailing the notice just before the deadline, but it was not docketed in time. The attorney's misreading of the date stamp led to the realization of the untimeliness only after the appeal period had expired. The court upheld the district court's decision that the appeal's lateness was due to a mistake, attributed to the Clerk's Office or postal service, as the attorney had acted diligently.
Contrarily, other courts criticized the Lewis decision for not addressing Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(6), which allows for time extensions when parties are unaware of final judgments. The current case parallels Lewis, with the plaintiff's late appeal resulting from his attorney's misinterpretation of Rule 6(e)'s applicability to Rule 59(e). The plaintiff argued that this misinterpretation was reasonable due to the lack of Sixth Circuit precedent on the issue. However, the court noted that the plaintiff failed to cite any case supporting the idea that an attorney's legal misinterpretation qualifies as a "mistake" under Rule 60(b)(1). The plaintiff's cited cases were unrelated and not from the Sixth Circuit, suggesting that similar relevant cases could have been found that clarify Rule 6(e) does not apply to Rule 59(e) motions.
Plaintiff's counsel's reliance on prior research concerning Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a) is deemed unreasonable due to the significant differences between it and Rule 59(e). Rule 72(a) requires objections to a magistrate judge's order to be filed within 10 days of service, while Rule 59(e) pertains to motions following the entry of judgment. The document emphasizes that Rule 6(a) applies when specific actions are required within a certain timeframe post-notice service. Although Plaintiff cites various cases advocating for a broad interpretation of Rule 60(b), none directly address an attorney's misinterpretation of law. The cited cases involve clerical errors or failure to notify, which differ from the current situation where the attorney misunderstood legal requirements.
Furthermore, courts have held that misinterpretations by attorneys do not warrant relief under Rule 60(b)(1). In the case of Edward H. Bohlin Co. v. Banning Co., the Fifth Circuit denied relief when counsel claimed a misunderstanding based on a prior hearing. The court stated that mere inadvertent mistakes, carelessness, or ignorance of the law are not sufficient grounds for relief under Rule 60(b)(1). Additional cases support this view, asserting that ignorance or carelessness by a litigant or attorney does not justify relief from judgment. Ultimately, the principle upheld is that clients cannot escape the consequences of their attorney's actions or omissions, as they have voluntarily chosen their legal representation.
Counsel voluntarily dismissed a state claim with prejudice, mistakenly believing it would not affect a related federal claim due to res judicata principles. The Second Circuit ruled that relief under Rule 60(b) was unwarranted because the attorney's misunderstanding of the law did not qualify as an excusable mistake. Consistent with precedents, including Smith v. Stone and Peake v. First Nat'l Bank, the courts have held that an attorney's failure to fully assess the legal consequences of their actions does not justify overturning a final judgment. In Peake, an attorney's erroneous belief that an untimely Rule 59(e) motion would extend the appeal period was rejected by the court as a failure to exercise due diligence, reinforcing that mere attorney error does not meet the standard for "excusable neglect." The plaintiff's attorney in the current case similarly recognized the uncertainty surrounding the applicability of Rule 6(e) to Rule 59(e), further aligning his situation with the precedents that dismiss attorney error as a basis for relief.
The Fifth Circuit addressed the issue of untimely motions and the applicability of Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure in Halicki v. Louisiana Casino Cruises, Inc. The appellant's attorney filed a late Rule 59(e) motion, incorrectly believing Rule 6(e) extended the filing deadline. After the opposing party objected, the appellant sought additional time to file a notice of appeal under Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(5) due to "excusable neglect" and requested that the district court treat the late Rule 59(e) motion as a Rule 60(b) motion for relief from judgment. The district court denied all motions, and the Fifth Circuit upheld this decision, clarifying that Rule 6(e) does not apply to Rule 59(e) motions and that the attorney's failure to meet the deadline did not constitute excusable neglect. The court emphasized the necessity for attorneys to understand the rules and noted that a clear rule leaves little room for claiming inexcusable neglect. Moreover, the court highlighted that Rule 60(b) is not intended to substitute for a timely appeal and that an attorney’s misinterpretation of rules does not justify setting aside a judgment. The court dismissed the appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and affirmed the district court's decision on the appeal.
Honorable Thomas J. Wiseman, Jr., serves as a United States District Judge for the Middle District of Tennessee. Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure (Fed. R. App. P.) 4(a)(4) stipulates that if a party files a timely motion, the appeal period for all parties starts from the order that resolves the last outstanding motion. This includes motions to alter or amend judgments under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 59. Relevant case law includes McKay v. Dutton and Riley v. City of Detroit, which are cited as unpublished cases. The plaintiff references cases that apply Rule 6(e), which extends time for responding to certain orders, but these cases are not applicable in this context. Rule 6(e) is intended to protect parties served by mail from losing response time. It is noted that Rule 4(a)(6) allows a district court to reopen the appeal period if a party entitled to notice did not receive it within 21 days of judgment entry, provided that no party suffers prejudice. The reopening period lasts for 14 days from the order's entry, contingent upon a motion filed within specified time frames.
