Barbara Grutter, for Herself and All Others Similarly Situated, 98-2009 v. Lee Bollinger, Kimberly James, Proposed Intervening Jennifer Gratz, Patrick Hamacher, and All Others Similarly Situated v. Lee Bollinger, Ebony Patterson, Proposed Intervening

Citations: 188 F.3d 394; 44 Fed. R. Serv. 3d 452; 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 18452Docket: 98-2009

Court: Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit; August 10, 1999; Federal Appellate Court

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Two cases were consolidated for appeal regarding the denial of intervention under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a) and (b) in lawsuits challenging the University of Michigan's race-conscious admissions policy. The appeals were initiated by proposed intervenors, including students and coalitions, who sought to join ongoing litigation filed by plaintiffs alleging that the admissions policy violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, as well as federal statutes 42 U.S.C. 1981, 1983, and 2000d et seq. The appellate court found that the district courts erred in denying the proposed intervenors' motions to intervene, indicating that the issues presented in both cases were similar enough to warrant consolidation for the opinion. The court's decision reflects a critical examination of the procedural rights associated with intervention in civil rights cases, particularly concerning affirmative action in higher education admissions.

Plaintiffs are seeking compensatory and punitive damages, injunctive relief against the allegedly discriminatory admissions process, and admission to the College. Intervenors consist of 17 African-American and Latino/a individuals, alongside the Citizens for Affirmative Action's Preservation (CAAP), a nonprofit advocating for educational opportunities for these groups in Michigan. The intervenors argue that the case threatens access to public higher education for qualified African-American and Latino/a students and claim that the University will not represent their interests adequately. The district court denied their motion for intervention as of right, determining that the plaintiffs lacked a substantial interest and that the University could sufficiently represent the intervenors. The court also denied an alternative motion for permissive intervention. 

In Grutter v. Bollinger, the named plaintiff, a white woman, challenges the University of Michigan Law School's race-conscious admissions policy, claiming violations of the Equal Protection Clause and several federal statutes. She seeks similar relief as the plaintiffs in Gratz. The proposed intervenors in this case include 41 students and three pro-affirmative action coalitions, comprising undergraduate students, high school students, current law school students, and others planning to apply. The plaintiff opposed the motion to intervene, while the defendants did not. The district court again denied intervention as of right, citing insufficient demonstration that the intervenors' interests would not be adequately represented by the University.

Intervenors contend that the district court erred in denying their motion to intervene as of right under Fed. R. Civ. P. 24, which allows intervention if the applicant has a significant interest related to the action and if that interest may be impaired without intervention, unless adequately represented by existing parties. Proposed intervenors must establish four elements to intervene as of right: timely application, substantial legal interest, potential impairment of interest without intervention, and inadequate representation by existing parties. The denial of intervention as of right is reviewed de novo, except for timeliness, which is reviewed for abuse of discretion.

The district court found the motions for intervention in each case timely, a conclusion unchallenged by the plaintiffs on appeal. Therefore, the focus shifts to three remaining elements, particularly the necessity for proposed intervenors to demonstrate a substantial legal interest in the litigation's subject matter. The circuit follows a broad interpretation of what constitutes a sufficient interest for intervention, allowing for interests that do not require the same standing as initiating a lawsuit. The proposed intervenors assert that their interest in preserving the use of race as a factor in university admissions supports their claim for intervention, emphasizing the importance of maintaining educational opportunities for African-American and Latino/a students.

In the Grutter case, the district court assumed the intervenors had a significant legal interest, while in Gratz, it determined that their interest was not legally protectable. However, Sixth Circuit precedent suggests a different outcome, as demonstrated in Jansen, where intervenors successfully claimed an interest in affirmative action due to their involvement in a prior consent decree. The Gratz court's reliance on the idea that a legally enforceable right is necessary for a significant legal interest is deemed a misinterpretation of the circuit's standards. This is further exemplified by the Michigan Chamber of Commerce's intervention in a case concerning campaign finance, affirming that a specific legal or equitable interest is not a prerequisite for intervention under Rule 24(a)(2).

The majority determined that the Chamber of Commerce had a significant legal interest due to its involvement in the political process leading to the contested amendments, allowing it to intervene as of right, despite lacking a legal "right" to the legislation itself. The district court's distinction of this case from precedents such as Miller and Meek was deemed misguided; those cases did not restrict substantial interest findings to legislative contexts or consent decrees. The interest in the current case was found to be more direct and compelling than the Chamber's general interest in Miller. 

The proposed intervenors articulated a specific interest in gaining admission to the University, which was substantially greater than the Chamber's interest. The district court erred in Gratz by not recognizing the proposed intervenors’ substantial legal interest and therefore misassessing the impairment element. The proposed intervenors argued that a ruling for the plaintiff would negatively affect their educational opportunities and admission prospects, particularly regarding the representation of African-American and Latino/a students. The court concluded that denial of intervention would likely impair access to the University for these students, as evidenced by outcomes in other states, thus satisfying the minimal burden for the impairment element.

Prospective intervenors must demonstrate that the University, as the existing defendant, may inadequately represent their interests. They do not need to prove that representation will definitely be inadequate; showing that the University may not present all their arguments is sufficient. There is a noted dispute regarding the standard for this showing when the defendant is a governmental entity. While the district court in Gratz referenced a higher standard from Hopwood v. State of Texas, it clarified that this standard was not applied. Conversely, in Grutter, a more stringent standard appeared to be used, but this circuit has not endorsed such a heightened requirement. In Miller, the court confirmed that only a potential for inadequate representation needs to be shown.

The proposed intervenors argue that the University might inadequately represent them due to institutional pressures and a differing risk of harm if the case is lost, suggesting the University may not defend as vigorously. However, the district courts in Gratz and Grutter found no specific defenses presented by the intervenors that the University would not also present. The appellate court concluded that the lower courts erred, reiterating that the burden of showing inadequacy is minimal. The proposed intervenors raised valid concerns that the University might not present particular defenses regarding affirmative action, such as evidence of past discrimination or the impact of current admissions criteria. Consequently, the court determined that the intervenors successfully articulated specific defenses that the University might not raise, establishing the possibility of inadequate representation.

Proposed intervenors have demonstrated a substantial legal interest in the matter, which may be adversely affected by the court's decision. The existing defendant, the University, is deemed inadequate to represent their interests, thereby granting the intervenors the right to intervene. The district court's denial of this motion cannot be upheld. Consequently, the district court's order is reversed and remanded to allow intervention under Rule 24(a). The prior stay of proceedings is vacated.

In dissent, Judge William Stafford argues that the proposed intervenors failed to prove their right to intervene. He believes their subjective concerns do not meet the burden of showing that the University of Michigan will inadequately defend their interests. Unlike the precedent case, the University has not shown any indication of failing to defend its admissions policies effectively. Stafford expresses that the trial judges' decisions to deny intervention should not be overridden, as they were based on the records before them.