Darrell Keith Rich v. Arthur Calderon, Warden

Citations: 187 F.3d 1064; 99 Daily Journal DAR 8363; 99 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 6518; 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 18789; 1999 WL 606998Docket: 97-99007

Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit; August 13, 1999; Federal Appellate Court

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In the case 187 F.3d 1064, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals addressed Darrell Keith Rich's appeal against Warden Arthur Calderon. The court amended its previous opinion regarding Rich's claims. It determined that Rich waived his argument concerning the impact of pretrial publicity by failing to challenge the jury's impartiality post-change of venue. Even accepting Rich's interpretation of the precedent set in Vasquez v. Hillery, the court found it would represent a "new rule" subject to the Teague v. Lane bar, as Hillery was recognized solely for its implications on racially biased grand jury selection.

Regarding Rich's allegations of prosecutorial misconduct during the penalty phase, the court found only one claim reviewable due to procedural default on six others. The claim in question revolved around the prosecutor discussing Rich's potential future violence and referencing a photo of his tattoo. The court concluded that discussing future danger was appropriate for sentencing and that any reference to the photo, while possibly improper, did not lead to prejudice as Rich's tattoos were undisputed. Ultimately, the panel voted to deny Rich's petition for rehearing and rejected the suggestion for en banc review, with no dissent from the full court.

Petitioner Darrell Keith Rich appeals the denial of his habeas corpus petition following his 1980 convictions for multiple sexual assaults and murders, for which he faces the death penalty. His claims include the denial of discovery and an evidentiary hearing, as well as alleged errors during the state court process, such as issues related to pre-trial publicity, grand jury composition, jury instructions, an economically conflicted defense counsel, prosecutorial misconduct, and being shackled during trial. Rich also argues he was not mentally competent to stand trial. The court affirms the denial of his claims, noting that the crimes led to significant public outcry due to their brutality, involving multiple sexual assaults and murders of young women, with several survivors identifying Rich as the attacker.

Rich's trial occurred in Yolo County after a change of venue from Shasta County. His defense centered on a mental defect argument, supported by testimonies from 44 witnesses and three state-paid mental health experts. The jury convicted him of three counts of first-degree murder, one second-degree murder count, and multiple sexual assault charges, finding him sane. The jury recommended life without parole for the second-degree charge and death for the first-degree charges. Following a direct appeal, the California Supreme Court affirmed Rich's convictions.

Rich's habeas petition, filed in 1990 and reaching the appellate court in 1997, faced issues of unexhausted claims. After being granted a four-year period to exhaust state claims, he submitted an amended petition that still included unexhausted claims. The court addressed his contention of being denied discovery and an evidentiary hearing, explaining that the Magistrate Judge had implemented a reasonable process for Rich to identify claims warranting further investigation. Despite being given ample time and opportunity, Rich failed to substantiate his claims with supporting evidence.

Habeas corpus serves to rectify clear injustices rather than allowing petitioners to seek evidence without basis. An evidentiary hearing is warranted if the petitioner's claims, if proven, would lead to relief and if the state court has not reliably established the facts. Rich's submissions fail to meet these criteria. Unlike civil litigants, habeas petitioners do not have a presumptive right to discovery; such requests are at the court's discretion and require a showing of good cause. Prior cases cited by Rich do not support his claims, as those involved petitioners who provided evidence justifying relief, a standard not met by Rich.

Rich's claims regarding pretrial publicity affecting his indictment were waived by his failure to challenge jury impartiality after a venue change. Even considering a potential overruling of precedent, any new interpretations would be considered a "new rule" subject to procedural bars. Additionally, his argument that any bias from publicity constitutes structural error is not supported by existing case law. 

Rich also challenges the grand jury selection process, particularly concerning the exclusion of Native Americans. However, his equal protection claim was appropriately narrowed by the district court. He did not establish a prima facie case of systematic exclusion, as the demographic data showed insufficient representation to support his claim. Therefore, no constitutional error occurred in the grand jury’s composition.

Rich's claim of trial error is addressed in three main areas. First, regarding jury instructions, he argues that the trial court misled the jury by not informing them that a deadlock on penalty would result in a life sentence. This claim is rejected as it contradicts California Penal Code section 190.4(b) and established case law, which does not require courts to inform juries of deadlock consequences.

Second, Rich asserts that his trial counsel had an "economic conflict" of interest due to pressures from Shasta County funding authorities, which allegedly prevented effective representation. However, the claim fails because Rich could not demonstrate that his counsel had conflicting interests or that any conflict adversely affected counsel's performance. The court determined that there was no need for an evidentiary hearing since Rich did not establish a prima facie case of ineffective assistance.

Finally, concerning the issue of shackling, Rich was shackled with ankle chains during the trial, but these were not visible to the jury due to a curtain. He was able to communicate with his counsel freely. The court noted that as long as shackling is not visible to the jury, there is no constitutional error, which was consistent with existing case law. Thus, the methods of shackling employed did not result in any constitutional violation.

Rich's claim of prosecutorial misconduct is limited to the prosecutor's remarks during the penalty phase regarding potential future violence and a tattoo photograph. Other misconduct claims are procedurally barred due to Rich's lack of contemporaneous objections. The court found the remarks about future danger appropriate for sentencing, supported by Rich's own statements. Although referencing the unadmitted photo may have been improper, it did not result in prejudice since Rich's tattoos were not disputed. Additionally, the Magistrate Judge reviewed all mental health expert testimonies and found no substantial doubt about Rich's competency to stand trial. Consequently, the court affirmed the district court's judgment, finding no constitutional error.