Rixson Merle Perry v. Village of Arlington Heights, a Municipal Corporation, and James E. Ryan, Attorney General of the State of Illinois
Docket: 98-3405
Court: Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit; July 27, 1999; Federal Appellate Court
Rixson Merle Perry filed a lawsuit against James E. Ryan, Attorney General of Illinois, and the Village of Arlington Heights, challenging the constitutionality of specific provisions of the Illinois Motor Vehicle Code and Arlington Heights Municipal Code that govern the seizure and disposal of abandoned vehicles. Perry claimed these provisions were unconstitutionally vague and violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The district court dismissed his amended complaint, ruling that he lacked standing to challenge the codes.
Initially, Perry's complaint included a challenge to a section of the Illinois Motor Vehicle Code concerning abandoned vehicles, arguing it provided inadequate notice and lacked a clear definition of abandonment. This section had previously been deemed unconstitutional due to its failure to provide notice and hearing opportunities in another case involving Perry where his vehicle was towed. In addition to this challenge, Perry raised issues regarding the vagueness of Arlington Heights's seizure and disposal ordinances.
The district court had previously dismissed Perry's original complaint for failing to establish standing, notably lacking allegations that he was an Illinois citizen and that he intended to park in Arlington Heights, both essential to demonstrate an actual or threatened injury. Following this, Perry submitted an amended complaint with new allegations asserting his residency in Illinois, possession of a driver's license, access to a vehicle, and a need to park in Arlington Heights, claiming he incurred significant expenses and inconveniences due to fear of vehicle towing.
Perry's amended complaint was dismissed by the district court due to lack of standing. The court determined that Perry did not own an automobile, making it impossible for him to claim a right to notice and an opportunity to be heard regarding potential towing, which was essential to his standing in Count I. Although new allegations might have supported standing for vagueness challenges in Counts II and III, the district court found Perry's deposition responses indicated these allegations were either false or unsupported. Specifically, Perry failed to recall any vehicles available to him on the date of filing and retracted his claim of needing to operate a vehicle in Arlington Heights. Perry's attempt to establish standing with supplemental affidavits, asserting residency and recent automobile ownership, was rejected because these events occurred post-filing, thus not retroactively supporting standing. The court allowed Perry to file a supplemental complaint, but he chose to appeal instead, contesting the dismissal, the postponement of his summary judgment motion, the defendants' ability to depose him, and the refusal to consider his affidavits. The summary of standing requirements from relevant Supreme Court cases outlines that a party must demonstrate: 1) an "injury in fact" that is concrete and imminent; 2) a causal link between the injury and the defendant's actions; and 3) a likelihood of redress through a favorable court decision. These elements constitute the "irreducible constitutional minimum of standing."
The burden of establishing standing in federal jurisdiction lies with the party invoking it, requiring proof for each element as fundamental to the plaintiff's case. While allegations in a complaint are accepted as true during a motion to dismiss, the plaintiff must provide "competent proof" to support standing when it is contested as a factual matter. This proof must demonstrate standing by a preponderance of the evidence. In this case, Perry lacks standing to challenge the Illinois Motor Vehicle Code and Arlington Heights Municipal Code because he did not allege ownership of an automobile, which is essential for proving an injury in fact. Although he initially made some relevant allegations, his deposition responses revealed a lack of memory regarding any vehicles and a subsequent abandonment of those claims. Specifically, Perry could not substantiate his need to operate or park a vehicle in Arlington Heights at the relevant time, undermining his assertion of an actual or imminent injury. Consequently, his claim that anyone who parks a vehicle in Arlington Heights automatically has standing to challenge the code is overly broad and unfounded.
Perry's deposition revealed that he believed establishing residency in Arlington Heights by renting an apartment and acquiring an automobile eliminated the need for the standing allegations in his amended complaint. He admitted these actions were undertaken solely to establish standing, but both occurred after filing his complaint. Standing must exist at the initiation of a lawsuit, as defined by United States Parole Comm'n v. Geraghty, meaning it cannot be retroactively satisfied. Consequently, Perry lacks standing to pursue his constitutional challenges in this case. Additionally, the district court did not abuse its discretion in postponing a ruling on Perry’s summary judgment motion or allowing the defendants to depose him. The court also correctly disregarded Perry's supplemental affidavits concerning facts arising post-filing, as Rule 15(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure outlines the proper method for introducing new facts related to a pleading. The district court's judgment is affirmed.
