Russell Bridenbaugh v. Frank O'bannon, in His Official Capacity as Governor of the State of Indiana
Docket: 98-3058
Court: Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit; July 21, 1999; Federal Appellate Court
Russell Bridenbaugh filed a lawsuit against Indiana Governor Frank O'Bannon, arguing that the designation of Good Friday as a paid legal holiday for state employees violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. Indiana law provides state employees with a day off on Good Friday, among other holidays, and has established a total of twelve to fourteen legal holidays per year depending on election years. The statute allows the Governor to shift certain holiday observances but not for Martin Luther King, Jr.'s birthday. Good Friday has been a recognized holiday in Indiana since 1941 and commemorates the death of Jesus Christ.
Bridenbaugh sought declaratory and injunctive relief, contending that the holiday's religious significance infringed upon the separation of church and state. After both parties moved for summary judgment, the magistrate judge ruled in favor of Indiana, stating that the law had a secular justification that complied with the Establishment Clause. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals upheld this decision.
The First Amendment, applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, prohibits Congress from establishing a religion or restricting its free exercise. The Supreme Court's notable case, Lemon v. Kurtzman, established a three-prong test for evaluating governmental actions under the Establishment Clause: 1) the action must have a secular purpose; 2) its primary effect must neither advance nor inhibit religion; and 3) it must not foster excessive entanglement with religion. Although some legal scholars advocate for the endorsement test introduced by Justice O'Connor, the Supreme Court in Agostini v. Felton affirmed that the principles for assessing government aid under the Establishment Clause remain unchanged, focusing on the purpose and effect of the government action regarding religion and potential entanglement.
In this case, Bridenbaugh argues that Indiana's Good Friday holiday violates the first two prongs of the Lemon test, claiming it lacks a secular justification and primarily advances religion, although he does not assert excessive entanglement. The district court rejected these claims, finding that Indiana provided a valid secular justification for the holiday—allowing employees a long spring weekend—thus upholding the holiday's constitutionality and granting Indiana summary judgment.
The district court's conclusion heavily referenced the case Metzl v. Leininger, where the plaintiff claimed Illinois violated the Establishment Clause by designating Good Friday as a legal holiday. Illinois defended this decision with a secular justification, stating it would save costs by closing schools on a day with low attendance. Metzl established that if a government asserts a secular reason for a law, it must provide evidence to support that claim. Illinois failed to do so, lacking data on expected absences from school on Good Friday. Metzl suggested that a clear secular purpose, such as providing a three-day weekend, could lead to a different outcome, a point that was clarified as dictum because Illinois did not present such a justification.
In contrast, Indiana's justification for recognizing Good Friday as a legal holiday is based on providing a spring holiday for state employees, addressing a four-month gap without holidays and enhancing employee morale and efficiency. Indiana backed its position with evidence indicating that a significant percentage of schools and employers in the region observe Good Friday as a holiday. Consequently, the district court found that Indiana had satisfied the first prong of the Lemon test by providing adequate secular justifications, distinguishing its case from Metzl.
The plaintiff contends that Indiana has not provided a secular justification for designating Good Friday as a spring holiday, despite acknowledging the state's intention to establish such a holiday. The plaintiff references statistics indicating that a majority of public schools and businesses remain open on Good Friday, suggesting that Indiana could have selected a more suitable day, although he fails to propose an alternative. The data indicates that nearly seventy percent of schools and over half of businesses operate on Good Friday, but it does not demonstrate that other Fridays or Mondays in spring would yield a higher percentage of closures.
The plaintiff argues that Indiana could never substantiate a secular purpose for this holiday due to Good Friday's religious connotation, contrasting it with secularized holidays like Thanksgiving and Christmas. This interpretation misrepresents legal precedent, as illustrated in McGowan v. Maryland, where the Supreme Court upheld Sunday closing laws based on a secular intent to provide a day of rest for all, not for the promotion of religious observance. The Court emphasized the state's right to protect citizens from the negative effects of continuous labor and recognized the advantages of a uniform day of rest. Similarly, Indiana's interest in establishing a common spring holiday allows it to manage non-essential services effectively, addressing practical operational needs. The Court in McGowan dismissed claims that a day with religious significance, such as Sunday, could not be chosen for secular purposes, affirming that such a designation does not violate the Establishment Clause.
Bridenbaugh misinterprets Supreme Court rulings that permit government involvement in Christmas and Thanksgiving, as the Court has affirmed these holidays retain their religious significance. In *Lynch v. Donnelly*, the Court upheld a city's Christmas display, including a creche, arguing that the display served legitimate secular purposes, such as celebrating the holiday season and acknowledging its historical origins. The Court emphasized that a secular purpose need not be the sole reason for government actions. In *County of Allegheny v. ACLU*, the Court ruled that while the government could celebrate Chanukah and Christmas with displays, those displays must not exclusively convey religious messages. This reasoning is particularly relevant for Indiana's observance of Good Friday, which is merely a paid holiday for employees rather than a celebration of the holiday itself. Bridenbaugh's assertion that the religious essence of Good Friday negates any secular motive is inconsistent with the precedents set in *Lynch* and *Allegheny*.
Indiana's secular justification for the Good Friday holiday is not a sham, as it aligns with its practice of providing extended weekends around other significant holidays. The state has moved holidays to create longer weekends, and while Good Friday has limited secular aspects, it is associated with numerous secular elements of Easter. Thus, Indiana's rationale for a long Easter weekend is justified. Furthermore, Bridenbaugh’s claim that the Good Friday holiday violates the second prong of the *Lemon* test by advancing religion fails because Indiana has presented several legitimate secular justifications for the holiday, which are supported by evidence.
Bridenbaugh's argument posits that the Good Friday holiday advances religion by facilitating Christian worship on a day they consider religious. While it is true that having this day off allows Christians to attend services more easily, this is also applicable to other legal holidays, such as Thanksgiving and Christmas. The Supreme Court's decision in McGowan clarified that the Establishment Clause does not prohibit state laws that coincide with religious practices when the intention is secular. The Good Friday holiday in Indiana is not celebrated for its religious significance; instead, it is merely a day off for employees to recuperate. Unlike holidays that endorse specific philosophies, Indiana does not promote the religious aspects of Good Friday. Thus, the holiday does not constitute state advancement of religion, satisfying the second prong of the Lemon test. The evidence presented indicates that the holiday serves several secular purposes without primarily advancing religion, leading to the conclusion that the Indiana Code's provision for the Good Friday holiday is constitutional. The dissenting opinion was noted, along with the Governor’s designation of an attorney to represent the state in this case.
Indiana's position regarding its designation of Good Friday as a holiday is supported by statistics, particularly considering interstate travel patterns during holiday weekends. The dissent misinterprets Indiana's burden of proof, asserting that Indiana doesn't have to demonstrate that the absence of a Good Friday holiday would lead to significant issues for state government, as its justification for the holiday differs from Illinois. Indiana's rationale is a secular one: to provide a spring holiday, which it has successfully demonstrated.
The 1941 designation of Good Friday as a movable "feast" by the Indiana legislature raises questions, as it is closely associated with the religious observance of Easter. The dissenting opinion argues that while Indiana could select any Friday or Monday for a holiday, the choice of Good Friday every year must adhere to the Lemon test's secular purpose requirement. The selection is scrutinized because Good Friday is recognized as a day of religious observance, and the state must justify its choice.
The dissent notes that evidence does not support a secular purpose for choosing Good Friday specifically, as legislative history is absent, and the statute refers to it as a "movable feast day," implying its religious significance. The only secular justification provided is that Good Friday serves as a spring holiday for state employees, with the Governor’s designee stating that any day could suffice for this purpose. Thus, while the state's intent may be secular, the selection of Good Friday raises Establishment Clause concerns.
Evidence indicates that 35% of employers nationwide observe Good Friday as a holiday, with the figure rising to 44% in the East Central region, and 34% among government employers in that region. In Indiana, 89 out of 293 school districts closed on Good Friday. The magistrate judge argued that Good Friday is a logical spring holiday choice due to potential employee needs for leave coinciding with school and work holidays. However, the author critiques this conclusion, stating that the evidence presented does not sufficiently demonstrate that absence of a Good Friday holiday would significantly burden state operations.
The author notes that the choice of Good Friday inherently advances Christianity, failing the second element of the Lemon test, which requires that a holiday's primary effect neither advances nor inhibits religion. Employees not observing Good Friday must request time off for alternative religious holidays, imposing potential costs and uncertainties. The author references a previous case suggesting that if a secular rationale had been provided for a holiday, the outcome might differ, but finds no such rationale in Indiana's case.
While some holidays have lost their religious significance over time, Good Friday remains a solemn religious observance for Christians and holds no relevance for other faiths, thus not fulfilling the secular purpose requirement. Even hypothesizing a secular purpose for Good Friday, conflicting evidence, including a theology expert's affidavit, suggests genuine issues of fact that warrant a trial rather than summary judgment. Ultimately, the author concludes that the evidence does not support a secular purpose for the holiday, recommending the reversal of the judgment and granting of the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment and an injunction.
