United States v. Marvin M. Johnson

Citations: 185 F.3d 765; 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 16368; 1999 WL 504725Docket: 98-2517

Court: Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit; July 16, 1999; Federal Appellate Court

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Marvin Johnson, employed as a truck driver for Worldwide Sales, became involved in transporting cash for Mexican cocaine dealers under the direction of Ronald Stanley, the company's owner. In 1997, Johnson was convicted of conspiracy to transport U.S. currency into Mexico for drug-related purposes, violating 18 U.S.C. sec. 1956(h). His appeal focuses on the sentencing, specifically questioning the reliability of the evidence used to attribute responsibility for $3.5 million to him. The Seventh Circuit Court found the evidence insufficiently reliable, vacated the sentence, and remanded the case for resentencing.

Stanley's illicit activities began in 1993, prior to the establishment of Worldwide Sales. He earned approximately $400,000 before enlisting employees for cash transport. In March 1997, Johnson accepted a job hauling cash for the Mexican Mafia, with payments ranging from $1,200 to $5,000 per load. He completed four shipments: the first involved transporting $1.2 million from Queens, New York, to El Paso, Texas. A second planned trip was canceled, and the third involved transporting $800,000, followed by a fourth trip carrying $1 million. A final trip's cash amount remains unspecified, but it involved picking up additional vehicles for delivery. After this last trip, Johnson departed from Worldwide.

Johnson's delivery of a tractor led Alvarez to realize that Stanley was not directly managing money shipments, prompting him to demand Stanley transport drugs. After a successful drug run, James was arrested on June 18, 1997, with 315 kilograms of cocaine in a motor home, subsequently agreeing to cooperate with authorities. This cooperation led to the unraveling of the conspiracy and the arrests of Johnson, Stanley, and others. 

The jury convicted Johnson of conspiracy to commit money laundering under 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h). At the sentencing hearing on June 5, 1998, the court established a base offense level of 23, as per U.S.S.G. § 2S1.1(a), applying the higher level due to the nature of the conspiracy. Adjustments were made: three levels were added for Johnson's knowledge of the drug-related proceeds, raising the level to 26. A two-level reduction for being a minor participant was applied, but this was offset by a two-level increase for presenting perjured testimony. Additional levels were added based on the amount of money laundered, exceeding $100,000.

The court determined Johnson was responsible for laundering over $3.5 million, resulting in a final offense level of 33. With a criminal history category of I, the sentencing range was set between 135 to 168 months, and Johnson received a sentence of 160 months. 

On appeal, Johnson contended that the evidence did not support the finding of over $3.5 million in laundered funds. Had the court determined the amount was over $2 million, his offense level would have been 32, reducing his sentencing range to 121-151 months. The court's calculation involved totaling known trip values of $3 million, averaging $1 million per trip, and conservatively estimating the last two trips to contribute at least $500,000 each, resulting in an overestimation of $4 million laundered. Additionally, Stanley testified to approximately 100 shipments of money totaling around $500 million.

District court findings regarding the amount of money involved are factual and receive deferential review but must be supported by reliable evidence. Estimates made by judges must not rely on vague approximations or arbitrary figures. The government argued that the district court did not err in its estimations and likened the situation to cases involving estimated drug quantities. However, courts have emphasized the necessity for inferences drawn from sample incidents to have evidential support, warning against overreliance on estimations that lack a factual basis. 

The Second Circuit case of United States v. Shonubi illustrates this point; the court found the district court's assumption of a standard quantity of heroin from a single incident to be erroneous due to a lack of supporting evidence for that quantity's typicality across other trips. Similarly, in United States v. Sepulveda, the First Circuit critiqued the methodology of averaging drug amounts and trips without sufficient evidentiary backing. The appeals court noted that the selection of average figures lacked support from witness testimony, rendering the estimates unreliable and leading to the conclusion that the defendant was entitled to resentencing.

The government's case against Johnson is undermined by insufficient information regarding the amounts of money involved in his trips. Although an average of $1 million for Johnson's trips and $5 million for Stanley's operations can be calculated, there is no data on the minimum or maximum amounts. The court's assumption of at least $500,000 on the truck during the last trip lacks evidentiary support, contrasting with more robust evidence in similar cases, like Jarrett, where numerous sales and detailed drug purity data were available.

The primary issue lies not in the point estimate but in the absence of a reliable confidence interval due to the limited sample size (only three trips), which complicates accurate statistical analysis. Nonprobability sampling was used, making it inappropriate to generalize findings beyond the known trips. The evidence indicates that Johnson's trips involved significantly less than Stanley's average, with Johnson's largest trip at $1.2 million and smallest at $800,000, which are both well below Stanley's average. There is no evidence to suggest any money was carried during a canceled trip, as it was intended for product transport instead.

Johnson acknowledges that the evidence supports a finding exceeding $2 million, warranting a six-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. sec. 2S1.1(b)(2)(G). Consequently, he has an adjusted offense level of 32 with a sentencing range of 121-151 months. The previous 160-month sentence is vacated, and the case is remanded for resentencing within the specified range.