United States v. Ricardo Morales, AKA "Ichi," and Jesus Mendez, AKA "G,"
Docket: 1998
Court: Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit; July 26, 1999; Federal Appellate Court
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the convictions of Ricardo Morales and Jesus Mendez, who were found guilty of racketeering, violations of the Hobbs Act, and firearms offenses after a jury trial in the Southern District of New York. Morales received a life sentence plus 105 years, while Mendez received a life sentence plus 125 years. On appeal, the court found the evidence insufficient to support the racketeering and racketeering-dependent convictions, as the prosecution failed to demonstrate a continuous racketeering enterprise from 1987 to 1996. The court rejected the defendants’ additional challenges, including claims of prejudicial spillover from the racketeering counts and Mendez's arguments regarding juror selection and evidence admission. Ultimately, the court affirmed the Hobbs Act and some firearms convictions but reversed the racketeering-related convictions and remanded the case for resentencing on the remaining counts. The original indictment consisted of twenty-six counts, with five counts redacted before trial.
Counts One and Two of the indictment charge Morales and Mendez with participating in and conspiring to participate in a racketeering enterprise, specifically the "Park Avenue Boys," from 1987 to 1996, through acts of robbery and murder in violation of the RICO statute (18 U.S.C. 1962(c), (d)). The indictment lists multiple predicate acts, primarily robberies of grocery stores and individuals in the Bronx, New York, as well as one in northern Manhattan. Specific incidents include robberies occurring between 1987 and 1996, attempted murders, and felony-murder charges related to a store owner and NYPD Officer Kevin Gillespie.
Counts Three through Eight allege that Morales and Mendez obstructed commerce by committing robberies in violation of the Hobbs Act (18 U.S.C. 1951), focusing on the same locations mentioned earlier. Counts Nine and Ten charge them with violent crimes in aid of racketeering, including an assault with a dangerous weapon and robbery resulting in felony-murder. Count Eleven charges Mendez alone with attempting to murder NYPD officers.
Counts Twelve through Eighteen involve violations of 18 U.S.C. 924(c) for using firearms during violent crimes and drug trafficking, detailing specific incidents tied to racketeering and Hobbs Act violations. Count Nineteen further charges Mendez with using a firearm during the attempted murders of two officers. Finally, Counts Twenty and Twenty-One charge Morales and Mendez with possessing firearms as convicted felons under 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). Jury trial commenced on April 7, 1997, with evidence presented favoring the government's case.
Morales, Mendez, and Angel Diaz were members of the "Park Avenue Boys" gang, active primarily in the Bronx during 1987-1988, where they committed numerous armed robberies of grocery stores. During one robbery at 917 Castle Hill Avenue, gang leader Jose Aponte fatally shot the store owner, while Morales shot an employee. Shortly after the robberies, Aponte died by suicide during a police attempt to arrest him, and the other gang members were imprisoned.
While incarcerated, Morales, Mendez, and Diaz made phone calls to shared contacts, with Mendez and Diaz both referencing a number linked to Mendez's nickname. Upon their release between May and October 1995, Morales and Mendez resumed armed robberies in the same area, culminating in a series of crimes that led to the murder of Officer Gillespie and attempted murders of two other officers in March 1996.
The District Court allowed into evidence redacted statements and confessions from the defendants, which were made while in custody on March 15, 1996. On May 1, 1997, a jury convicted both Morales and Mendez on multiple counts including RICO, Hobbs Act violations, and firearm-related charges, although they were acquitted of certain robbery-related charges. Subsequently, the District Court granted Morales' motion for acquittal on one robbery count due to insufficient evidence.
On August 13, 1997, the District Court sentenced Morales to life plus 105 years and Mendez to life plus 125 years, along with terms of supervised release and special assessments for both defendants.
Morales and Mendez, currently serving their sentences, filed timely appeals challenging the sufficiency of evidence regarding the existence of the racketeering enterprise alleged in their indictment. They face a significant burden in this challenge, as evidence must be viewed favorably to the government, allowing for inferences that support the jury's verdict. A conviction stands if substantial evidence supports the jury's findings, but must be overturned if essential elements of the crime are not proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
The RICO statute defines "enterprise" broadly, encompassing various legal and informal associations. The existence of a racketeering enterprise is established through evidence of an ongoing organization and the functioning of its members as a unit. The defendants argue that the government failed to prove an ongoing organization from 1987 to 1996, claiming any such organization effectively ended in 1988 due to the incarceration or death of its members. They contend that a seven-year hiatus in criminal activity indicated the conclusion of the enterprise.
In response, the government argues that the defendants quickly resumed armed robberies upon their release, suggesting a continued understanding to engage in criminal activities despite their incarceration. The similarity of their criminal acts before and after imprisonment and the use of common phone numbers while incarcerated further support the government's case.
The document emphasizes that the imprisonment of all members of a racketeering enterprise does not automatically terminate its existence. Each case must be evaluated on its own facts to determine whether an ongoing enterprise continues despite members being incarcerated.
Imprisonment can be viewed as a potential withdrawal from a conspiracy, but it is not automatically considered as such in every case. The determination of whether a conspirator's imprisonment signifies withdrawal is a question for the jury, and it should consider factors like the duration and location of incarceration, the nature of the conspiracy, and other relevant evidence. In the case at hand, the evidence was inadequate to demonstrate that the Park Avenue Boys enterprise existed throughout the alleged duration in the indictment. The government failed to provide sufficient proof that the enterprise continued during the seven years of the defendants' incarceration, as there was no evidence of communication among them while in prison. Consequently, no reasonable jury could find beyond a reasonable doubt that the enterprise existed from 1987 to 1996. Moreover, the indictment charged a singular nine-year enterprise, and the jury was instructed that a conviction could only occur if the specific enterprise outlined in the indictment was proven to exist. The government must establish the existence of the alleged criminal enterprise beyond a reasonable doubt for the RICO charge. The jury’s finding, based on an unsupported determination, led to a conclusion that the evidence did not substantiate the existence of the enterprise as charged.
The government failed to establish the existence of the alleged racketeering enterprise, leading to the reversal of several convictions: substantive RICO (Count One), RICO conspiracy (Count Two), and violent crimes in aid of racketeering (Counts Nine, Ten, and Eleven). Additionally, convictions for using and carrying a firearm related to racketeering acts—including conspiracies and robberies at specific locations and the felony-murder of Officer Gillespie—were also reversed. However, convictions for firearm use during Hobbs Act violations (Counts Thirteen and Fourteen) were upheld since these crimes remain valid predicate offenses.
The court will not review the defendants' alternative arguments for reversing the racketeering charges due to the overall reversal. Regarding the remaining counts—Hobbs Act violations (Counts Five to Eight), firearm possession and use during a crime of violence (Counts Thirteen and Fourteen), and possession as a felon (Counts Twenty and Twenty-One)—defendants Morales and Mendez argued for a new trial due to prejudicial spillover from the vacated counts. The court rejected this claim, outlining a framework for assessing prejudicial spillover, which includes evaluating the inflammatory nature of vacated evidence, the similarity or dissimilarity of evidence between vacated and remaining counts, and the strength of the government's case on the remaining counts.
No prejudicial spillover from the racketeering charges affected the jury's verdict against the defendants. The reversed RICO count did not appear to influence the jury's decision, supported by precedents indicating that merely reversing a charge does not establish prejudice. The District Court's clear instructions to the jury to disregard the term "racketeering" further minimized potential bias. The evidence presented for the reversed counts was not more inflammatory than that for the remaining counts, which all involved violent armed robberies.
The reversed and remaining charges were based on overlapping facts, with much of the evidence being admissible for the remaining counts regardless of the racketeering charges. Additionally, the jury's partial acquittal of the defendants on some charges suggested a lack of prejudicial spillover, reinforcing the notion that they followed the court's instructions to assess each charge independently.
The government's case against the defendants on the remaining counts was robust, bolstered by detailed eyewitness testimonies and confessions that supported the convictions for the Hobbs Act violations and firearm possession. Given that all three examined factors indicate no prejudicial spillover, Morales and Mendez are not entitled to a new trial on the remaining counts.
Mendez contends that the District Court improperly denied three challenges for cause during jury selection based on the jurors' connections to law enforcement. The first juror was a corrections officer, the second had close relatives in law enforcement, and the third was a peace officer with family ties to the NYPD. Despite their claims of impartiality, Mendez argues that their relationships with law enforcement warranted a presumption of partiality. The court disagreed, affirming that jury selection is at the trial judge's discretion and that no actual bias was demonstrated by the jurors, as defined by existing case law. The court emphasized that mere connections to law enforcement do not equate to implied bias or a presumption of bias. Furthermore, even if bias were present, Mendez's use of peremptory challenges to exclude the jurors negated his claim, as the jury ultimately selected was fair and impartial, which does not violate the Sixth Amendment. Additionally, Mendez argued against the District Court's condition for admitting a photograph of him taken at arrest, asserting it was inconsistent with Simmons v. United States. The court rejected this argument as well.
In the case of Simmons, the Supreme Court ruled that a defendant's testimony during a motion to suppress evidence on Fourth Amendment grounds cannot be used against them at trial regarding guilt unless there is no objection. This ruling did not apply in the current case since the government sought to use Mendez's testimony solely to clarify the timing of a photograph related to his allegations of police brutality, not to establish his guilt. The District Court's decision to condition the admission of the photograph on a proposed instruction was deemed not an abuse of discretion.
Further challenges by the defendants regarding Hobbs Act and firearms convictions were found to lack merit. Given that the sentences on the reversed and remaining counts are interdependent, the District Court is instructed to resentence the defendants de novo on the remaining counts. This approach is necessary because challenging convictions tied to others risks complicating sentencing calculations.
Ultimately, the court reversed the racketeering convictions and those dependent on them while affirming all other convictions. Sentences on the remaining counts were vacated, and the case was remanded for resentencing in line with these findings. The initial indictment, which preceded the superseding indictment, included defendants Morales, Mendez, Angel Diaz, and Jose Ruiz, charging them with a more limited version of the racketeering enterprise.
