Jorge Acosta was indicted on three drug-related charges: conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute heroin, possession with intent to distribute heroin, and conspiracy to commit money laundering. After the district court denied his motion to suppress certain statements and evidence, Acosta entered a conditional guilty plea to all counts, preserving his right to appeal the suppression ruling.
The case involved undercover surveillance by the U.S. Customs Service's High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area Group. An undercover officer planned a $190,000 monetary exchange related to a money laundering operation, with the suspect driving a silver Nissan Xterra. Officer Kenneth Loveland photographed Acosta in the Xterra while the undercover officer communicated with him. Acosta was observed transferring a black gym bag to the driver of a gold Lexus and subsequently leaving the scene.
The following day, officers resumed surveillance at Acosta's residence. After learning the exchange amount had increased to approximately $300,000, they observed Acosta leaving his home, visiting a bank, and returning to the apartment complex where he had previously transferred the gym bag. Acosta was seen with another man, Alberto Sade, carrying what appeared to be the same gym bag. Officers decided to stop Acosta before he could drive away, approaching his vehicle with at least one gun drawn, though all weapons were re-holstered shortly thereafter.
Acosta was approached by officers who informed him he was not under arrest but wanted to discuss a money laundering investigation. He provided his identification and consented to a search of his vehicle after denying he had any money, weapons, or drugs. During this interaction, he later admitted there was money in the car, leading to the discovery of approximately $278,000 in cash. The passenger, Sade, consented to a search of their apartment, where officers found a locked duffel bag that Acosta allegedly owned. Officer Sallick obtained Acosta's consent to search the bag, resulting in the discovery of more cash and heroin. Acosta was then read his Miranda rights and admitted ownership of the heroin, stating Sade was uninvolved.
Subsequently, Acosta was taken to the United States Customs Service HIDTA headquarters, where he was asked to read and initial a Miranda rights form. Although he refused to waive his rights, he indicated a willingness to cooperate and answer questions. He ultimately provided information about the source of the money and heroin, as well as his compensation for the delivery.
After being charged, Acosta sought to suppress the evidence obtained and his statements made during the encounter. A magistrate judge conducted an evidentiary hearing and recommended denying the motion, which the district court adopted. Acosta entered a conditional guilty plea, preserving the right to appeal the suppression denial, and was sentenced to 46 months in prison followed by 4 years of supervised release.
On reviewing a district court's denial of a motion to suppress evidence, findings of fact are assessed for clear error, while the legal application to those facts is reviewed de novo. Acosta argues that his initial stop did not meet the standards set by *Terry v. Ohio* for stops conducted without probable cause, asserting the officers lacked reasonable suspicion. He further claims that even if reasonable suspicion existed, the nature of the stop escalated to an arrest without probable cause, necessitating the suppression of evidence obtained thereafter. The court disagrees with both arguments.
* Terry * establishes a two-part inquiry for the reasonableness of investigative stops: first, determining if the officer's actions were justified at the outset based on reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, and second, assessing whether the stop was reasonable in scope and did not evolve into an arrest before probable cause was established. The officers are permitted to stop Acosta if the totality of circumstances suggests they had objectively reasonable suspicion of his involvement in criminal activity. This suspicion must exceed mere hunches or vague feelings and requires a minimal level of objective justification under the Fourth Amendment.
In this instance, the officers possessed ample reasonable suspicion regarding Acosta's potential criminal activity. An undercover officer informed the surveillance team about a meeting involving a suspect driving a silver Nissan Xterra. The officers observed Acosta, matching that description, at the meeting location and noted his cellphone activity during the encounter. Additionally, after a postponement communicated by the undercover officer, Acosta was seen leaving the meeting site and later preparing for a rescheduled exchange. These observations provided a solid basis for the officers' reasonable suspicion of Acosta's involvement in money laundering.
Acosta argues that, even if the initial stop was a valid Terry stop, it escalated into an arrest lacking probable cause, warranting the suppression of evidence obtained thereafter. He contends that he was questioned for an extended period post-arrest before receiving Miranda warnings. The analysis hinges on the second part of the Terry inquiry, assessing whether the stop's scope was reasonably related to the circumstances justifying it. Distinctions are made between a limited investigative stop, which requires reasonable suspicion, and a detention equating to an arrest, which requires probable cause. The criteria for differentiating between the two include: the law enforcement purposes served, the diligence of police in the investigation, the scope and intrusiveness of the detention, and its duration.
The first factor emphasizes the importance of using the stop to confirm or dispel suspicions swiftly and minimally intrusively. A Terry stop allows for brief, nonintrusive investigative techniques, but not for extensive searches or custodial interrogations without probable cause or consent. In Acosta’s case, the officers engaged in questioning about his car, sought permission to search the car and an apartment, briefly searched the apartment, and requested to open a found bag before arresting him. This sequence was aimed at a quick, non-intrusive resolution of the officers' reasonable suspicions, supporting the legality of the stop.
Regarding the second factor, the police are assessed on their diligence in investigation, which implies promptness in executing their actions. The record indicates that the police acted promptly during their investigation on the scene.
Investigatory actions taken by the police were sequential and timely. The analysis considers whether the scope of the detention was proportional to the need for police safety, referencing case law that permits officers to take reasonable safety precautions based on an objectively reasonable suspicion of danger. Drawing a weapon, using handcuffs, or securing a suspect in a patrol car does not automatically convert an investigatory stop into an arrest; rather, the totality of circumstances and any restriction on movement must be evaluated. In Acosta's case, the officers had reasonable suspicion regarding a potential weapon due to the large amount of cash suspected in his vehicle, justifying their actions, including momentarily drawing a firearm and conducting a frisk. Although Acosta was prevented from returning to his car during the stop, this was deemed a reasonable precaution as the vehicle had not been fully searched. Retaining Acosta's driver’s license for identity verification was also reasonable, while the retention of his keys and blockage of his car by police vehicles did not indicate an arrest, as no requests to move the vehicles were recorded. The essence of a Terry stop allows for some restriction of movement without constituting an arrest. The duration of Acosta's detention was assessed as reasonable, with no strict time limits defined for a Terry stop. The officers demonstrated diligence in pursuing their investigation, and the timeline suggests Acosta was detained for approximately 20 minutes before his arrest and consent to search was obtained.
Acosta asserts he was detained for at least thirty minutes before his formal arrest, but this duration is deemed reasonable for a Terry stop, as established in prior cases. In Gil, a seventy-five-minute detention in handcuffs did not constitute an unlawful arrest, and in Hardy, a fifty-minute Terry stop was approved. Conversely, the Supreme Court found a ninety-minute luggage detention in Place excessive for a Terry stop. Thus, a thirty-minute duration for Acosta's stop aligns with precedent, affirming the officers had reasonable suspicion without the stop evolving into a de facto arrest prior to probable cause.
Acosta also argues he was in custody for Miranda purposes from the onset of his stop, necessitating the reading of his rights before questioning. The district court and magistrate judge did not address this issue, but it is examined as Acosta raised it in his motion to suppress. According to Miranda v. Arizona, the right to warnings arises during custodial interrogation. A two-part test assesses custody: the circumstances of the interrogation and whether a reasonable person would feel free to leave. A Terry stop inherently restricts a person's freedom to leave until it concludes. However, applying the Miranda custodial test strictly to Terry stops would imply that warnings are required during any questioning, which the Supreme Court's Berkemer v. McCarty decision counters. Berkemer clarifies that the non-threatening nature of Terry stops means they are not subject to Miranda's requirements, suggesting that while individuals cannot leave during such stops, this does not automatically invoke Miranda protections.
The Berkemer Court established that the critical question regarding the need for Miranda warnings during a traffic stop is whether the stop imposes sufficient pressure on the detained individual that impairs their right against self-incrimination. It determined that motorists are seized under the Fourth Amendment during typical traffic stops, which are generally brief and temporary, distinguishing them from prolonged interrogations at police stations. The Court noted that the short, spontaneous nature of traffic stops limits the risk of police trickery designed to elicit self-incriminating statements.
Additionally, the Court recognized that most drivers do not feel completely vulnerable during these stops, as the presence of bystanders and the visibility of the interaction with police mitigate the sense of intimidation. The limited number of officers involved further reduces the feeling of being at the police's mercy. However, in the Tenth Circuit case of United States v. Perdue, the court highlighted that the specific circumstances of the stop—occurring in an isolated area with police aggression—created a situation where the detainee felt entirely vulnerable. Consequently, the Tenth Circuit ruled that Miranda warnings were warranted, despite the stop being within the parameters of a Terry stop, due to the highly intrusive nature of the encounter.
Acosta’s case differs significantly from the Purdue case due to the circumstances surrounding his stop. He was approached in a public parking lot during the day, where officers’ actions were visible to bystanders. Unlike Purdue, Acosta was not questioned at gunpoint; weapons were holstered, and he remained standing without any physical coercion, handcuffs, or confinement in a police vehicle. He was assured he was not under arrest, and the situation lacked the high-pressure tactics seen in Purdue.
Regarding the heroin found in the duffle-bag in Sade’s apartment, Acosta argued that the district court mistakenly denied his motion to suppress the evidence. Although the lower court did not specifically address the search of the duffle-bag, the magistrate judge concluded that Sade’s consent to search the apartment justified the search. However, it was established that Acosta himself consented to the search of the bag, as he explicitly agreed when asked for the key.
Officer Sallick testified that Acosta voluntarily produced the key for the search, and there was no opposing evidence to challenge this testimony. The courts do not require explicit findings on every issue raised, but findings should align with the overall judgment supported by evidence. The district court found Acosta’s pre-arrest statements were made freely, including his consent to search the duffle-bag.
A consensual search is deemed constitutional if it is voluntary, stemming from a free choice rather than coercion. The government must demonstrate that consent was given freely and not as a result of submission to authority. The determination of voluntariness relies on the totality of the circumstances, placing the burden of proof on the government.
Determining whether consent to a search is voluntary requires a case-by-case analysis without fixed definitions. In this instance, Acosta's consent to search his duffle bag was deemed voluntary, and the district court's decision not to suppress the search results was upheld. Regarding Acosta's rights during questioning by the officer at the United States Customs Service HIDTA headquarters, the law stipulates that if a suspect indicates a desire to remain silent or consult an attorney, questioning must cease. However, law enforcement is not required to stop questioning if the suspect's invocation of rights is ambiguous. In this case, Acosta made contradictory statements about his willingness to invoke his rights or continue answering questions. Although he had been read his rights and did not clearly express a desire to invoke them, he initially refused to sign a written waiver of rights but later indicated a willingness to talk. The officer clarified the meaning of waiving rights, while Acosta acknowledged understanding his rights but seemed confused about the implications of waiving them. Ultimately, the questioning continued as Acosta's statements did not constitute an unequivocal invocation of his right to remain silent.
Acosta was informed by Agent Ocasio that he could stop talking at any time during their conversation. Despite understanding his rights, Acosta expressed a desire to avoid misunderstandings regarding waiving those rights. He acknowledged the drugs in his possession but refused to sign a waiver form, asserting he could still cooperate without signing. Ocasio noted Acosta's verbal agreement to cooperate and the recording of the conversation, but acknowledged Acosta's choice not to sign the waiver. The discussion continued without further reference to the waiver.
The document further cites legal precedents indicating that a refusal to sign a waiver does not inherently signify an invocation of rights. Cases such as North Carolina v. Butler establish that such refusal does not prevent subsequent questioning. Acosta’s refusal to sign, without requesting legal counsel, does not amount to an explicit invocation of his rights. Although he stated, "No, I’m not going to waive my rights," the conversation suggests he voluntarily engaged with law enforcement after this statement.
Acosta's statements during the interrogation were ambiguous regarding his willingness to waive his Miranda rights. Although he expressed a desire to cooperate without signing a waiver, he simultaneously indicated that he did not want to waive his rights. The district court, relying on the interrogation transcript and Officer Ocasio's testimony, concluded that Acosta had effectively waived his rights without coercion from the officers. The court noted that a reasonable officer in Ocasio's position would not interpret Acosta's statements as an invocation of his right to silence or to an attorney. Despite the ambiguity in Acosta’s statements, the court emphasized that the existence of multiple reasonable interpretations does not support a claim of having invoked those rights clearly. Thus, the court affirmed the denial of Acosta's motion to suppress his statements, as he did not unambiguously assert his right to remain silent or to counsel.
