Jesus Garcia Delgado v. Gail Lewis, Deputy Warden Attorney General of the State of California

Citations: 181 F.3d 1087; 99 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 4967; 99 Daily Journal DAR 6404; 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 13759; 1999 WL 415523Docket: 97-56162

Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit; June 23, 1999; Federal Appellate Court

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Jesus Garcia Delgado, a petitioner in a case against Deputy Warden Gail Lewis and the Attorney General of California, claimed ineffective assistance of counsel due to his appellate lawyer's failure to raise any viable issues. The U.S. District Court for the Central District of California agreed and granted Delgado's habeas corpus petition, a decision affirmed by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.

Delgado, a 45-year-old Hispanic man with limited English proficiency, was arrested in 1994 alongside five co-defendants for manufacturing methamphetamine and related charges. Initially pleading not guilty, he later accepted a guilty plea to three charges and sentence enhancements as part of a global plea agreement limiting any defendant's sentence to a maximum of fifteen years, with consideration for mitigating factors.

Notably, Delgado's appointed trial counsel was absent from critical proceedings, including the preliminary and sentencing hearings, as well as during the signing of the plea agreement. A codefendant's attorney explained the plea agreement to Delgado, while his own attorney admitted in court that he had not adequately explained the change-of-plea form. During the plea hearing, Delgado expressed his belief in his innocence before ultimately pleading guilty to the charges.

Delgado's appointed counsel did not appear for his sentencing hearing, leading another attorney to temporarily represent him, despite also representing a different codefendant. During the hearing, Delgado's substitute counsel refrained from advocating for him, merely submitting to the court's judgment. Delgado was not given the opportunity to make a personal statement, nor was it clear if he had an interpreter. The judge sentenced Delgado to the maximum fifteen years, despite his lack of a criminal record.

Delgado's appointed counsel filed a request for a certificate of probable cause, indicating Delgado's desire to appeal his plea based on inadequate translation and advice, as well as confusion that prevented him from withdrawing his plea. New appellate counsel was appointed but filed a brief that neither raised any issues nor sought reversal, simply inviting the California Court of Appeals to review the record. Delgado independently filed a supplemental brief claiming ineffective assistance of trial counsel, citing poor communication, a mistaken belief regarding his sentence, and the absence of his attorney during sentencing.

The California Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction without opinion after an independent review. Delgado's subsequent pro per petition to the California Supreme Court was denied without opinion. He later filed a state writ of habeas corpus alleging ineffective assistance of both trial and appellate counsel, asserting that his appellate counsel failed to address trial counsel’s ineffectiveness and did not provide him with trial transcripts. He also claimed a misunderstanding about the implications of his plea due to language barriers. The California Supreme Court denied the habeas petition in a brief order.

On October 15, 1996, Delgado filed a federal habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, claiming ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. The district court granted this petition, ordering the California Court of Appeals to reinstate Delgado's appeal and appoint new counsel within sixty days, or he would be released from prison. Deputy Warden Lewis appealed but did not seek a stay, prompting the California Court of Appeals to vacate its prior decision, reinstate the appeal, and appoint new counsel while staying state proceedings pending the appeal's outcome.

Delgado exhausted state remedies as required by 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1) by filing a state writ of habeas corpus in the California Supreme Court, alleging ineffective assistance of both trial and appellate counsel under Strickland v. Washington. His claims sufficiently presented his situation to the state court, despite not explicitly mentioning Anders v. California, thus alerting the State to relevant legal precedents.

Since Delgado's federal habeas petition was filed after April 1, 1996, it is governed by the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA). Under AEDPA, federal courts can grant habeas relief if the state court’s decision was contrary to, or unreasonably applied, clearly established federal law, or if it was based on an unreasonable determination of facts. The standard set by the Ninth Circuit emphasizes that federal courts should not overturn state court decisions unless they fail to follow Supreme Court law. If a state court does not provide the rationale for its decision, federal courts must independently assess the record to determine if the state court's resolution was contrary to or involved an unreasonable application of federal law.

An independent review found that the California state court's decision was contrary to clearly established federal law, specifically regarding Delgado's Sixth Amendment right to effective appellate counsel as established in Strickland v. Washington. The district court determined Delgado's counsel was ineffective for failing to identify any arguable issues in the appellate brief, violating the procedures set forth in Anders v. California. Under Supreme Court precedent, criminal defendants have the right to competent advocacy in mandatory appeals, and appellate counsel must address non-frivolous issues or request to withdraw with a supporting brief for the court's review. In Delgado's case, his counsel neither raised arguable issues nor filed a motion to withdraw, resulting in constitutionally deficient representation. The appellate process outlined in Anders was not followed, leading to a lack of effective counsel for Delgado. Furthermore, the Deputy Warden's claim that AEDPA limits the district court's application of Anders to invalidate California's no-merit brief procedure was rejected. Previous cases confirmed that the California no-merit brief procedure did not meet constitutional standards set by Anders. This case applied existing Supreme Court precedent, aligning with AEDPA's requirements.

AEDPA does not require federal courts to overlook state court proceedings or to accept state court decisions that contradict clearly established federal law as determined by the Supreme Court. The established law under Anders has been recognized for over thirty years, and procedures outlined in Wende do not meet the Supreme Court's minimal standards set in Anders. Delgado's appellate counsel failed to meet these standards by not identifying any appellate issues despite potential issues raised by trial counsel and neglecting to withdraw as counsel, resulting in constitutionally deficient performance under the Sixth Amendment. 

Under Strickland, Delgado was not required to demonstrate prejudice because the failure to raise arguable issues in the appellate brief creates a presumption of prejudice. The Supreme Court noted that when appellate counsel files a motion to withdraw without raising any appealable issues, the petitioner lacks representation during the appellate decision-making process. This situation is significantly different from instances where particular arguments are not pressed by counsel. Delgado's case exemplifies this presumption of prejudice as he received minimal and ineffective assistance from counsel throughout the criminal proceedings, with his trial counsel present only briefly and often absent. 

Delgado's trial counsel did not present any mitigating evidence that could have supported a reduced sentence, and although there were legitimate appellate issues stemming from counsel's ineffective assistance, these were ignored by appellate counsel, who incorrectly claimed there were no arguable issues. As a result, Delgado was deprived of his right to counsel on appeal, leading to a violation of his Sixth Amendment rights. The legal representation provided did not align with the standards for indigent defendants established by the Supreme Court, affirming the district court’s judgment.

The panel affirmed the case without oral argument as permitted by Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 34(a). It highlighted the distinction from the case of Davis v. Kramer, where the California Court of Appeals provided an unpublished decision explaining the denial of an appeal. In contrast, the California Court of Appeals affirmed Delgado's conviction without opinion, making no factual findings or legal conclusions, and the Supreme Court of California subsequently denied review and a habeas relief petition without explanation, indicating different factual circumstances. The panel clarified that an independent review of the record and applicable federal law, in the absence of state court reasoning, does not equate to a de novo standard of review. Instead, it serves to determine if the state court's decision was "contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law," as per AEDPA (28 U.S.C.A. 2254(d)(1)). This approach aligns with the deference typically given to state court factual findings in habeas reviews. However, in instances where state courts do not make factual findings, federal courts may afford less deference, as established in Jones v. Wood and Baylor v. Estelle, asserting that thorough review of the complete state court record remains essential regardless of AEDPA constraints.