Brentwood Academy v. Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Association Ronnie Carter, Executive Director and Individually

Citations: 180 F.3d 758; 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 13597; 1999 WL 402246Docket: 98-6113

Court: Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit; June 21, 1999; Federal Appellate Court

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The case involves Brentwood Academy, a private school in Tennessee, which was found to have violated the Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Association's (TSSAA) "recruiting rule" that prohibits undue influence in securing student-athletes. After Brentwood exhausted its internal appeals against TSSAA sanctions, it filed a lawsuit claiming violations of its First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The district court ruled in favor of Brentwood, granting summary judgment on the First Amendment claim and issuing an injunction against TSSAA's enforcement of the recruiting rule. TSSAA appealed, arguing that the district court incorrectly determined it to be a state actor and contended that the recruiting rule does not violate the First Amendment. The appellate court reversed the district court's judgment, vacated the injunction, and remanded the case for further proceedings. The background notes that Brentwood has a strong athletic reputation, particularly in football, and highlights specific incidents that led to TSSAA's investigation, focusing on actions by the football coach related to the recruiting rule.

The TSSAA's recruiting rule prohibits undue influence on students or their guardians by any school-affiliated individual to secure or retain students for athletic purposes. The regulations include extensive interpretations of what constitutes "undue influence." Following an investigation in August 1997, TSSAA found Brentwood in violation of these rules based on three incidents, resulting in a one-year ineligibility for TSSAA tournaments in football and basketball, along with a two-year probation. After an appeals process, the penalties increased to a two-year ban, a four-year probation, and a $3,000 fine. Brentwood subsequently filed a lawsuit against TSSAA on December 12, 1997, seeking an injunction related to the recruiting rule and alleging violations under 42 U.S.C. 1983 for infringing on its First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Cross-motions for summary judgment were submitted, leading the district court to grant summary judgment for Brentwood on the First Amendment claims and to enjoin the recruiting rule's enforcement, while granting TSSAA summary judgment on one state-law claim. TSSAA appealed, arguing it is not a state actor and that its actions, even if deemed state action, were permissible under the First Amendment. The standard of review for the summary judgment is de novo, emphasizing that summary judgment is appropriate when no material facts are disputed and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. To establish a First Amendment claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant acted as a state actor, as outlined by the requirements of 1983. The Supreme Court emphasizes the importance of the "state action" requirement to ensure the preservation of individual freedoms against federal overreach.

The Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Association (TSSAA) is a voluntary association established in 1925, comprising 290 public and 55 private schools in Tennessee. Its governance lies with a Board of Control, made up of nine members, all of whom are public school administrators, despite private administrators' eligibility for election. TSSAA operates without state funding, relying on revenues from tournament gate receipts, and is responsible solely for scheduling state tournaments, not other interscholastic contests. It must contract with the state when using public facilities and pay for that use. Importantly, there is no Tennessee Code provision that authorizes the state to conduct interscholastic athletics or delegate such authority to another entity. While a State Board of Education rule from 1972 to 1995 designated TSSAA for interscholastic athletics, this rule was repealed, allowing public schools the option to join or withdraw from TSSAA. These factors indicate that TSSAA is not a government entity, although the issue of whether its actions should be considered state actions due to its ties with the government remains complex.

The "Blum trilogy" from the Supreme Court addresses the state action doctrine concerning private entities. In Blum v. Yaretsky, the Court ruled that extensive state regulation and federal funding do not automatically render a nursing home a state actor. Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co. established that state action requires the conduct to be "fairly attributable" to the state, with significant involvement from state officials. The Court concluded that certain government actions, such as judicial enforcement of a statute, can indicate state action.

In **Rendell-Baker**, the Supreme Court ruled that a privately operated school did not exert state power in discharging teachers, despite receiving state funding for the majority of its students' education. The **Blum trilogy** establishes a framework for assessing state action, which is determined case-by-case, without a singular test. The **Sixth Circuit** employs three tests to evaluate whether actions can be attributed to the state: 

1. **Public Function Test**: This test assesses whether a private entity performs functions traditionally reserved for the state, such as holding elections. The conduct of interscholastic sports is not traditionally a government function, and courts have consistently ruled that there is no constitutional right to participate in such sports. As a result, the **TSSAA** (Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Association) does not qualify as a state actor under this test.

2. **State Compulsion Test**: This test examines whether the state has coerced or encouraged a private entity to act, making its actions equivalent to state actions. The state of Tennessee's interaction with TSSAA has been limited, with the most notable involvement being a now-repealed Board of Education rule designating TSSAA for interscholastic activities. The Supreme Court's decision in **Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison** clarified that mere designation does not constitute state action. Tennessee's relationship with TSSAA is far less involved than Pennsylvania's with Metropolitan Edison, which had significant state oversight. Consequently, Brentwood has not demonstrated that TSSAA is a state actor under this test.

The critical question is whether TSSAA qualifies as a state actor under the "symbiotic relationship" test, which assesses the closeness of the relationship between the state and the regulated entity. A symbiotic relationship is present when the actions of a private entity can be considered state actions due to significant state involvement. Previous rulings indicate that mere extensive state regulation or funding does not suffice to establish this relationship. A state actor designation requires evidence of coercive power or substantial encouragement from the state.

In Burrows v. Ohio High School Athletic Association, the court ruled that an athletic association did not act as a state actor, emphasizing that a plaintiff must demonstrate state control over the association's actions. Brentwood failed to establish this in the current case. Although Burrows is the most recent relevant case, it does not reference two earlier cases that reached the opposite conclusion regarding OHSAA's state actor status. 

The earlier case, Yellow Springs v. Ohio High School Athletic Association, is significant as it is cited by both the district court and Brentwood to argue that OHSAA and TSSAA are comparable, hence Yellow Springs should govern the decision. The court acknowledges that when a later decision conflicts with an earlier one, the earlier ruling holds precedence. However, it finds that the holding in Yellow Springs does not conflict with Burrows or the current decision, maintaining that prior case law remains authoritative unless overruled by the Supreme Court or an en banc decision.

A school district in Yellow Springs challenged an OHSAA rule prohibiting co-ed teams in contact sports under Title IX, which addresses sex discrimination in federally funded education programs. The court concluded that OHSAA's semi-official status and its relationship with the state indicated state action, but Brentwood argues this statement is binding. However, the text clarifies that Title IX allows for liability of private entities without requiring a demonstration of state action, making references to state action in Yellow Springs non-essential and merely dicta. 

In Alerding v. OHSAA, the court examined a rule barring out-of-state students from participating in Ohio interscholastic athletics, with claims based on the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The court rejected these claims, with a footnote stating OHSAA is a state actor due to Ohio's implicit delegation of regulatory power. This reliance on Yellow Springs for state action is limited, especially since Tennessee revoked its delegation to TSSAA in 1995, distinguishing it from Ohio’s situation and leading to the conclusion that Alerding does not apply to the current case.

Additionally, the district court cited NCAA v. Tarkanian, where the Supreme Court suggested that a high school athletic association could be a state actor. However, the Court emphasized that such associations do not act under color of state law in dealings with private universities, indicating that Tarkanian's remarks are not authoritative in the present context.

TSSAA is not considered a state actor, as Brentwood has not demonstrated that TSSAA's actions are attributable to the state of Tennessee, nor are there any binding precedents requiring a different conclusion. Consequently, member schools cannot pursue a 1983 claim against TSSAA. The court does not address the merits of Brentwood's First Amendment claims, even though concerns about the vagueness and arbitrary enforcement of TSSAA's rules are noted. These issues should be resolved within TSSAA's membership rather than through federal courts. The court emphasizes that it does not act as an overseer of high school athletics and recognizes that while eligibility questions are significant to students and parents, they do not rise to constitutional importance. The district court's summary judgment in favor of Brentwood is reversed, the injunction is vacated, and the case is remanded for further proceedings.