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Beard v. Talladega County Commission
Citations: 556 So. 2d 384; 1990 Ala. LEXIS 11; 1990 WL 4427Docket: 88-1390
Court: Supreme Court of Alabama; January 4, 1990; Alabama; State Supreme Court
Jill and Jane Beard petitioned for a writ of mandamus to direct Judge Robert R. Armstrong, Jr. to vacate his February 8, 1989, order that transferred their case from Coosa County to Talladega County. The Beards had sued multiple defendants, including Southern Railway, after Jill Beard was injured in an accident at a railroad crossing in Talladega County. Southern Railway argued for the transfer, stating it did not own or operate any tracks in Coosa County, although it held a controlling interest in Central of Georgia Railroad Company, which did operate there. The trial court ruled that venue was improper in Coosa County due to insufficient evidence of Southern Railway’s ownership or operational presence there and a lack of proof that Central of Georgia acted as its agent for venue purposes. The Court clarified that its standard for determining agency in venue cases differs from that for liability, emphasizing that an entity can be considered an agent for venue if it is the means through which the principal conducts business in a county. The case referenced, Ex parte Charter Retreat Hospital, Inc., illustrated this principle, where a subsidiary was deemed an agent for venue despite corporate separations. The Court noted uncertainty about Central of Georgia's ownership structure relative to Southern Railway but acknowledged that Southern Railway maintained a controlling interest. Respondents contend that the “means” test should not apply because there is insufficient evidence that Central of Georgia is a wholly owned subsidiary of Southern Railway. The court disagrees, referencing Charter Retreat Hospital, which indicates that the relevant inquiry for venue determination is the corporate purpose served by the subsidiary for its owner, rather than the degree of ownership. Testimony from S.L. McGinnis, a superintendent at Norfolk Southern Corporation, revealed shared corporate officers and a common safety officer between the two companies. Additionally, he noted that significant functions were consolidated following Southern Railway's acquisition of a controlling interest in Central of Georgia in 1963. This evidence led the court to conclude that Central of Georgia acted as an agent of Southern Railway in Coosa County for business purposes, establishing proper venue. Consequently, the petition for a writ of mandamus is granted. The court emphasized that the term "agency" may not align strictly with principal/agent legal standards, and the criteria for determining agency in this context is governed by constitutional and statutory language, without specific ownership thresholds being necessary.