Carol Stavropoulos appeals the summary judgment favoring the Board of Regents of the University System of Georgia and individual defendants Evan Firestone and William Squires concerning allegations of retaliation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act and a First Amendment claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The case stems from Stavropoulos's employment as an assistant professor in the School of Art at the University of Georgia, where she received positive performance evaluations in her first two years.
In 1994, she was involved in a committee to recommend a candidate for a computer artist position, believing that a female candidate, Dr. Ann Marie LeBlanc, was the most qualified. The majority favored hiring Dr. David Kaufman, leading to dissent from Stavropoulos and committee member Dr. Bradley Tindall. Following the faculty vote to hire Kaufman, Stavropoulos and Tindall filed a minority report advocating for LeBlanc, emphasizing the importance of diversity in hiring. Director Firestone disapproved of their report, sending a memo expressing his dissatisfaction, which was shared with higher administration.
After the faculty vote, Dr. LeBlanc expressed concerns about potential gender discrimination, with Stavropoulos assisting her in seeking help with the complaint. Firestone became aware of Stavropoulos's involvement in this matter. The court ultimately affirmed the summary judgment, concluding that there was insufficient evidence of retaliation against Stavropoulos.
In 1995, Stavropoulos received strong performance evaluations but faced a faculty vote against renewing her contract, predominantly based on perceptions of her as uncollegial and hostile. Following this, she raised concerns with the dean, prompting the associate dean to request documentation of her behavior from Director Firestone. Firestone compiled letters from faculty regarding Stavropoulos's conduct and performance, which ultimately led the deans to reject the non-renewal vote and grant her a contract for the 1995-96 academic year. At no point was Stavropoulos informed of a contract termination.
In March 1996, she received her first negative performance evaluation coinciding with her upcoming third-year tenure review. Director Firestone appointed a review committee, selecting members from outside the Art Education Program to minimize bias. During the review process, Firestone's initial remarks indicated a negative tone towards the committee's task. The committee was instructed not to consider the previously compiled letters and was required to offer Stavropoulos a chance to respond to their findings.
Stavropoulos alleged that Firestone encouraged faculty to share negative experiences about her. He also contributed a memo detailing his perspective on her involvement in a discrimination claim. Chairman Squires prepared a memorandum suggesting that Stavropoulos's mental health impacted her professional relationships. During her interview, questions about her mental health arose, which she denied, leading to visible anger from Squires. The committee's report acknowledged illness as a factor in her relationships, yet Stavropoulos maintained that her performance remained uncompromised.
In June 1996, faculty members convened to discuss the renewal of Dr. Stavropoulos’s employment contract. A third-year review committee presented a report highlighting several concerns: Stavropoulos exhibited public anger towards colleagues, awarded all students “A” grades over a year, showed resistance to procedural learning which led to inaccurate student guidance, and conducted classes at her home instead of on campus. While the committee acknowledged her research progress towards promotion and tenure, they noted ongoing issues in teaching and service that jeopardized her advancement.
Chairman Squires shared a response from Stavropoulos and mentioned discussions with deans, who would not interfere with the faculty's vote. He also indicated that Stavropoulos might be suffering from a mental illness, which she had privately disclosed to him. Ultimately, the faculty voted not to renew her contract. Following this decision, Stavropoulos filed a grievance with the faculty senate, which led to a hearing where she was represented by an attorney at her own expense. The grievance panel concluded that the faculty’s non-renewal decision was improperly influenced by gender discrimination, perceived disability, and retaliation related to her actions in a prior selection process. As a result, Stavropoulos retained her job without loss of pay or benefits, but her attorney fees were not reimbursed.
Stavropoulos subsequently filed a lawsuit alleging violations of various rights, including First Amendment rights and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. Defendants Firestone and Squires sought to dismiss the claims against them, partially succeeding in the district court. The court allowed her to proceed with a First Amendment retaliation claim against the Defendants in their individual capacities, ruling they were not entitled to qualified immunity. The Defendants appealed this ruling. After discovery, all Defendants moved for summary judgment, which the district court granted, resulting in a judgment favoring the Defendants. On appeal, Stavropoulos contended that the district court incorrectly granted summary judgment regarding her Title VII retaliation claim, arguing that the non-renewal votes and negative reviews constituted adverse employment actions under Title VII.
Stavropoulos argues that the district court erred in granting summary judgment to Firestone and Squires regarding her 1983 First Amendment retaliation claim, asserting that the court improperly concluded she failed to demonstrate an adverse employment action necessary for such a claim. The Defendants maintain that no error occurred. The review of the summary judgment is conducted de novo, applying the same standards as the district court.
Stavropoulos's appeal raises issues regarding the substantiality of actions taken against her, specifically whether these actions qualify as adverse employment actions under Title VII and the First Amendment. She claims a retaliatory-harassment theory, arguing that the cumulative effect of trivial acts created a significantly inferior working environment. However, this theory was not presented during the summary judgment phase but was introduced only in a motion to reconsider, which the district court denied as untimely. Stavropoulos does not contest the denial of her motion to reconsider, leading to its exclusion from the appeal.
Regarding her Title VII retaliation claim, the district court found that Stavropoulos did not establish a prima facie case, as she failed to show an adverse employment action. To prove retaliation, a plaintiff must demonstrate engagement in protected activity, suffering an adverse employment action, and a causal link between the two. The court ruled that the actions Stavropoulos cited did not amount to an ultimate employment decision, such as termination or demotion, nor did they meet the substantiality threshold. In comparing her situation to previous cases, the court highlighted that her complaints did not involve significant detriment to her employment status, concluding that she did not meet the necessary criteria for an adverse employment action under Title VII.
In Gupta v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, the 11th Circuit established that an employment action must be 'objectively serious and tangible enough' to affect an employee's compensation or employment conditions to qualify as an adverse action. The court found that scheduling the employee to teach across three campuses did not meet this threshold, as she never followed that schedule. Denying her the chance to teach a specific class was insufficient since she opted not to teach that term. Additionally, delaying her visa application was deemed not serious enough because it was returned in time for her to file it properly. The court emphasized that actions with no actual effect on the employee do not constitute adverse actions.
In contrast, in Bass, the court identified adverse employment actions where the plaintiff was forced into menial tasks compared to peers, denied extra pay opportunities, and subjected to testing requirements not mandated for colleagues. However, orders not to record certain tasks or to destroy materials were considered insubstantial as they did not affect the plaintiff's employment status.
In Stavropoulos's case, despite negative ratings and termination votes, her position and benefits remained intact due to a subsequent override, indicating no adverse employment action occurred. The court reiterated that actions like reprimands or transfers, if rescinded before tangible harm, are not adverse under Title VII. Emotional distress or costs related to seeking contract review were also deemed insubstantial since the review was ultimately successful.
Consequently, Stavropoulos failed to establish a prima facie case of retaliation under Title VII due to the absence of adverse employment actions. Regarding her 1983 First Amendment retaliation claim against Firestone and Squires, the court applied a two-step analysis to assess whether their actions violated a constitutional right, considering the facts favorably for the claimant.
If an officer's conduct is found to have violated a constitutional right, it must then be determined whether that right was clearly established. If not, or if no violation occurred, the officer is protected by qualified immunity. To succeed in a First Amendment retaliation claim, a public employee must demonstrate that their employer retaliated against them due to speech on a public concern, which is defined as an adverse employment action likely to discourage constitutionally protected speech. In this case, the district court ruled that Stavropoulos failed to show that Firestone and Squires imposed an adverse employment action. This conclusion was based solely on Title VII's adverse-action analysis, leading to the determination that there was no adverse action under the First Amendment. Stavropoulos argued that the First Amendment should have a more lenient standard for what constitutes an adverse action, suggesting that any action likely to chill protected speech should be sufficient. However, precedent indicates that a chilling effect must stem from an adverse employment action, which involves significant employment conditions. Important adverse actions include discharges, demotions, refusals to hire or promote, and reprimands. The court noted that previous rulings do not support redefining the standard for adverse employment actions under the First Amendment to be less stringent than Title VII’s. As such, the statement regarding the First Amendment's standard was deemed dicta, and the court chose not to deviate from established precedents to adopt it.
The legal standards for determining adverse employment actions under Title VII and the First Amendment are aligned. Title VII defines adverse actions as those that affect an employee's compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment. Similarly, the First Amendment requires that the alleged retaliatory action must involve important conditions of employment and create a direct injury or threat thereof, rather than just a subjective chilling effect on speech. Supreme Court precedents clarify that mere allegations of a chilling effect are insufficient without demonstrating concrete harm.
In the case of Stavropoulos, the district court correctly applied Title VII standards to her First Amendment retaliation claim, concluding that neither Firestone nor Squires inflicted an adverse employment action. Stavropoulos cited actions by Firestone, including a critical memo regarding her report and attempts to solicit negative feedback about her, as retaliatory. However, these actions did not constitute adverse employment actions because they did not impact significant aspects of her employment, such as salary or job duties. This mirrors a precedent where retaliatory actions lacking effect on employment conditions were deemed non-adverse. Thus, the court found no error in dismissing Stavropoulos's claims.
Stavropoulos claimed that Squires’s preparation and presentation of a mental illness memo constituted an adverse employment action. However, this claim was deemed insufficient as it did not impact a significant condition of Stavropoulos’s employment, similar to the precedent set in Breaux, where required psychological evaluations following inappropriate remarks were not considered adverse actions. The district court correctly concluded that Stavropoulos did not demonstrate an adverse employment action, failing to establish a constitutional violation against Firestone or Squires. Additionally, even if their actions were considered violations of First Amendment rights, there was no clearly established law indicating that their conduct was unlawful, thus granting them qualified immunity. Consequently, the district court’s summary judgment for the Defendants was upheld. Regarding Nix, Stavropoulos did not attribute any retaliatory actions to her on appeal, leading to affirmation of the district court's judgment concerning Nix without further commentary.
