First National Bank of Gonzales v. Morton

Citations: 544 So. 2d 5; 1989 La. App. LEXIS 656; 1989 WL 35219Docket: Nos. 88 CA 0048, 88 CA 0642

Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal; April 11, 1989; Louisiana; State Appellate Court

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Consolidated appeals have been filed by First National Bank of Gonzales (Bank) challenging two adverse judgments: one from October 14, 1987, regarding the ranking of mortgages and another from February 15, 1988, concerning possession of seized property and lease proceeds. The appellees, Charles E. Metrailer and Martha W. Metrailer, hold a real estate mortgage recorded in 1982 for $360,000. The Bank initiated a lawsuit on June 9, 1986, to enforce its mortgage on the same property, alleging it held a collateral mortgage note for $750,000 dated October 18, 1984. The Metrailers successfully moved for summary judgment, leading to their dismissal from the Bank's suit on January 6, 1987, a judgment which the Bank did not appeal and is now final.

The transactions surrounding the mortgaged property involve several parties. In September 1982, the Metrailers sold the property to William and Susan Mengshol, who later sold it to an unincorporated joint venture, Joned, in August 1984. Joned assumed the Metrailer mortgage and subsequently secured a loan with the Bank, resulting in the Bank mortgage. A document executed in June 1985, purportedly a dation en paiement in favor of the Metrailers, was never recorded and lacked signatures from some involved parties. Following this, Mr. Metrailer managed the property, collecting rent and applying it to the debt.

The Metrailers argued the dation en paiement was invalid in support of their summary judgment motion. On April 2, 1987, the Bank obtained a judgment against the other defendants, recognizing its mortgage privilege. The Bank's later rule to rank mortgages argued that the Metrailer mortgage was extinguished by the dation en paiement, a claim previously rejected by the trial court. The January 6, 1987, dismissal of the Metrailers did not revive this issue for appeal. Upon filing appeals, the Metrailers invoked an Exception of Res Judicata, asserting that the January 6 judgment, unappealed, settled the same issue in the same cause between the same parties.

The exception of res judicata is upheld based on LSA-R.S. 13:4231, which stipulates that the authority of a judgment applies only to matters actually litigated and decided between the same parties regarding the same cause of action. The court asserts that the validity of the dation was addressed and decided by the trial court, establishing that the Metrailers' status as owners was central to the Bank's claim. It is irrelevant that the Metrailers were defendants in the first suit and mortgagees in the second, as the underlying cause of action remains the same. The court affirms the trial court's judgment prioritizing the Metrailer mortgage.

Regarding the Bank's claim for possession of seized property and lease proceeds, the judgment is deemed interlocutory, which is generally non-appealable unless irreparable injury is shown. The Bank failed to demonstrate such injury, as it sought possession rather than ownership. The court clarifies that an interlocutory judgment does not affect the merits of the case and therefore is non-appealable. The court affirms part of the judgment and remands another without reviewing the record since it is not appealable, with costs assessed against the appellant.