Grubbs v. Alabama State Bar

Citation: 542 So. 2d 927Docket: 86-1076

Court: Supreme Court of Alabama; March 2, 1989; Alabama; State Supreme Court

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Norman Jackson Grubbs filed a petition for a writ of mandamus against the Alabama State Bar Association, seeking certification as a member without passing the Alabama State Bar Examination. His petition, denied by the Court on November 14, 1988, argued he was denied admission to the University of Alabama School of Law in 1949 due to racial discrimination, violating his Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection. Grubbs asserts that had he been admitted and graduated before August 31, 1965, he would have qualified for 'diploma privilege,' allowing bar admission without examination.

Grubbs attempts to differentiate his case from Jones v. Alabama State Bar, where Jones did not apply to law school due to perceived futility, while Grubbs claims he would have applied if not for racial barriers. The Court acknowledged that both Grubbs's and Jones's applications would likely have been rejected due to race. Grubbs emphasizes that the State Bar cannot prove he would have been denied admission for reasons other than race, as Alabama Law School lacks records of his application from 1949.

The State Bar invoked the doctrine of laches, which prevents legal claims from being enforced if there has been an unreasonable delay that prejudices the defendant. This doctrine is based on public policy against stale claims and considers the inequity of allowing enforcement after significant time has passed.

The doctrine of laches aims to prevent unfairness arising from a party's delay in asserting claims or failing to meet equitable obligations. For the State Bar to invoke laches against Grubbs, it must demonstrate his unreasonable delay in asserting a claim and that this delay caused undue prejudice to the State Bar. Undue prejudice can include factors such as unavailability of witnesses, changes in personnel, and loss of relevant records. The court is not required to determine whether the original claim was unjust; it suffices that it is too late to evaluate the merits of the issue at hand.

In Grubbs's case, he claimed he was denied admission to Alabama Law School in 1949 due to his race, but no supporting records were provided to verify his application or the reasons for any denial. At the time, applicants needed a specific academic standing, including a C+ average and completion of required coursework. Due to the passage of time and lack of documentation from both Grubbs's college and the law school, it is impossible to ascertain whether reasons other than race influenced the denial of admission.

Despite attending an out-of-state law school with state financial assistance, Grubbs retained the right not to be denied admission based on race. He graduated from the University of Detroit School of Law in 1953 and was admitted to the Michigan State Bar in 1954, but he waited over 36 years to seek redress for the alleged constitutional violation regarding his admission to the Alabama Law School. Additionally, the diploma privilege, which could have provided a remedy, has not been available since the 1960s, and Grubbs's request for this privilege came over 20 years after its termination.

Grubbs's claim for admission under a privilege no longer available is barred by the doctrine of laches and the rule of repose in Alabama, which prohibits actions not brought within 20 years. This rule, distinct from statutes of limitations, is absolute and not influenced by situational factors or party status; it focuses solely on the passage of time. Recognition of the plaintiff's ongoing right is required to pause the prescriptive period, which Grubbs has not demonstrated. The court emphasizes that allowing claims after such a long delay undermines societal peace and the integrity of litigation, as memories fade and evidence deteriorates over time. Grubbs's claim relates to a deprivation of his right to practice law, allegedly due to racial discrimination, occurring over 30 years prior. His failure to act for more than 35 years (1949-1986) after becoming aware of the discrimination results in an absolute bar to his claim under the rule of repose. The court acknowledges the value of the right to practice law, which can only be revoked through due process, but reiterates the necessity for timely action.

The Court asserts its inherent and plenary authority to regulate admissions to the State Bar, defined as powers not derived from other sources but originating from the nature of government. It has the capacity to admit Grubbs to the State Bar without requiring him to pass the Bar Examination. However, the Court chooses not to exercise this power, noting that Grubbs delayed 36 years in seeking remedy for a 1949 violation of his constitutional right to equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment. 

The Court references the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Owens v. Okure, which mandates borrowing the state's general personal injury statute of limitations for 42 U.S.C. § 1983 actions. In Alabama, the relevant statute of limitations is two years for actions related to personal injuries not arising from contract. Consequently, any claims for damages relating to constitutional rights associated with State Bar admission must be filed within two years of the deprivation. 

However, since the Supreme Court had not issued Owens v. Okure and the Court had not established this time limitation before the initiation of Grubbs's case, it will not classify his action as time-barred. Instead, Grubbs's claim is dismissed due to laches and the rule of repose. The application for rehearing is denied, with several justices concurring in the result. Notably, the educational institution Grubbs attended has since closed, and there are no records of his courses or grades.