Lake Charles Auto Salvage, Inc. v. Stine

Docket: No. 87-1245

Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal; February 7, 1989; Louisiana; State Appellate Court

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Lake Charles Auto Salvage, Inc. (plaintiff) sued Gary C. Stine (defendant) for the purchase price and vehicle transfer fees of a 1981 Ford Mustang. The trial court ruled in favor of the plaintiff, prompting the defendant to appeal. In December 1985, Vicki Stine, the defendant's wife, visited the plaintiff's business to inquire about the Mustang advertised in a local newspaper. During her visit, she was informed by an employee that the vehicle had sustained prior damage to the right front fender, which she inspected and found to be well repaired. After expressing interest, Mrs. Stine contacted the owner, Harry Guillory, who reiterated the car's prior damage and mentioned necessary repairs, including a radiator and condenser replacement.

Despite knowing about the damage, the Stines decided to purchase the vehicle, with Mr. Stine executing a bill of sale and paying $3,750. The following day, Mrs. Stine discovered the registration indicated the vehicle was “Reconstructed,” meaning it had been deemed a total loss due to prior damage. Concerned for their daughter's safety, the Stines attempted to rescind the sale, but Guillory refused. Mr. Stine then stopped payment on the check and returned the vehicle.

Defendant argues there was no “meeting of the minds” justifying rescission due to: (1) his lack of knowledge that the vehicle was “Reconstructed,” (2) a belief that the purchase was for personal use rather than resale, and (3) misrepresentation regarding the extent of the vehicle's damage. While he maintains that he would not have bought the car if aware of its status, he did not provide evidence questioning the vehicle's mechanical or structural integrity.

La.R.S. 32:707 J(2) mandates that the term "Reconstructed" be displayed on the title of all rebuilt salvage vehicles, which are defined as vehicles deemed a total loss after sustaining damage equivalent to 75% of their market value. The vehicle in question has “Reconstructed Vehicle” noted on its title, indicating it was previously adjudged a total loss before repairs. Under C.C. art. 2439, a sales contract requires the item sold, the price, and the consent of both parties. C.C. art. 1948 states that consent can be invalidated by error, fraud, or duress. The defendant claims a lack of mutual understanding regarding the sale due to ignorance of the vehicle's status as "Reconstructed," but the court disagrees. C.C. art. 1949 specifies that error must pertain to a critical cause of the contract, known or should have been known by the other party. 

The defendant's primary concern was purchasing a safe vehicle for his daughter, which was affirmed by testimonies indicating concerns about safety. The plaintiff presented evidence that the vehicle was in good condition at the time of sale, and the defendant did not provide proof that any critical aspect of the sale was unmet. The defendant's assertion that knowledge of the vehicle being "Reconstructed" would have influenced his purchase is unsupported, as there is no evidence that the plaintiff was aware this was a critical factor for the defendant. 

The decision in Cochran Ford, Inc. v. Copeland, where the plaintiff was allowed to rescind the sale due to the impact of "Reconstructed" status on resale value, is distinguished on two grounds: the current plaintiff did not intend to resell the vehicle and there was no evidence presented regarding a reduction in value. Furthermore, the defendant purchased the vehicle from a salvage dealer, unlike in Cochran. The court also found insufficient evidence to support the defendant's claims that he was misled about the vehicle's status or the extent of its prior damage. Consequently, the trial court's judgment is affirmed, and all appeal costs are assigned to the defendant, Gary C. Stine.