Wayne Powell, as of the Estate of Dana Kimberly Devilla v. Sunny Schriver, Superintendent Thomas A. Coughlin, III C.O. Lynch C.O. Crowley
Docket: 543
Court: Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit; April 1, 1999; Federal Appellate Court
Dana Kimberly Devilla, an inmate at Albion Correctional Facility, filed a lawsuit alleging that Correction Officer Jeffrey Lynch violated her constitutional right to privacy and her Eighth Amendment rights by disclosing her HIV-positive status and her history as a transsexual to other inmates and staff. Devilla also named Lynch's supervisor, Sunny Schriver, arguing that Lynch's actions stemmed from Schriver's inadequate training.
Before trial, the court dismissed the Eighth Amendment claim based on qualified immunity but allowed the privacy claim to proceed. The jury found Lynch not liable while holding Schriver liable. However, the district court later set aside this verdict, finding it inconsistent, and ruled in favor of both Lynch and Schriver.
On appeal, the court determined that the district court incorrectly granted qualified immunity for the Eighth Amendment claim. Regarding the privacy claim, the court affirmed the ruling in favor of Schriver based on qualified immunity. Devilla, who had undergone sex reassignment surgery and tested positive for HIV prior to her incarceration, became a target of harassment following Lynch's disclosure on December 31, 1991. After Devilla’s death in 1995, her executor was substituted as the plaintiff, but the case continued to reference her as the plaintiff.
The amended complaint brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleged multiple constitutional violations by the defendants, including infringement on the right to privacy, deprivation of life, liberty, due process, and equal protection, as well as cruel and unusual punishment, all in violation of the Fifth, Fourteenth, and Eighth Amendments. Devilla's claims also included negligent failure to provide care, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and violations of two New York statutes: Correction Law § 137(5) prohibiting corporal punishment and degrading treatment of inmates, and Public Health Law § 2782(3) protecting the confidentiality of HIV status. During the trial, the court dismissed Crowley and Coughlin and several of Devilla's claims, including the Eighth Amendment claim due to qualified immunity, leaving the jury to decide only whether Lynch violated Devilla's privacy rights and whether Schriver failed to properly train Lynch regarding those rights. The jury found in favor of Lynch and against Schriver, awarding Devilla $5,000 in compensatory damages and $25,000 in punitive damages. Following the verdict, Schriver moved to set aside the verdict against her, citing qualified immunity and inconsistency with Lynch's verdict. The district court agreed, stating that a claim against a supervisor under § 1983 requires a finding of a constitutional violation by the supervised party. Consequently, the court denied Devilla's request for attorney's fees, ruling that she was not a prevailing party, and entered an amended judgment favoring all defendants. Devilla appealed, challenging the dismissal of her Eighth Amendment claim, the denial of her juror dismissal request, the granting of Schriver's motion, and the denial of her attorney's fees. The appellate court affirmed the judgment in favor of Schriver on the privacy claim due to qualified immunity, but vacated the dismissal of the Eighth Amendment claim and remanded for further proceedings, also vacating the denial of attorney's fees as it depended on the determination of prevailing party status, which was unresolved.
Devilla's right to privacy claim questions whether the Constitution protects a prisoner's confidentiality regarding HIV-positive status or transsexualism. The court must first determine if a constitutional right has been alleged before addressing Schriver's qualified immunity defense. Citing the precedent from Doe v. City of New York, the court acknowledges that individuals with HIV have a constitutional right to privacy. This raises two key issues: the confidentiality rights of transsexuals and whether such rights exist within a prison context.
The court concludes that the reasoning in Doe supports the constitutional protection of transsexuals' confidentiality. The right to privacy encompasses an individual's interest in keeping personal matters, including health information, confidential. The court highlights that medical information, particularly regarding serious conditions like HIV, is intensely personal, and individuals should have the autonomy to disclose it at their discretion. This is especially critical for those with HIV due to societal stigma and discrimination.
Similarly, individuals undergoing gender transition have a compelling interest in privacy regarding their medical status, as the nature of transsexualism may provoke societal hostility. Thus, the right to confidentiality is deemed essential for both HIV-positive individuals and those identifying as transsexual.
Transsexualism is characterized as a deeply personal and private condition, often leading individuals to feel imprisoned in bodies that do not match their gender identity, prompting desires for anatomical changes. Courts have recognized the necessity for confidentiality regarding transsexualism due to the potential for discrimination and intolerance faced by individuals revealing this status. The case of Doe established a constitutional right to maintain medical confidentiality for transsexuals.
In the context of prison, inmates retain certain constitutional rights, including the right to privacy regarding medical information, as long as these rights do not conflict with legitimate penological goals. Regulations that infringe on inmates' rights must be reasonably related to those interests. The unauthorized disclosure of an inmate's confidential medical information, particularly for trivial reasons, violates their constitutional right to privacy.
While some disclosures, such as an inmate's HIV-positive status, may be justified for legitimate penological interests—like segregation of HIV-positive inmates for health reasons—disclosures made for humor or gossip do not meet this standard, therefore infringing on inmates' rights. Courts have upheld certain practices concerning the disclosure of HIV status that align with public health concerns, but these must be carefully balanced against the rights of the inmates.
Disclosure of an inmate's transsexualism in a prison setting is unlikely to serve legitimate penological interests, particularly due to the risk of inmate-on-inmate violence in such environments. While there are scenarios where a prison official's disclosure could be justified by penological concerns, no such justification was presented in this case. Schriver argues for affirmance based on qualified immunity, despite claims that immunity has been waived due to a lack of a cross-notice of appeal. This argument is rejected, as established legal precedent allows an appellee to support a judgment without a cross-appeal. Qualified immunity protects government officials from liability when their actions do not violate clearly established rights that a reasonable person would recognize. The determination of whether a right is "clearly established" considers three factors: specificity of the right, support from Supreme Court and circuit court decisions, and whether the official could reasonably understand their actions as unlawful.
The right of a prisoner to maintain the privacy of medical information was not clearly established as of December 31, 1991, the date of Lynch's disclosure. The controlling precedent on medical confidentiality was set in 1994 with Doe v. City of New York, which did not address prison inmates specifically. Prior to 1991, there was disagreement among circuits regarding this right, and no pre-1992 appellate case acknowledged a confidentiality right within a prison context. The court assumed that seropositive prisoners have a significant privacy interest concerning the non-consensual disclosure of their HIV-positive status but affirmed judgment in favor of Schriver on Devilla's privacy claim due to the lack of clearly established rights at the time of disclosure.
Regarding the Eighth Amendment claim, the district court dismissed it based on qualified immunity, stating it was not clearly established in 1991 that a corrections officer could be liable for unauthorized disclosure of medical information. However, the court emphasized that a reasonable prison official would have known by December 1991 that they could not be deliberately indifferent to the risk of violence against inmates. The court referenced a prior case from August 1991, which recognized that protecting inmates from violence is essential for maintaining order and may give rise to a viable 1983 cause of action if officials are deliberately indifferent.
In Hendricks v. Coughlin, the court addressed the denial of qualified immunity for prison officials accused of violating inmates' Eighth Amendment rights by condoning violent reprisals following a prison riot. The court emphasized that, as of 1991, it was clear that disclosing an inmate's HIV-positive status or transsexual identity could expose them to significant harm. Consequently, a reasonable prison official would have recognized that such disclosures, absent legitimate penological reasons, could equate to deliberate indifference to the risk of serious harm. The court reversed the district court's ruling that granted qualified immunity to the defendants concerning Devilla's Eighth Amendment claim, remanding the case for further consideration. The reversal stemmed from a flaw in the district court's initial reasoning, and the court did not comment on other potential grounds for qualified immunity or the validity of Devilla's allegations under the Eighth Amendment.
Devilla's privacy claim was denied, affirming judgment for Schriver. However, the Eighth Amendment claim's judgment in favor of defendants was vacated, and the case was remanded for further proceedings. The previous denial of attorney's fees was also vacated, as the determination of Devilla's status as a prevailing party remains unresolved. The right to confidentiality regarding transsexualism, similar to HIV status, may be waived, as indicated by prior case law (Doe v. Marsh, 105 F.3d 106, 111). It was noted that the confidentiality of personal information is not a fundamental right, and a balancing approach is appropriate for review. The "reasonably related to legitimate penological interests" standard applies even for non-fundamental rights, as established in Washington v. Harper. The Supreme Court's ruling in Hudson v. Palmer affirmed that prisoners have limited expectations of privacy in their cells, and thus, the Fourth Amendment does not guard against unreasonable searches in that context. However, the right to confidentiality of medical information is distinct from Fourth Amendment privacy rights. Lastly, in Doe v. Marsh, the assumption was made that a constitutional right to privacy existed preventing the state from disclosing HIV status for non-prisoners as of September 1992.
