Court: District Court of Appeal of Florida; August 4, 1988; Florida; State Appellate Court
An appeal was filed regarding a ruling that adjudged D.N. delinquent and placed him on community control due to charges of grand theft of an automobile and obstruction of police officers. The grand theft charge stemmed from an incident on July 10, 1987, while the obstruction charge arose from events on July 17, 1987. D.N. sought to suppress statements made to law enforcement, claiming violations of his Miranda rights and asserting that his statements were not voluntary. He entered a no contest plea to the obstruction charge, while the court denied the motion to suppress and proceeded with a hearing on the grand theft charge.
During the hearing, testimony revealed that D.N. was involved in a plan to steal cars at a Tallahassee dealership. Although he did not arrive at the meeting point, his accomplices stole a vehicle, a 1987 gray Buick LeSabre, and later picked him up. Initially unaware of the car's stolen status, D.N. was informed of it by one of the accomplices before they left Tallahassee. After being stopped for suspected gas theft, law enforcement officers became suspicious of the vehicle's status and arrested the group, but later released them due to conflicting statements.
On July 23, 1987, while a passenger in a suspected stolen Toyota, D.N. fled from the vehicle during a police chase and was apprehended. Investigator Stevens testified that he informed D.N. of his rights, which he waived, and that D.N. did not provide information about the Buick. Later that day, Investigator Norman interviewed D.N., who acknowledged his involvement in multiple vehicle thefts, including the stolen Buick, admitting he knew the cars were stolen and was participating in the thefts.
At the conclusion of the state’s case, the appellant's attorney sought a judgment of acquittal, claiming insufficient evidence to establish the appellant's involvement in the theft of a Buick automobile. The defense contended that mere presence as a passenger did not equate to guilt, even with knowledge that the vehicle was stolen. The court denied this motion. The appellant served as the sole defense witness, asserting he was unaware the car was stolen when he entered it. He testified that inquiries about the vehicle's ownership led him to believe it belonged to Burgess’s mother due to a similar car. During interrogation, he admitted to misleading investigators, claiming he was promised leniency in exchange for information, although he maintained he was not involved in selling stolen cars. The court subsequently denied a renewed motion for acquittal and found the appellant guilty of grand theft. At the disposition hearing, the court adjudged him delinquent, placing him on community control with conditions including restitution. The appellant challenged the adjudication by arguing that the state failed to prove a violation of section 812.014(1), Florida Statutes (1985), which defines theft as knowingly obtaining or using another's property with intent to deprive or appropriate it. Section 812.012(2) elaborates on "obtains or uses," encompassing actions such as taking control, unauthorized use, and fraud. The statute, enacted in 1977 as part of a comprehensive theft law revision, has been upheld by the supreme court against various constitutional challenges, including vagueness and potential for cruel punishment. The court clarified that specific criminal intent is required despite the absence of explicit language in the statute, emphasizing that the term "endeavors" indicates an overt act exhibiting criminal intent rather than mere mental formulation.
In State v. Dunmann, the court clarified that the specific intent required for theft is the intent to steal, rather than the intent to permanently deprive the owner of property. In State v. Sykes, the court interpreted section 812.014(1) to include attempts to commit theft, ruling that it was an error to instruct the jury on attempt as a lesser included offense. The trial court in State v. Lewis deemed sections 812.014(1)(b) and (2)(b) unconstitutional for being overly broad and indefinite, violating due process and property rights; however, the supreme court reversed this decision, applying the specific intent reasoning from State v. Allen to receiving stolen property under the omnibus theft statute. The court in Colvin v. State determined that possessing stolen property with knowledge of its status constitutes theft, regardless of how the property was acquired. Similarly, in Patten v. State, possession of recently stolen property sufficed to meet the statute's requirements. The broad interpretation of section 812.014 suggests it encompasses all aspects of theft, including unauthorized use of stolen property. In the current case, despite the state proving that the appellant rode in a stolen vehicle knowing it was stolen, there was no evidence of his possession or control over the car. Testimony from a witness about the appellant’s intent to steal did not satisfy the requirement for proving criminal intent. The court concluded that unauthorized use of stolen property with knowledge of its stolen nature is sufficient for a theft conviction under the statute, affirming the trial judge's ruling that the evidence was adequate to establish theft.
A broad interpretation of section 812.014 could yield absurd results, as illustrated by hypothetical scenarios where individuals gain knowledge of a vehicle or property being stolen but do not have possession or control over it. For instance, a hitchhiker accepting a ride in a stolen car or a person watching a stolen television may technically be guilty of grand theft under section 812.014, despite the implausibility of such charges. The appellant's conviction for theft based on knowingly riding in a stolen vehicle is questioned, prompting a certification to the supreme court regarding the necessity of evidence demonstrating possession, dominion, or control for a valid conviction under this statute.
Additionally, the appellant challenges the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress statements made to Investigators Stevens and Norman. A recorded interview reveals that the investigators provided the appellant with Miranda warnings, ensuring he understood his rights, including the right to consult with an attorney before questioning. Throughout the exchange, the investigators clarified the implications of waiving these rights and the potential consequences if charges were brought against him. The appellant affirmed his understanding of his rights during the interrogation process.
In Cribbs v. State, the defendant requested an attorney before questioning after receiving Miranda warnings. During an attempt to contact a public defender, an officer misinformed him that a public defender could only represent him after a court appointment post-charging, which confused the defendant about his rights. Unable to reach his attorney, he agreed to speak with the officer and made an initial confession. After being transported to jail and receiving another set of Miranda warnings, he confessed again. The court determined the first confession should be suppressed due to the misleading information provided by the officer, which invalidated the effectiveness of the Miranda warnings. Florida law allows immediate access to counsel for indigent defendants in custody, regardless of formal appointment. The second confession was also deemed inadmissible as the initial misinformation had not been adequately addressed by the subsequent warnings. The court emphasized that the assessment of the defendant's rights is based on his state of mind, not the officers' intent. The misstatements made by Officer Stevens regarding the right to counsel and the implications of requesting an attorney created confusion and coercion, influencing the defendant's decision-making. Therefore, both confessions were improperly admitted, and the lower court erred in denying the motions to suppress.
The lower court's denial of the motion to suppress statements made to Investigator Stevens was found to be an error, but it was deemed harmless since Stevens did not provide any incriminating statements regarding the appellant's connection to the Buick. In contrast, the denial of suppression regarding statements made to Investigator Norman was not harmless, as Norman testified that the appellant acknowledged knowledge of the Buick being stolen. Consequently, the court reversed the denial of the motion to suppress, reversed the adjudication of conviction, and remanded for further proceedings.
On appeal, the appellant contended that under section 775.089(1)(a), Florida Statutes (1987), restitution requires proof that the defendant caused the damages before any restitution order can be made. The Florida Supreme Court, in State v. Williams, clarified that a court cannot order restitution for damages unrelated to the convicted crime without determining causation. In this case, the evidence did not establish a clear link between the theft and the damages, which amounted to approximately $800, as testified by the car dealership manager. The lower court failed to assess whether the appellant's actions caused those damages, necessitating the vacation of the restitution order and a remand for further proceedings.
In summary, the evidence sufficiently supported the appellant's conviction, but the denial of the motion to suppress was erroneous, and the restitution order was improper due to lack of proof of causation. The conviction was reversed, and the case was remanded for a new trial. The court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for a new trial. There were no findings on whether all individuals involved were arrested, and some confusion existed regarding the timing of the alleged obstruction offense. The court refrained from commenting on the legislative intent of section 812.014 as applied to this case. A tape of the interview was available but not entered into evidence, though a transcript was included in the motion to suppress.
