Charles Greenleaf, Jr., Alternate of the Estate of Charles Greenleaf, Sr., Deceased Naomi Greenleaf, in Her Own Right v. Garlock, Inc. Fibreboard Corporation Celotex Corporation Owens Corning Fiberglas Corp. Owens-Illinois Glass Co. Eagle-Picher Industries, Inc. John Crane-Houdaille, Inc. A.W. Chesterton Sepco Corp. Uniroyal, Inc. Owens Corning Fiberglas Corp. Owens-Illinois Glass Co., Third-Party v. Hopeman Brothers, Inc. Combustion Engineering, Inc. Anchor Packing Co., Inc. Armstrong World Industries, Inc. Green Tweed & Co., Inc. Melrath Gasket Company, Inc. Melrath Basket Holding Co., Inc. Pars Manufacturing Co., Third-Party Owens Corning, No. 97-1820. Charles Greenleaf, Jr., Alternate of the Estate of Charles Greenleaf, Sr., Deceased Naomi Greenleaf, in Her Own Right v. Garlock, Inc. Fibreboard Corporation Celotex Corporation Owens Corning Fiberglas Corp. Owens-Illinois Glass Co. Eagle-Picher Industries, Inc. John Crane-Houdaille, Inc. A.W. Chesterton Sepco Corp. Uniroyal, Inc. Owens Corning Fiberglas Cor
Docket: 97-1820
Court: Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit; April 26, 1999; Federal Appellate Court
Garlock, Inc. and Owens Corning Fiberglas Corp. appeal the District Court's decision denying their motions to amend a judgment that held them liable for injuries sustained by Charles Greenleaf, Jr. in an asbestos products liability case. The court addresses six key issues raised by the appellants:
1. Pennsylvania's "one satisfaction" rule, which they argue bars Greenleaf's federal action.
2. Issue preclusion, which they claim prevents relitigation of damages.
3. Alleged inadequacies in the jury instructions concerning Pennsylvania law.
4. Claims of prejudice due to inflammatory remarks made by the plaintiffs' counsel.
5. Insufficient evidence to support Garlock's liability.
6. The jury's verdict that cleared non-appearing defendants of liability, which they assert contradicts the evidence.
The court agrees that issue preclusion bars relitigation of damages and mandates a new trial to reassess the liability of the non-appearing defendants. However, it finds the remaining arguments unpersuasive. Consequently, the court partially reverses and partially affirms the District Court’s orders. The initial action, filed in March 1990, named Owens and Garlock as defendants, alleging that occupational asbestos exposure caused Mr. Greenleaf's mesothelioma, with claims for damages for pain and suffering and loss of consortium. All defendants denied liability and sought contribution from co-defendants.
Two months after initiating a federal lawsuit, the Greenleafs filed a similar state lawsuit in Delaware County against five Pennsylvania defendants. Following Mr. Greenleaf's death from mesothelioma, Mrs. Greenleaf continued the claims as executrix of his estate. In July 1991, the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation stayed the federal case and transferred it to Judge Weiner in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. While the federal case was stayed, Mrs. Greenleaf's state case proceeded to a reverse bifurcated trial in January 1995, resulting in a Phase I jury verdict of $151,870 for the estate and $37,500 for loss of consortium. Subsequently, she settled with two non-bankrupt defendants before Phase II began, leading the state court to mark the action as "settled, discontinued and ended" on January 24, 1995.
Two years later, Mrs. Greenleaf reactivated the federal case. The defendants filed summary judgment motions, arguing that Pennsylvania's "one satisfaction" rule barred the claims and that issue preclusion prevented relitigation of damages. The District Court denied these motions, and the trial was conducted again in a reverse bifurcated format. The jury awarded $250,000 for the estate and $1.6 million for loss of consortium in Phase I, while Phase II focused on the defendants' liability. The jury found Owens and Garlock solely liable and absolved the non-appearing defendants.
Following the verdict, the appellants sought judgment notwithstanding the verdict, a new trial, remittitur, and other modifications, asserting that the prior state settlement precluded the federal action. Owens and Garlock appealed the District Court's denial of these motions. The discussion highlights the appellants' claims regarding the preclusive effect of the earlier state litigation and cites Pennsylvania's "one satisfaction" rule, which allows a plaintiff to recover from multiple tortfeasors but entitles them to only one satisfaction for their injuries.
The "one satisfaction" rule prohibits a subsequent lawsuit against another tortfeasor if a previous case reasonably resulted in full satisfaction of the plaintiff's claim. Full satisfaction can occur even with a settlement involving fewer than all tortfeasors, but determining this requires a detailed factual analysis of the settlement's context and value. The burden of proof lies with the party claiming "one satisfaction," which in this case was not met due to a lack of evidence regarding the state settlement, thus the federal action was not barred by this rule.
Regarding issue preclusion under Pennsylvania law, it applies when: (1) the issue in the prior case is identical to that in the current case; (2) there was a final judgment on the merits; (3) the party against whom it is asserted was involved in the previous case; and (4) that party had a full opportunity to litigate the issue. The parties concur on the first, third, and fourth factors but dispute whether the state jury's damages verdict constitutes a final judgment. Pennsylvania courts reference the Restatement (Second) of Judgments for defining "final judgments" for issue preclusion, which states that a prior adjudication can be deemed sufficiently firm for preclusive effect even if not final in the strict sense. Factors to assess this include the deliberation and firmness of the prior decision, whether the parties were fully heard, if the court provided a reasoned opinion, and whether the decision was subject to appeal.
A jury verdict in a negligence case found the defendant (B) liable to the plaintiff (A) regarding liability, but a separate trial to determine damages would take place later. In the relevant jurisdiction, B cannot appeal the liability verdict until the damages phase concludes, but the liability finding may be conclusive in future related actions. The prior state court jury verdict on damages is deemed a "final judgment" under section 13, possessing issue preclusive effect on the damages in this case. The jury's deliberation was thorough, and the verdict would have been appealable if not for a settlement, which relinquished the Greenleafs' right to further review and ensured that the damages were conclusively assessed.
The District Court's assertion that the damages verdict did not preclude relitigation of the damages issue in federal court was found unconvincing. The court incorrectly cited a previous ruling, Dici v. Commonwealth of Pa., which did not pertain to a bifurcated trial or a jury verdict. Additionally, the District Court's claim that the preliminary verdict was not immediately appealable was misapplied; while appealability is a consideration for issue preclusion, the relevant legal framework allows for issue preclusion even without the ability to appeal if the issues were effectively decided in the initial action. The exceptions in section 28 of the Restatement (Second) of Judgments clarify that issue preclusion applies unless the party against whom it is sought could not have legally obtained review, which is not the case here as the Greenleafs voluntarily settled.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has adopted section 28 but has not specifically defined the scope of its section 28(1) exception. The court has, however, established that decisions not final for appeal purposes can still hold issue preclusive effects, referencing cases such as In re Brown and Burlington Northern R.R. v. Hyundai Merchant Marine Co. In In re Brown, a partial summary judgment was deemed sufficiently final to have issue preclusive effect despite being non-appealable because it had reached a stage where relitigation posed unnecessary judicial waste. Factors supporting this included the representation of counsel, contested issues, and the non-tentative nature of the judgment. Similarly, in Burlington, a denial of summary judgment was considered final enough to justify issue preclusion based on analogous factors. The current case reflects these elements, as Greenleaf was represented by counsel, the issue of damages was contested in a jury trial, and relitigating damages in federal court would waste resources. The court concludes that the lack of immediate appealability of Greenleaf's preliminary damages verdict does not preclude its issue preclusive effect. Furthermore, issue preclusion serves to avoid the costs and complications of multiple lawsuits and promotes reliance on judicial decisions.
Regarding the adequacy of jury instructions, the appellants claim that the District Court did not properly inform jurors on Pennsylvania asbestos law. The court's review follows a mixed standard: plenary review for any misstatements of law, and abuse of discretion for the jury instruction decisions themselves, which can only be reversed if a misstatement occurred.
Appellants argue that the District Court's jury instruction misrepresented Pennsylvania law regarding asbestos cases. They assert two main points: first, the court did not specifically instruct the jury on the "frequency, regularity and proximity" test established in Eckenrod, which they claim is the exclusive standard for asbestos cases; second, Garlock argues that its proposed "de minimis" exposure defense was improperly excluded from jury consideration. The District Court's instruction emphasized that the jury must focus on the specific asbestos products of each defendant and required the plaintiffs to prove that exposure to those products was a substantial factor in causing the harm to Charles Greenleaf. It clarified that multiple substantial factors could contribute to the harm and that the plaintiffs bore the burden of proving proximate cause for each defendant independently. This approach aligns with Pennsylvania case law, particularly as outlined in Eckenrod, which mandates that plaintiffs demonstrate actual exposure to specific products and their causal link to injuries for liability to be established. The Eckenrod ruling underscored that mere presence of asbestos does not suffice; evidence of regular exposure to the manufacturer's product is necessary. The court noted the absence of evidence regarding the decedent's regular contact with the specific asbestos products from the defendants, reinforcing the requirement for plaintiffs to provide concrete proof of exposure.
Eckenrod does not impose additional requirements for jury instructions in asbestos cases; it applies traditional principles of summary judgment and proximate cause law to relevant factual scenarios. Post-Eckenrod decisions have upheld jury verdicts without necessitating the "frequency, regularity, and proximity" test advocated by the appellants. In Lilley v. Johns-Manville Corp., the Superior Court affirmed that the jury instructions were adequate, emphasizing that a plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant's product was a substantial factor in causing harm, including evidence of inhalation of asbestos fibers from that product. The court determined that no more precise explanation was required than what was provided.
The District Court's jury instructions were reviewed for abuse of discretion, and none was found in its omission of the appellants' proposed "frequency, regularity, and proximity" instructions or the "de minimis" exposure defense. The Lilley case supported the conclusion that no Pennsylvania law mandates these specific instructions.
Regarding attorney misconduct, the appellants argued for a new trial due to alleged inflammatory closing arguments by Greenleaf's counsel. The standard for granting a new trial based on such claims involves assessing whether the improper statements likely influenced the verdict. The trial judge holds significant discretion in evaluating the impact of these statements, and a new trial is warranted only if it is reasonably probable that the verdict was affected.
Appellants cite three instances of alleged misconduct by Greenleaf's counsel: (1) the suggestion that Greenleaf would not receive compensation unless the jury ruled against the defendants, potentially prejudicing the jury as Greenleaf had already settled; (2) distraction of the jury from relevant issues through irrelevant comments regarding absent defendants; and (3) the implication that a verdict for plaintiffs would "send a message" to Owens. However, these comments do not constitute the level of misconduct that would prejudice the jury, as established in precedent cases. Consequently, the court finds no abuse of discretion in denying the appellants' request for a new trial based on these claims.
Regarding their motions for a new trial, appellants present two arguments: (1) Garlock argues that the evidence does not support its liability for Greenleaf's injuries; (2) both appellants claim that the verdict absolving the non-appearing defendants contradicts the overwhelming weight of the evidence. Greenleaf counters that these claims are barred based on the precedent set in Yohannon v. Keene Corp.
The court notes that it cannot address Garlock's sufficiency of evidence claim because it failed to file a motion for judgment as a matter of law before jury deliberations, which waives the right to contest the verdict based on evidence insufficiency post-trial. This waiver significantly impacts Garlock's appeal. Regarding the verdict for the non-appearing defendants, the court disagrees with Greenleaf's assertion that Yohannon precludes consideration of this claim, allowing for the possibility of a new trial on this matter.
A court has the authority to grant a new trial under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(a) if evidence is insufficient to support a verdict or if the verdict contradicts the weight of the evidence. The precedent set in Yohannon limits a party's ability to claim insufficient evidence for a verdict against them, as such claims must be raised at the close of evidence to avoid waiving the right to a new trial. The appellants do not argue that the evidence was insufficient; they acknowledge their burden of proof on cross-claims and instead assert that the court should exercise discretion under Rule 59(a) to grant a new trial due to overwhelming probative evidence in their favor.
The court finds that Yohannon does not preclude a new trial for the appellants' situation, as they reasonably expected a favorable jury decision based on the evidence and jury instructions. They cannot argue that the jury was required to infer that exposure to products from non-appearing defendants caused Greenleaf's mesothelioma. Thus, the appellants did not waive their rights under Rule 59 by failing to file for judgment as a matter of law under Rule 50.
When reviewing a District Court's decision on a new trial based on the weight of the evidence, the standard is abuse of discretion. This deferential review acknowledges that the District Court observes witnesses and trial dynamics that appellate courts cannot. A new trial is warranted only if the jury's verdict constitutes a miscarriage of justice or is so unreasonable that it shocks the conscience.
Five co-defendants—Johns-Manville, Owens-Illinois, Uniroyal, Fireboard, and Hopeman Brothers—failed to appear at trial to contest Greenleaf's claims and the appellants' counterclaims. Uncontested evidence presented included Mr. Greenleaf's videotaped deposition detailing his occupational exposure to asbestos during his employment as a shipfitter at Sun Ship from 1942 for seven and a half years. Although he did not directly handle asbestos, he was frequently exposed to asbestos dust from materials used above him, estimating 90% exposure during his time there, specifically identifying Johns-Manville as a product manufacturer and Hopeman Bros. as a contractor involved.
Greenleaf later worked at New York Ship for eight months, where he experienced similar exposure for four months. He subsequently joined Westinghouse, where he worked as a fabricator for over 30 years until his retirement in 1986. At Westinghouse, he reported exposure to various asbestos-containing materials, including rope, cloth, and gaskets, and indicated that the work environment lacked adequate air circulation, leading to airborne asbestos dust. He estimated his exposure to cloth at one-third of his time and to block and pipe covering at one-quarter each.
Greenleaf identified Johns-Manville and Owens-Illinois as manufacturers of asbestos products used at Westinghouse, indicating that Johns-Manville products were the most prevalent, comprising approximately 50% of the materials he encountered. He also noted a complete absence of warnings on asbestos products at both work sites. Additionally, a coworker, James Cyrus, corroborated Greenleaf’s exposure, stating they frequently used asbestos cloth from Johns-Manville, Uniroyal, and Fireboard, which deteriorated under heat and released asbestos dust. Cyrus also confirmed Greenleaf's use of Uniroyal gaskets.
Cyrus's and Greenleaf's testimony demonstrated that Greenleaf was exposed to asbestos products from Uniroyal, Fireboard, and Owens-Illinois for 30 years, in addition to 30 years of exposure to Johns-Manville products. The non-appearing defendants acknowledged in their interrogatory responses that they sold or used asbestos products. An expert witness testified that Greenleaf's workplace exposure from 1942 to 1976 was sufficient to cause mesothelioma. The jury was instructed to determine three elements for holding a defendant liable: (i) the defendant's asbestos product was defective due to lack of warning, (ii) Greenleaf was exposed to that product, and (iii) the exposure was a substantial factor in causing his mesothelioma. The evidence presented satisfied these elements for the non-appearing defendants, as they admitted to producing asbestos products and Greenleaf’s testimony showed a lack of warning labels. Greenleaf's exposure included approximately 38 years to Johns-Manville, 30 years to Fireboard, Uniroyal, and Owens-Illinois, and 8 years to Hopeman Bros. Despite the jury not being required to accept all uncontroverted evidence or infer causation, they found Garlock and Owens liable based on similar evidence. The jury’s decision to not hold Johns-Manville liable was inconsistent, given the greater exposure Greenleaf had to their products compared to Garlock and Owens. The court concluded that a mistake had occurred, necessitating a new trial on the cross-claims. The judgment against Garlock and Owens was to be reversed and remanded for further proceedings, including a new trial for the cross-claims against the non-appearing defendants.
Honorable Joseph J. Longobardi, Senior United States District Judge for the District of Delaware, addressed several key legal issues. The court found it unnecessary to consider the appellants' claims regarding the excessiveness of the loss of consortium award and the need to adjust the judgment for the Manville Trust's liability for Greenleaf's injuries. The District Court granted summary judgment, dismissing defendants John Crane Inc., Chesterton, Inc., and SEPCO from the case. The remaining defendants, including Johns-Manville, Owens-Illinois, Uniroyal, Fireboard, and Hopeman Brothers, did not participate in the trial.
The appellants primarily relied on the precedent set in Brandt v. Eagle, which asserts that a judgment marked satisfied implies full satisfaction of damages under Pennsylvania law. However, the court noted that this case did not involve a judgment marked satisfied, making the appellants' reliance on this line of cases misplaced.
Greenleaf attempted to argue that the relevant discussions pertained only to cases involving the same parties, but the court clarified that Pennsylvania law does not require identity of parties to invoke issue preclusion. The court's interpretation aligns with a modern trend to apply issue preclusion even in cases resolved by preliminary rulings or incomplete liability determinations.
Finally, while the court did not determine the scope of section 28(1), it acknowledged that this section typically applies to judgments that cannot be appealed as a matter of law, distinguishing between non-appealable decisions and those eligible for future appeal.
Relaxation of traditional views on finality allows for preclusion to be based on decisions that are currently unappealable but may be appealed later. Courts have applied section 28(1) to jurisdictional findings related to remand orders, which are unappealable under 28 U.S.C. 1447(d), as seen in cases like Nutter v. Monongahela Power Co. and Southern Leasing Corp. v. Tufts. Similarly, parties who prevailed generally but lost on specific issues may relitigate those issues if they were not aggrieved by the judgment, as demonstrated in Lombardi v. City of El Cajon and Hernandez v. Region Nine Housing Corp. The Greenleafs' preliminary verdict does not fit these scenarios. In Jobe v. W.P. Metz Refining, the court applied Eckenrod principles to establish proof requirements for cadmium exposure, noting that the "frequency, regularity, and proximity" formula was not included in the summary of asbestos liability law. Appellants' assertion that the District Court's Phase II verdict form was inadequate is rejected; the court's form presented a single question regarding defendant liability, which was sufficient given the jury instructions on liability. Owens Corning's reference to Foster v. Crawford Shipping Co. is deemed irrelevant, as it did not establish a rule against jury invitations to "send a message" and involved different issues, including prejudicial remarks affecting the jury.
Counsel's appeal to financial disparity between parties before the jury is deemed improperly prejudicial, as established in Foster and reiterated in Draper. In this case, Greenleaf's counsel did not highlight such disparities, and other factors from Foster are absent, rendering Owens Corning's argument ineffective. Garlock's claim that its proposed jury instruction number one constituted a request for judgment as a matter of law is rejected. A litigant must meet a high standard to receive judgment as a matter of law, applicable only when the evidence overwhelmingly supports one side without any room for contrary inferences. The District Court granted Greenleaf's request for delay damages under Pennsylvania law, awarding $135,433.22 based on the federal jury's assessment. However, due to issue preclusion barring relitigation of damages, the District Court must recalculate delay damages upon remand.
