Rudolph v. Gwin
Docket: 86-1293
Court: Supreme Court of Alabama; May 6, 1988; Alabama; State Supreme Court
Sidney Rudolph was injured on June 3, 1985, while working in the Sanitation Department for the City of Bessemer when he was run over by a garbage truck driven by co-employee Johnnie T. Gwin, Jr. Rudolph appealed summary judgments in favor of Gwin regarding claims of negligence, wantonness, and willful conduct. The trial court had found insufficient evidence to support Rudolph's claims. Rudolph alleged that Gwin was reading a Penthouse magazine and drinking a beer just before the accident. However, Gwin's co-worker, Malcom Brown, denied these assertions, stating he did not purchase beer for Gwin, nor did he see Gwin drinking or reading prior to the incident. Additional affidavits from co-workers and police officers confirmed Gwin had not been seen drinking alcohol and appeared sober immediately after the accident. The trial court granted summary judgment on all claims, ruling that the evidence did not meet the threshold for willful conduct as defined under Alabama law. Specifically, the court referenced previous case law (Reed v. Brunson) that distinguished willful from negligent or wanton conduct. The court concluded that even if Rudolph's evidence was believed, it did not rise to the level of willful misconduct necessary to support his claim. The appeal presented two main issues: the constitutionality of the relevant Alabama code and the sufficiency of evidence for willful conduct. The court affirmed the summary judgment, citing the precedent set in Reed regarding the definitions and requirements for willful misconduct. Rudolph's evidence indicated that Gwin possessed a 16-ounce beer and took two sips, with no additional evidence of Gwin's drinking or intoxication. The term 'intoxication' is defined in its ordinary meaning, which indicates a lack of normal use of physical or mental faculties due to drinking, distinguishing it from merely 'drinking' alcohol. The legislature did not intend for 'drinking' to equate to 'willful' conduct under statute 25-5-11(c)(3). Even if the jury believed Gwin consumed the beer, it would not suffice to prove 'intoxication' without further evidence. Consequently, the trial court correctly granted Gwin summary judgment on the willful misconduct claim, leading to the affirmation of the trial court's judgment.