Granite State Outdoor Advertising, Inc. filed a lawsuit against the City of St. Petersburg after its applications to erect six billboards were denied. The central legal question was whether the First Amendment mandates that municipal sign ordinances include explicit time limits for processing permit applications. The district court ruled that the absence of such time limits invalidated the City’s sign ordinance. However, the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed this decision, concluding that time limits are not inherently required. Consequently, the City was granted summary judgment, and Granite was denied damages and attorneys' fees.
The City’s sign ordinance regulates signs, particularly off-premise signs, which must be placed on commercial or industrially zoned lots without other structures. Each sign is subject to height, area, separation, and setback requirements, and a permit is required. Granite, having secured lease agreements for billboard locations, submitted permit applications but was denied after 17 days due to noncompliance with the ordinance. Granite did not appeal the denials administratively but instead challenged the constitutionality of the ordinance in court. The district court found Granite's as-applied challenge unpersuasive, determined certain provisions of the ordinance were unconstitutional yet severable, and ruled that the lack of time limits granted excessive discretion to City officials, leading to the ordinance's invalidation.
Granite sought to erect six billboards following a judgment in its favor, but the City refused and filed a Motion for Clarification and Stay pending appeal. The district court clarified that it was not mandating the issuance of permits or allowing the erection of billboards. Subsequently, it issued a second order granting a stay and adopting its oral clarification. Both parties filed appeals regarding these orders.
The court affirmed much of the district court's decision but reversed on the issue of time limits, concluding that such limits are not necessary. Granite argued that the absence of specific time limits grants excessive discretion to City officials, potentially infringing on free speech. The district court had invalidated parts of the sign ordinance based on this absence and granted summary judgment for Granite.
The appellate court reviewed this decision de novo, confirming the invalidity and severability of three provisions of the sign ordinance. It referenced two Supreme Court cases to establish procedural safeguards for permitting schemes. The first case, Freedman v. Maryland, invalidated a content-based licensing law, requiring specific safeguards for any pre-judicial review restraints. The second case, Thomas v. Chicago Park District, addressed a content-neutral permitting scheme and clarified that while time limits are not inherently required, adequate standards for decision-making and judicial review must be in place.
The determination of whether the City’s sign ordinance is governed by Freedman or Thomas hinges on whether it is content-based or content-neutral, with the government's intent in regulating speech being pivotal. Regulations that do not consider content are classified as content-neutral. The ordinance aims to promote uniformity, preserve aesthetics, and enhance safety, indicating it is content-neutral, as it does not discriminate based on content. The analysis confirms that the ordinance provides objective criteria for processing permit applications, preventing arbitrary rejection based on content. Although there are concerns about potential delays in processing permits, these hypothetical issues are not sufficient grounds to invalidate the ordinance without clear evidence of systemic abuse. Other court decisions support the view that procedural safeguards are less relevant in content-neutral schemes. The mention of permit processing improvements by the Mayor does not imply a constitutional issue exists. While incorporating specific time limits in sign ordinances may be beneficial, such limits are not mandatory for content-neutral licensing schemes.
Griffin v. Sec’y of Veterans Affairs, 288 F.3d 1309, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2002), upheld a federal regulation allowing indefinite consideration of requests to speak on Veterans Administration property, a decision echoed by at least two district courts. Consequently, the court reversed the prior ruling, affirming that the absence of time limits in the City’s sign ordinance is constitutionally acceptable, thereby maintaining the ordinance's validity. Granite, having failed to comply with the ordinance, is denied summary judgment. The City maintains that other zoning provisions, such as safety and building codes, apply, but the district court did not assess Granite’s compliance with these provisions, necessitating a remand.
Granite's request for actual damages is denied due to the failure of its as-applied challenge, aligning with the precedent set in Carey v. Piphus regarding substantial damages for actual injury. Furthermore, Granite is not eligible for nominal damages as neither its First Amendment rights nor procedural due process rights were violated; the denial of a sign permit does not constitute a violation. Granite also does not qualify for attorneys’ fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988, as it did not achieve prevailing party status, lacking any material alteration in the legal relationship with the City.
The court concludes by affirming in part and reversing in part, specifically stating that Granite’s as-applied challenge fails, certain provisions of the sign ordinance are unconstitutional but severable, and Granite is not entitled to damages or attorneys’ fees. The City’s sign ordinance remains effective, and summary judgment is granted in its favor. Minor changes in the ordinance resulting from Granite's efforts do not affect its status as a non-prevailing party.
