Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal; March 29, 1988; Louisiana; State Appellate Court
Five teenage boys were involved in a fatal car accident after attending a beer party hosted by a minor, Molly Davenport, whose mother had legal custody. Molly, while her father was out of town, arranged for an 18-year-old, Bryan Williams, to purchase three cases of beer. During the party, multiple minors consumed alcohol, including James Ford, who drank ten cans. Concerned about curfew, the boys prepared to leave with Brewer driving. Shortly after departing, the car crashed into a tree, resulting in Brewer's death and serious injuries to passengers Hardwick and Gresham. The parents of the injured boys filed lawsuits against several parties: Sharon Brewer (mother of the driver) and her insurer for negligence; Thomas Davenport (Molly's father) and his insurer for claims related to Molly's role in providing alcohol; and Bryan Williams for supplying beer to minors. Testimony revealed that the minors were consuming alcohol at the party. The accident occurred on a hilly, two-lane road in Ouachita Parish, with evidence of erratic driving before the crash.
Mailboxes were located on the east side of the road at the top of a hill near East Puckett Lake Road. Witness Ford testified that Brewer accelerated after leaving the Davenport residence, driving at high speed towards the mailboxes. Despite Ford's warning to slow down, Brewer allegedly jerked the steering wheel, leading to a loss of control and the subsequent accident. Ford claimed he might have grabbed the steering wheel but did not believe he did so at the moment. However, both Gresham and Hardwick recounted that Ford expressed fear of hitting the mailboxes and admitted to grabbing the steering wheel, which caused the vehicle to veer left across the road.
Expert testimony from Dr. Duborwski indicated that alcohol impairs judgment before physical symptoms become evident, while Dr. Redtski estimated Ford's blood alcohol level at .19. The trial judge found Ford's testimony lacking in credibility, noting his recklessness and impaired judgment due to alcohol consumption. The judge stated that there was no corroborating evidence for Ford's claims about Brewer's driving, and even Ford's own admissions suggested that his overreaction and grabbing of the steering wheel were more likely causes of the accident than Brewer's actions.
Ultimately, the judge concluded that there was no sufficient causal link between Brewer's driving, the alcohol consumed, and the accident, resulting in no liability for the Davenports or Williams' insurer. Plaintiffs argued that the trial court erred in not holding the Davenports' insurance liable, not finding Brewer’s impaired driving as a cause, and not attributing blame to Williams for providing the alcohol.
The trial court found that Brewer's driving was not a cause of the accident, attributing fault to Ford, who, influenced by alcohol, caused the accident by jerking the steering wheel. The court’s factual findings were upheld as not clearly wrong, thus absolving Brewer of negligence. The central issue was whether Molly Davenport was liable for providing beer to Ford, raising the question of whether she had a duty that encompassed the risks leading to the accident. Under Louisiana law (La.R.S. 14:91.2 and La.R.S. 14:91.3), it is illegal for anyone under 17 to purchase alcohol, and adults cannot buy alcohol for minors. Previous cases, such as Garcia v. Jennings and Chausse v. Southland Corp., established that adults have a duty to refrain from providing alcohol to minors and to ensure their safety when intoxicated. The court concluded that Davenport breached her duty by supplying beer to Ford. The analysis then shifted to whether the risk of Ford causing the accident by grabbing the steering wheel fell within the scope of Davenport's duty. Citing Finley v. North Assurance Co. of America, the court noted that foreseeability alone does not determine the duty-risk relationship. The scope of duty is assessed based on legislative intent and the purpose of the rule, identifying whether the plaintiff is within the class of persons the law intends to protect. Thus, duty-risk analysis incorporates various factors, with foreseeability being just one aspect, not a definitive test.
Courts across various jurisdictions have established that social hosts may be held liable for serving alcohol to minors or intoxicated individuals. The California Supreme Court determined that a social host has a duty to the public to deny alcohol to an obviously intoxicated person if that person poses a foreseeable risk of injury to others (Coulter v. Superior Court). In New Jersey, the court ruled that a host who continues to serve alcohol to a visibly intoxicated guest can be held liable (Kelly v. Gwinnell). Washington courts noted that while providing alcohol to sober adults at a party is generally permissible, hosts must refrain from serving those who are obviously intoxicated.
In Massachusetts, liability was recognized for social hosts but ultimately resulted in a summary judgment favoring the host in a case involving a minor and an intoxicated guest (McGuiggan v. New England Tel. Tel. Co.). In this incident, a minor left a supervised graduation party with an intoxicated adult, leading to a fatal accident. The court emphasized that hosts could be liable if they unreasonably create a risk of injury due to intoxication.
Several cases illustrate the trend of imposing liability on social hosts for serving alcohol to minors or intoxicated individuals, including Sutter v. Hutchings (Georgia), which extended liability to protect third parties. This court highlighted the foreseeable risks associated with serving alcohol to those intending to drive. The Indiana case of Brattain v. Herron established liability for serving minors knowingly, resulting in injuries from a subsequent accident. The courts collectively underscore the balance between the rights of hosts to serve alcohol and the safety of the public.
The host allowed young men access to her apartment for self-service alcohol and did not object to their drinking or taking beer when they left. Michigan law has extended liability to social hosts serving alcohol to minors, as established in Longstreth, reflecting a public policy against underage alcohol consumption. The court emphasized that this law aims to protect public health, safety, and morals by prohibiting the sale or distribution of alcohol to those under 21. In Wiener v. Gamma Phi Chapter, a fraternity was found liable under negligence for serving alcohol to minors who later caused an automobile accident due to intoxication. The court ruled that social hosts have a duty to prevent unreasonable drinking that could endanger guests or others. In Ohio, while social hosts can be held liable for providing liquor, a specific case found no liability. Conversely, in Wisconsin’s Koback v. Crook, a host served a minor who subsequently caused injury to a third party, establishing liability for the host and categorizing both the intoxicated minor and host as joint tort-feasors. The court asserted that social hosts must exercise due care to prevent foreseeable harm, indicating that negligence applies even if the specific harm or harmed individual is unknown at the time of the act. Furthermore, the Michigan case Klotz v. Persenaire held a social host liable after a minor she served alcohol to drowned after becoming intoxicated and leaving in a vehicle with other minors. The host continued to provide alcohol despite awareness of the minor's intoxicated state and prior restrictions against drinking.
Molly Davenport was found liable for the plaintiffs’ damages due to her irresponsible behavior while in a vehicle, which contributed to the accident. Consequently, her father's homeowner's insurance company is liable for the damages. Despite her parents’ divorce, Davenport was not vicariously liable for her actions as her legal custody was awarded to her mother. In contrast, Williams, who provided beer to Molly prior to the event, was not held liable because the risks associated with his actions were not within his knowledge and thus did not fall under his duty.
The damages awarded to Gresham totaled $454,592, which included $250,000 in general damages, $54,592 for future special damages related to prosthesis replacement, and $150,000 for loss of earning capacity. Gresham incurred significant injuries leading to major surgeries and permanent disabilities, alongside medical expenses of $111,871.08 incurred by his parents. Their claim for loss of consortium was denied due to insufficient evidence.
Hardwick sustained multiple injuries, including lacerations, broken bones, and nerve damage, resulting in a 20% permanent partial disability in his right shoulder. The loss of vision in his right eye, discovered later, was attributed to severe head trauma from the accident. Prior to the incident, Hardwick had 20/20 vision. His medical issues required extensive treatment and hospitalization.
The youth did not experience any head trauma outside of the accident. Damages for Hardwick were determined as follows: general damages of $125,000 and loss of earning capacity of $100,000, totaling $225,000. Hardwick's mother incurred medical expenses of $30,619.16, of which Blue Cross covered $28,713.74 and has sought reimbursement. The claim for loss of consortium by Mrs. Hardwick was denied due to insufficient evidence. The court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs and the intervenor against Commercial Union Insurance Company, awarding the following amounts: Jeffery Gresham $454,592; Buck Gresham and Lonnae Gresham $111,871.08; Alton Hardwick, Jr. $225,000; Sandra Hardwick $1,905.42; and Blue Cross $28,713.74. The trial court's judgment was affirmed regarding other defendants. Commercial Union Insurance Company is responsible for all court costs incurred in both the trial and appeal. Gresham and Hardwick reached the age of majority during the proceedings and were substituted as plaintiffs, while their parents retained their claims.
