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Pens. Plan Guide (Cch) P 23,952 Harold E. Shepley, Jr., Richard A. Kimmel, Gary L. Miller, Elmer C. Beeman, Jr., Mark E. Deflori and Dorothy B. Marker, and a Class of All Others Similarly Situated v. New Coleman Holdings Inc., Formerly Known as the Coleman Company, Inc., Glen P. Dickes, Donald G. Drapkin, William J. Fox, Howard Gittis, Richard E. Halpern, Frederick W. McNabb Jr., Ronald O. Perelman, Bruce Slovin, Fred L. Tepperman, Carl T. Tsang, Warren B. Armstrong, Kenneth J. Wagnon, Richard D. Smith, MacAndrews Acquisition (Kansas), Inc., MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., Jay Davis, Jeffrey Curtis and Timothy P. Cotter

Citation: 174 F.3d 65Docket: 818

Court: Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit; March 31, 1999; Federal Appellate Court

Narrative Opinion Summary

The case involves a dispute between a class of former employees and New Coleman Holdings Inc. concerning surplus assets from a terminated defined benefit pension plan, governed by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA). The plaintiffs argued against the return of the surplus to Coleman, asserting it violated ERISA, while Coleman maintained its entitlement under the plan's terms. The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York initially granted partial summary judgment for the plaintiffs. However, upon appeal, the appellate court reversed this decision. The appellate court examined the plan's provisions, particularly the term 'overpayment,' interpreting it as the surplus remaining after all liabilities are satisfied, contrary to the district court's ruling based on actuarial schedules. The court found that Coleman was entitled to the surplus assets according to the plan's terms, including provisions related to changes in corporate control. The reversal was based on the determination that the term 'overpayment' was not ambiguous and referred to actual surplus rather than excess contributions over actuarial estimates. Consequently, the appellate court directed summary judgment in favor of Coleman, affirming its right to the surplus under ERISA and the plan's specific provisions.

Legal Issues Addressed

Application of Contra Proferentem

Application: The district court applied the principle of contra proferentem, interpreting ambiguities in the plan against the drafter, Coleman. The appellate court disagreed, providing a different interpretation of 'overpayment.'

Reasoning: The principle of contra proferentem was applied, leading the court to declare that the participants are entitled to the Plan's surplus.

ERISA and Defined Benefit Pension Plans

Application: The case discusses the rights of employers and participants regarding surplus assets in a defined benefit pension plan under ERISA.

Reasoning: Participants in defined benefit plans do not have rights to surpluses, nor do employers unless specified by the plan, which must satisfy three conditions under ERISA: all participant liabilities must be met, the distribution must comply with the law, and the plan must allow for such distribution.

Interpretation of 'Overpayment' in Pension Plans

Application: The court clarifies that 'overpayment' refers to surplus assets remaining after liabilities are met, contrary to the district court's interpretation based on actuarial payment schedules.

Reasoning: The court asserts that the term 'overpayment' in Section 9.2(c) clearly refers to the surplus of Plan assets—contributions made by Coleman plus investment returns—after deducting liabilities at termination.

Plan Provisions on Surplus Distribution

Application: The appellate court analyzed the plan's provisions related to surplus distribution, particularly in the context of a Change in Control, affirming Coleman's entitlement to surplus assets.

Reasoning: Section 11.5(d)(2) stipulates that any remaining balance in the Trust Fund, after satisfying all liabilities, may be directed by the Company.

Summary Judgment Standards

Application: The court emphasized that summary judgment is appropriate when there are no genuine issues of material fact, even if contractual language is ambiguous, provided that extrinsic evidence does not create such an issue.

Reasoning: Summary judgment is not limited to cases where all contractual terms can be clearly defined; rather, it is appropriate when there is no genuine issue of material fact, even in the presence of ambiguous language.