United States v. Patrick Carey

Citations: 172 F.3d 1268; 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 10370; 1999 WL 215669Docket: 98-3077

Court: Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit; April 30, 1999; Federal Appellate Court

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Patrick J. Carey was charged with possessing a computer hard drive containing child pornography, violating 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(5)(B). After entering a conditional guilty plea, he appealed the district court's denial of his motion to suppress evidence seized during what he argued was a warrantless search. The appeal also raised issues regarding the legality of his sentence and the district court's failure to impose a downward departure from the sentencing guidelines, though these issues were not addressed in the ruling.

Carey had been investigated for drug-related activities, which included controlled purchases of cocaine from him. Following a warrant for his arrest, police observed drug paraphernalia in his apartment. When asked for consent to search, Carey verbally agreed and later signed a written consent form, which allowed officers to search his residence for evidence of drug-related crimes. The officers discovered illegal substances and seized two computers, believing they might provide evidence of drug dealing.

Subsequently, a warrant was obtained to search the computers for evidence related to drug transactions. During the search, the investigators initially sought text-based files related to drugs but found none. However, Detective Lewis continued to explore the computers and discovered files labeled with sexually suggestive titles. After downloading these files to another computer, he found that one contained child pornography. Ultimately, the court concluded that the motion to suppress should have been granted and reversed the district court's decision.

Detective Lewis downloaded approximately 244 image files suspected of containing child pornography onto 19 disks, examining 5 to 7 files from each disk. After inadvertently discovering child pornography, he believed he had probable cause to search further without a warrant, a decision made in consultation with his captain and the county attorney's office. Although he claimed he was not conducting a search for child pornography, he acknowledged knowing the files were images upon viewing the hard disk directory.

Mr. Carey filed a motion to suppress the evidence on the grounds that the search exceeded the warrant's scope, he did not consent to the search, and the seizure of the computers was unlawful due to lack of probable cause. The district court denied the motion without detailed findings, indicating it was a close question. Carey's main argument was that the search of the computers constituted a general warrant, violating the Fourth Amendment’s requirement for particularity in search warrants to prevent unauthorized searches. The court emphasized that the reasonableness of a search is assessed against standards established at the Fourth Amendment's inception, which aimed to eliminate general searches that characterized British practices preceding American independence.

Mr. Carey contends that the police search of his files violated the Fourth Amendment due to general rummaging in disregard of the search warrant's terms. He argues that files unrelated to drug offenses were improperly opened and should be suppressed. The government counters that the plain view doctrine justified the search, allowing officers to seize evidence without a warrant if they were lawfully positioned to view the object, its incriminating nature was apparent, and they had lawful access to it. The government likens the computer search to examining a file cabinet, asserting that finding child pornography was permissible under the valid warrant that allowed searching any file potentially related to drug crimes. It emphasizes that drug trafficking often involves concealed information. Furthermore, the government claims that the defendant's consent to search the apartment allowed for the examination of all files on the computers. However, the Supreme Court has ruled that the plain view doctrine cannot legitimize an exploratory search. The warrant specifically limited the search to files related to drug trafficking, and the government's assertion that the files were in plain view is flawed, as it was the contents of the files, not the files themselves, that were seized. Detective Lewis initially could not differentiate between text files and JPG files and only discovered child pornography after opening a JPG file, indicating he had no prior suspicion of finding such material.

The officer, upon opening the first JPG file, developed 'probable cause' to believe subsequent files contained similar erotic material, specifically child pornography, rather than drug-related content. His expectation led him to continue opening additional JPG files to confirm his assumptions, indicating the discovery of their contents was not inadvertent. Detective Lewis explicitly stated he was not searching for evidence of drug trafficking at that time, having shifted focus to child pornography and only returning to drug-related searches after a five-hour examination of the child pornography files. This behavior indicated a conscious expansion of his search scope without judicial authority, contrasting with the initial warrant obtained for drug-related evidence. The court concluded that the items seized were not authorized by the warrant and were not in 'plain view' as they were in closed files. 

The excerpt references a related case, United States v. Turner, in which the First Circuit affirmed the suppression of child pornography found on a defendant's computer. In that case, police obtained consent to search for evidence related to an assault but overstepped by searching the computer without appropriate consent, leading to the conclusion that the search exceeded its authorized scope.

The government contends that Mr. Carey’s consent to search his apartment extended to the contents of his computer files, which the court disagrees with. The officer's request for permission was limited to searching the apartment at 3225 Canterbury and did not encompass the computer files. Mr. Carey's consent allowed for the removal of property under his control only if it was essential for proving a crime, but did not authorize the officer to access the specific files on the computer. Recognizing this limitation, the officer secured a warrant to search for drug-related evidence before accessing the files.

The warrant outlined specific items to be searched, and the discovery of child pornography in a file labeled 'JPG' indicated to the officer that subsequent files would likely not contain drug-related evidence, contrary to the warrant’s scope. The court distinguishes this case from a hypothetical scenario where an officer must open drawers in a file cabinet to determine their contents, asserting that in this instance, the officer was aware of the explicit labeling of the files and their likely contents.

The court critiques the adequacy of the file cabinet analogy for searches of computers, arguing that computers store a complex and vast array of data, complicating Fourth Amendment considerations. It emphasizes that courts should recognize the nature of electronic storage, which often contains intermingled documents, requiring officers to sort and only search specified files in a warrant. If sorting on-site is impractical, officers should seal the documents and seek magistrate approval for further searches.

In Mr. Carey's case, law enforcement officers removed computers from his control, which diminished any exigent circumstances that would justify a broad search of all stored data beyond what was specified in the warrant. While Detective Lewis and a computer technician conducted a directory listing and a keyword search, they failed to limit their search to the warrant’s specified items and did not obtain a new warrant for searching child pornography, leading to the conclusion that Detective Lewis exceeded the warrant's scope. Consequently, the seizure of evidence related to the conviction was deemed an unconstitutional general search, and the district court's refusal to suppress this evidence was deemed an error. This decision is based strictly on the unique facts of this case, and the court did not address other raised errors or the issue of whether Mr. Carey consented to the search of his apartment.

Judge Baldock concurred, emphasizing that the case's issues were closely tied to the facts. He noted that without Detective Lewis' testimony, he would not have suppressed the evidence, as the plain view doctrine should not extend a general search. Lewis’ actions indicated he shifted focus from a drug-related investigation to child pornography upon finding an image, necessitating a new warrant for such a search. He further clarified that while he agreed that Mr. Carey’s consent did not extend to the computer hard drive, he believed the consent was limited to drug-related evidence, which requires careful factual examination to ascertain its scope.

The waiver signed by the Defendant permitted officers to search the premises at 3255 Canterbury and to remove any property essential for proving a crime. Following the Defendant's arrest, the officer observed drug paraphernalia in plain view and informed the Defendant he would seek a search warrant. The Defendant was uncertain about consenting to a search but later expressed a desire to consent while at the police station, providing information about additional drugs, a scale, a firearm, and cash. The officer indicated that he was not concerned about the pornographic videotapes mentioned by the Defendant.

The court found that the officer's repeated references to drugs limited the scope of the search consent to drug-related items only. The consent did not extend to a general exploratory search or to the Defendant's computer for pornographic material, as established in precedent cases. Although the officer obtained a valid search warrant for drug-related evidence on the computer, the search for pornographic files was impermissible and constituted an expansion of the search's scope. The government’s petition for rehearing was denied, noting that while inadvertence is not a Fourth Amendment requirement, the absence of it in this case was relevant. The court acknowledged that the officer's focus shifted improperly from drug evidence to child pornography. Additionally, the applicability of a 1996 statute regarding child pornography was confirmed for the case in question, as the Defendant was charged under that version of the law.

The officer's testimony indicated he accidentally found the first image during a search for drug-related documents, but the ruling focuses on the later examination of multiple files that were likely to contain child pornography. The case referenced, United States v. Maxwell, highlights that the plain view doctrine does not apply when files not specified in the warrant are searched, as the evidence was gathered through improper opening rather than legitimate observation. In United States v. Tamura, the court ruled that seizing all documents from a corporation, rather than just those specified, was unreasonable, suggesting that the concept of 'intermingled documents' is relevant in this context. The government argued that possession of illicit material in any format yields equal culpability, referencing United States v. Reyes, which acknowledged the challenge of precisely describing items in warrants due to technological variations. The text emphasizes that computer searches require a unique approach and that law enforcement should not search unrelated files without reasonable belief they contain relevant evidence. It also notes that while the seizure of broad categories of records may be permissible under certain circumstances, officers should not conduct overly expansive searches beyond the warrant's scope. Lastly, in United States v. Hall, it was determined that a private search conducted by a repair technician did not invalidate the subsequent police search, despite the initial improper copying of files.