Charles Buazard v. Charles Meridith John Patrick City of Pocahontas, Arkansas

Citations: 172 F.3d 546; 14 I.E.R. Cas. (BNA) 1755; 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 5764; 75 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 45,829; 1999 WL 177445Docket: 98-2422

Court: Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit; March 30, 1999; Federal Appellate Court

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Charles Buazard appealed a District Court's summary judgment favoring defendants Charles Meridith, John Patrick, and the City of Pocahontas, Arkansas, on his claim of First Amendment retaliation. Buazard, a patrol officer since 1984 and promoted to Assistant Chief in 1989, was involved in the termination of two police officers for misconduct in 1994. After preparing statements regarding the incident, he refused to alter them when Meridith claimed they contained false information. Following this refusal, Buazard was demoted to patrolman and felt marginalized, alleging retaliation for his protected speech. The defendants contended the demotion was due to poor performance. The District Court concluded that Buazard's speech did not concern a matter of public interest and thus was not protected under the First Amendment. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the lower court's ruling, agreeing that summary judgment was appropriate as there were no genuine issues of material fact.

A public employee, such as Buazard, must demonstrate that their speech qualifies for First Amendment protection by addressing a matter of public concern. In assessing whether speech pertains to public concern, courts consider its content, form, and context, as established in Connick v. Myers. Buazard’s statements regarding the firing of police officers, made at the request of his Chief, did not qualify as matters of public concern because they were job-related and internal to the police department. Consequently, his refusal to alter these statements, viewed as actions taken purely in his capacity as an employee, lacks constitutional protection under the First Amendment. Therefore, any retaliatory actions taken by his superiors do not constitute a violation of his rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The dissenting opinion argues against this conclusion, asserting that public employees should not be compelled to falsify reports or face termination, suggesting that refusing to participate in corruption should merit protection.

Charles Buazard alleged that he was instructed by the chief of police to file a report regarding an incident where a police officer conspired with prisoners to provoke another officer into using mace on an innocent prisoner. Both officers involved were terminated, although the one who deployed the mace was unaware of the setup. Buazard disagreed with the chief's handling of the situation, believing a further investigation was warranted before taking action against the uninvolved officer. At a subsequent lunch with the chief and the mayor, the mayor expressed concerns about the city's financial exposure to a wrongful termination lawsuit from the fired officers. Following this, the chief told Buazard to amend his report, which he refused to do, believing that changing it would protect the city from liability at the cost of truth.

The majority opinion noted that public employee speech has limited First Amendment protections but acknowledged that employees should not be silenced on matters of public concern. However, they argued Buazard's speech was merely job-related and not indicative of a concerned citizen's actions. In dissent, it was argued that Buazard's situation parallels Rankin v. McPherson, where the context of the speech was significant in determining its protection. The dissent emphasized that Buazard's refusal to file a false report was not a purely job-related action but rather a stance against political corruption, framing his actions as public-minded. Furthermore, Buazard indicated that his refusal to alter the report was motivated by concerns about potential criminal liability, reinforcing that his actions transcended mere job duties and reflected broader public interest.

Police misconduct and attempts by city officials to cover it up are matters of public interest. The majority views Buazard's speech as job-related, as he did not explicitly express public concern about the misconduct. However, the dissenting opinion argues that Buazard's refusal to change the report raises a genuine factual dispute regarding whether his motivations were public-minded or self-serving, particularly in the context of avoiding criminal liability for falsifying a report. The district court noted the police chief's vague instructions regarding which parts of the report to change, suggesting possible coercion to participate in the falsification. The dissent finds that Buazard's actions were not merely job-related but were driven by ethical considerations about the city's handling of police misconduct. Given that Buazard's motivations appear to center on public interest, the dissent proposes that the public's right to free speech should prevail over the employer's interest in efficiency, recommending a reversal of the summary judgment and further proceedings.