Prescott v. Pritchett

Citations: 509 So. 2d 222; 1986 Ala. Civ. App. LEXIS 1273Docket: Civ. 4914

Court: Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama; March 11, 1986; Alabama; State Appellate Court

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Luther Joe Pritchett, a trooper in the Alabama Department of Public Safety's Highway Patrol Division, filed a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint against Byron Prescott, the Department's Director, and James L. Fuqua, Chief of the Highway Patrol Division. Pritchett alleged unequal enforcement of a residency policy affecting officers assigned state vehicles, claiming this violated his rights to equal protection under both state and federal law. A jury trial in August 1984 resulted in a $10,000 verdict for Pritchett, which the trial court upheld in January 1985 after further arguments on damages and immunity.

Pritchett had been transferred to the Highway Patrol Division in April 1979 and was required to live in Scottsboro, despite his family residing in Woodville, due to departmental policy. After unsuccessfully seeking housing in Scottsboro, he filed a grievance in September 1979 regarding the residency requirement. An investigation affirmed the policy, and Pritchett continued living in Woodville while renting a room in Scottsboro during workdays. In April 1980, following a new written residency policy effective May 1, 1980, Pritchett notified his supervisor of his return to Woodville. The policy required officers to reside within the police jurisdiction of their assigned city unless authorized otherwise, allowing exemptions for those already living outside the jurisdiction until they changed their residence or were reassigned.

Pritchett resided in Woodville from April 1980 until February 1983, when he received a letter from Fuqua and Prescott instructing him to return to Scottsboro, where he complied while his family remained in Woodville. He filed a legal action in December 1983, which Fuqua and Prescott argue is barred by the one-year statute of limitations. They claim Pritchett should have filed his action in 1979 when he first noticed unequal enforcement of residency requirements. However, Pritchett believed that a memorandum from April 1980 had resolved his issues and that he was acting prudently based on that understanding. He only realized the discrepancy in interpretations when he received the February 1983 letter. Thus, he contends that his claim is timely as it was filed within one year of discovering his civil rights were violated.

Fuqua and Prescott also invoke the legal principle "volenti non fit injuria," asserting that Pritchett knowingly accepted the risks associated with the residency requirement when he transferred to the Highway Patrol Division. They argue he was aware of the policy and agreed to move. However, Pritchett counters that he lacked complete information regarding the inconsistent enforcement of the policy at the time of his decision. The trial court could have reasonably concluded that Pritchett was not fully informed, which would prevent the maxim from barring his claim.

Additionally, Fuqua and Prescott challenge the trial court's denial of their motions for directed verdict, judgment notwithstanding the verdict, and for a new trial, arguing that the verdict was contrary to the evidence. The legal standard dictates that if any conflict in the evidence exists, these motions must be denied, and an appellate court will uphold a verdict unless it is clearly unjust.

The written residence policy effective May 1, 1980, mandated that arresting officers and employees assigned vehicles must reside within their respective police jurisdictions. However, several officers were found living outside these jurisdictions, including a trooper in Elmore County and officers in Autauga and Madison counties while assigned to Montgomery and Huntsville, respectively. This discrepancy in evidence justified the denial of a motion for directed verdict and the judgment notwithstanding the verdict (j.n.o.v.), affirming the trial court’s decision. 

Fuqua and Prescott claimed entitlement to qualified immunity, arguing no evidence of bad faith warranted damages. The Supreme Court's ruling in Wood v. Strickland established that school board members could be liable if they acted with knowledge of violating constitutional rights or with malicious intent, a principle later applied to broader cases of qualified immunity in Harlow v. Fitzgerald. In this case, the defendants did not plead qualified immunity as an affirmative defense until two months post-trial, rendering the defense untimely. 

Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, damages may be awarded for violations of constitutional rights causing compensable injury, as supported by Carey v. Piphus and Bauer v. Norris, which allow recovery for emotional harm and violations of substantive rights. Pritchett demonstrated actual damages from having to rent accommodations and incurred transportation costs, alongside emotional distress from family separation. The evidence supported the award of damages, and the trial court's judgment was affirmed, with Holmes concurring and Wright dissenting.