State v. Hale

Docket: No. 86-1349

Court: District Court of Appeal of Florida; April 16, 1987; Florida; State Appellate Court

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The state appeals a trial judge's decision to suppress two admissions made by Hale in a burglary and grand theft case. The trial judge ruled that the booking clerk at the Altamonte Springs police station did not comply with Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.111(c), which outlines the duties of a booking officer regarding a defendant's right to counsel. The court reversed the suppression, stating that the violation of this rule was insufficient to invalidate Hale's statements.

Hale was arrested around 10:30 a.m. on April 23, 1986, received Miranda warnings, and requested counsel. After becoming ill, he was taken to a hospital and returned to the police station around 5:00 p.m., after the original booking clerk had left. Panju, a non-sworn clerk, completed the booking process without re-advising Hale of his rights. Hale requested an attorney and a phone call but was told by Panju that he would attend to him as soon as possible. During the booking, Hale made spontaneous statements about entering a residence. After completing the necessary procedures, Panju allowed Hale to make a phone call, overhearing Hale repeat the same admissions during the conversation.

Hale and his wife contested the claim that Hale made certain statements, while the trial court confirmed that these statements were made. The court identified a procedural error by the arresting officer, Panju, who failed to ensure that Hale was promptly connected with a public defender as mandated by rule 3.111(c) prior to booking. Panju did not attempt to facilitate this connection despite informing Hale that it would be handled after his transfer to the Seminole County Sheriff's Department. 

Both Hale and the state referenced the case Cribbs v. State as relevant, where a similar failure to comply with rule 3.111(c) occurred, compounded by misinformation provided to the accused and continued interrogation despite the invocation of the right to counsel. Unlike Cribbs, this case involved no such misinformation or continued questioning after Hale requested an attorney. 

The court ruled that the brief duration Hale spent at the police station and the nature of his statements did not warrant suppression, as there were no indications that his statements were involuntarily made. The first statement to Panju was deemed voluntary since Hale initiated the conversation. The second statement, overheard while Hale was on the phone, was considered a repetition of the first and also found admissible, as it did not violate Hale’s Fourth Amendment rights. Consequently, the order to suppress Hale’s admissions was reversed, and the case was remanded for further proceedings.