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Stewart v. Clayton

Citations: 502 So. 2d 767; 1986 Ala. Civ. App. LEXIS 1549Docket: Civ. 5360

Court: Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama; November 25, 1986; Alabama; State Appellate Court

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In this trespass case, defendant Mary Ellen Stewart owned real property adjacent to the plaintiff's property in Etowah County. In May 1983, Tim Cloud informed Stewart that tree cutter Ross Vaughn wanted to buy and cut timber from her land. During a meeting arranged by Cloud, Vaughn presented Stewart with a map from the Etowah County Tax Assessor's office, claiming to know her property boundaries. Stewart, unaware of her actual property lines, relied on Vaughn's assertions and agreed to sell him timber at a rate of $30 per cord for Vaughn, $10 per cord for herself, and $2 per cord for Cloud as a commission.

After cutting and removing seven or eight cords of timber, Vaughn realized he had mistakenly trespassed onto the plaintiff's property. Following this discovery, he ceased work and returned to the tax assessor's office for clarification on the property boundaries. The plaintiff subsequently filed a trespass suit against Vaughn and later amended the complaint to include Stewart.

During the trial, Stewart's attorney moved for a directed verdict, arguing the plaintiff failed to establish an agency relationship between Stewart and Vaughn. The trial court took this motion under advisement and later denied it. The court instructed the jury that Stewart could be held liable for Vaughn's actions, even if she did not directly participate in the trespass, based on principles of agency and joint participation.

Stewart's attorney objected to the jury instructions, noting a prior stipulation that no agency relationship existed between Stewart and Vaughn. The trial court then attempted to clarify that there was no agency matter to consider. After four hours of deliberation, the jury found both Stewart and Vaughn liable, awarding the plaintiff $10,000. Stewart appealed, claiming three errors by the trial court.

Defendant Stewart argues that the trial court erred in providing the plaintiff’s requested jury instruction regarding agency and joint venture, despite the plaintiff's stipulation that no agency relationship existed between Stewart and Vaughn. Stewart also contends that the jury was improperly instructed on punitive damages due to a lack of supporting evidence. Furthermore, Stewart claims that two jury verdicts were inconsistent and therefore null and void. The critical issue is whether the trial court's jury instruction on agency constituted reversible error. The court initially instructed the jury that Stewart could be liable for trespass through her 'active agent or joint participant,' despite the stipulation and lack of evidence for an agency relationship. After an objection, the court told the jury that no agency existed but failed to withdraw the erroneous instruction or provide a correcting charge. Alabama law requires that a trial judge correct any erroneous instruction by clarifying which charge the jury should follow. The trial court's failure to adequately address the erroneous instruction led to confusion in the jury's deliberations. Consequently, the court found this error prejudicial to Stewart, resulting in the reversal of the trial court’s judgment and a remand for further proceedings.