Saranthus v. State

Citations: 501 So. 2d 1247; 1985 Ala. Crim. App. LEXIS 4870Docket: 1 Div. 892

Court: Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama; March 11, 1985; Alabama; State Appellate Court

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Leigh M. Clark, a retired Circuit Judge, notes that a jury convicted Donald Walker Saranthus for intentionally obtaining lodging services without compensation, using a false name, resulting in a loss of $260.21 to Quality Inn, violating Alabama Code 13A-8-10.2. The indictment was deemed sufficient, with the alleged theft qualifying as a Class C felony due to exceeding $100 but not $2,000. Saranthus was sentenced to life imprisonment based on having more than three prior felony convictions, a point not contested on appeal. The court found substantial evidence supporting the conviction, with the defendant not testifying. 

Appellant’s attorney argued that the trial court abused discretion by denying a motion for continuance, claiming prosecutorial misconduct regarding case representations. This motion followed the recusal of a resident judge and the reassignment to retired Judge Telfair J. Mashburn. The motion, filed on May 2, 1984, alleged that the state’s attorney misrepresented the trial schedule during negotiations, stating the defendant would be tried in other cases instead of the current one. It also claimed the prosecutor informed the defense two days before trial that the original charges would not proceed, causing scheduling conflicts for the attorney with other pending cases, including a murder trial.

A ruling on a written motion was not requested until after jury selection had occurred under Judge Mashburn. During a recess, the defendant's attorney informed the judge that the defendant was not ready for trial due to a misunderstanding with the State's attorney. The court sought clarification on what additional evidence or witnesses would impact the case. The defense mentioned witnesses Doug Hall, Mary Hall, and Anita Saranthus, who would testify regarding the defendant's intentions in the case of alleged false registration and failure to pay at a motel. The defendant asserted that these witnesses could clarify his lack of intent to deceive, citing specific circumstances involving his ex-wife and the payment for the motel bill. Despite the discussion, the court denied a motion for a continuance, stating that the manner of requesting it was not approved. Ultimately, the trial court's denial of the continuance was deemed appropriate and not erroneous.

Neither the defendant nor his attorney provided a clear justification for delaying the request to continue the case until after jury selection. The appellant argues that the trial court erred by allowing Assistant District Attorney Jay Kimbrough to testify regarding the appellant's identity. The defense objected to Kimbrough's testimony on the grounds that he had been present throughout the trial and was thus biased. The court overruled the objection, leading to further defense objections and a motion for mistrial, claiming that Kimbrough’s testimony was prejudicial and suggested the appellant had a prior criminal record. The court denied the motion for mistrial. The defense maintained that Kimbrough's testimony aimed to prejudice the jury against the appellant, as he had previously stated he did not know the defendant but still testified about him. Additionally, a witness from Quality Inn confirmed that the defendant registered under the name Ronald Napier in June 1983, identifying him in court despite a difference in appearance (the defendant had a beard at trial but did not have one during registration).

The trial court's decision to overrule the defendant's objection to Mr. Kimbrough's testimony and deny the motion for a mistrial was upheld. The trial judge showed some concern regarding the introduction of Mr. Kimbrough but ultimately found no error in the denial of the mistrial, citing discretion granted under Code of Alabama 1975, § 12-16-233. The court emphasized that the granting of a mistrial falls under the trial judge's broad discretion and should only be revised on appeal if there is a clear abuse of that discretion. The text references past cases to support the principle that a prosecuting attorney may testify, but should withdraw if they know they will be a necessary witness.

Further, during closing arguments, the prosecutor made a remark deemed improper, which led to an objection from the defense and a subsequent motion for mistrial. The trial judge acknowledged the inappropriateness of the language used, advised the prosecutor against such terms, but did not grant a mistrial, indicating the objectionable argument did not warrant such a drastic measure. Ultimately, the trial court's rulings were found to be appropriate and not prejudicial to the defendant, leading to an affirmation of the judgment by the appellate court. The opinion was authored by Retired Circuit Judge Leigh M. Clark and was adopted by the court with unanimous agreement from all judges.